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NATO Burden Sharing: A New Research Agenda

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Current studies on NATO burden sharing only show some weak statistical trends between selective variables; they are unable to explain and show why this trend exists and why it occurred at particular times (or not). This is due to the dominant deductive and hypothesis testing research designs that prevent researchers from producing richer causal explanations or intersubjective understandings of how states, for example, construct and assign meaning to burdens or what forms of social representation, values, norms, and ideals influence the making of (national) burden-sharing decisions. Thus, the literature needs an interpretative turn and to open up to sociological approaches and methodologies highlighting the importance of intersubjective meanings and the role of social forces, norms, beliefs, and values. This article offers one example of how such a new research program might look.

Introduction

The issue of Atlantic burden sharing and how to achieve distributive justice in the alliance has been both contentious and constant since the birth of NATO in 1949 (Lundestad 1998, 2003). Ever since then, NATO’s defense ministers have regularly—and often vociferously, uncompromisingly, and publicly—disagreed about how to reach distributional fairness in running and maintaining an alliance. Robert Gates’s last speech as U.S. Secretary of Defense in June 2011 is no exception in this regard (Gates, 2011) and nicely joins the long history of grumbling about NATO’s burden-sharing regime. What is at stake, Gates laments in his remarks, is no less than the future of the Atlantic alliance sliding into irrelevance unless the Europeans increase their willingness and ability to share more of the collective burden. The inequality stems from those countries, he charges, that are “willing and able to pay the price and bear the burdens of alliance commitments, and those who enjoy the benefits of NATO membership—be they security guarantees or headquarters billets—but don’t want to share the risks and costs.”

Such extensive political disagreements on NATO burden sharing are also reflected, perhaps in a less heated way, in scholarly debates from across the disciplines, including economics, international political economy, and international relations. Each discipline, of course, has claimed to have the best theories at hand to study states’ various behaviors of burden sharing, while quantitative political economists interested in statistical inferences and regression analysis using NATO’s burden-sharing regime as a case study clearly seem to come out on top. Surprisingly, this literature does not cross-fertilize much with other studies on NATO burden sharing; for example, those in international relations and regimes, which has produced a plethora of studies discussing questions of alliance cooperation and conflict (Axelrod 1984; Barnett and Levy 1991; Bennett and Unger 1994; Betts 2003; Boyer 1993; Duffield 1996; Gilpin 1981; Greico 1988; Keohane 1988; Kimball 2010; Kreps 2010; Kupchan 1988; March and Olsen 2004; Palmer 1990; Ringsmose 2010; Snyder 1997, 2002; Walt 1987). Current

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studies not only disregard an extensive body of literature on alliance politics and cooperation, they also miss an important opportunity to relate empirical findings to larger theoretical and methodological burden-sharing debates and, thus, to produce new explanatory values. It is not surprising that the latest proponents of such an approach only reveal that “burden sharing has changed since around 2002 and the start of the war on terror.” [... ] Evidence of this exploitation starts to show up around 2005 and is present in 2010” and “this is indicative of a less cohesive alliance, where many allies have reduced interest in the outputs of NATO” (Sandler and Shimizu 2014, 58–9). Put differently, current NATO burden-sharing studies are good at laying out some (weak) statistical trends, yet they are unable to explain and show why this trend exists and why it occurred at particular times (or not). This, I charge, is not surprising, given the dominant deductive and hypothesis-testing research designs that limit researchers to only make inferences from the statistical analysis (Ibid., 59). They are indeed unable to produce richer causal explanations or intersubjective understandings of, for example, how states construct and assign meaning to burden sharing, or what forms of social representation, values, norms, and ideals influence the making of (national) burden-sharing decisions. Put differently, current rationalist models and theories, which are essentially based on deductive reasoning and methodological individualism, dominate the burden-sharing literature. Moreover, they treat burden sharing as an outcome rather than a practice—that is a practical knowledge of politics, negotiation, and political exchanges of national preference formations for (or against) burden sharing that are based on patterned social activities embodying shared meanings and understandings (Neumann 2002; Pouliot 2010; Schatzki, Knorr Cetina and von Savigny 2001). In other words, even though recent studies clearly have shown the explanatory weakness of such rationalist studies (Oma 2012), I charge that the literature on NATO burden sharing continues to neglect interpretative, sociological approaches and methodologies highlighting the importance of intersubjective meanings and the role of social forces, norms, beliefs, and values that are not derived from material interests and that reflexively inform behavior (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Applied to NATO burden sharing, I argue that such a qualitative, interpretative perspective using a post-positivist methodology would offer an understanding of how states construct and perceive NATO burdens (Foucault and Merand 2012) and how they might be driven in their burden-sharing contributions, for example, by norms of solidarity or a sense of collective identity and thus following a logic of appropriateness rather than one of consequentiality. Again, rationalist studies on burden sharing assuming utility-maximizing states do not provide analytical space for such perspectives, are therefore analytically restrictive, and are missing an important analytical perspective of such a highly politicized subject.

The purpose of this article is to critically engage with what is called the “conventional” thinking on Atlantic burden sharing. This is done by reviewing and critiquing the extensive theoretical literature on NATO burden sharing. Such critical reflection will identify gaps and suggests to increase the explanatory value of burden-sharing practices by focusing on new (qualitative) variables to better understand the sociological formation of state motivations for sharing collective burdens in very specific yet distinct situational environments. Those motivations are not independent from states’ definitions of burden sharing and are analytically prior to measuring burden sharing as an outcome (which is the current practice). This article then offers suggestions of how to include post-positivist theories and methodologies into current burden-sharing debates.

The article proceeds in three steps. First, there is a review of the relevant literature on NATO burden sharing in the field of international relations, especially the one on international regimes, and reminds the reader of its richness as well as its theoretical finesses. It thereby shows that current burden-sharing studies are disconnected from other relevant literatures in the field of international relations. Second, the article provides theoretical critiques of that dominantly rationalist body of literature. The third step is aimed at deducing possible future avenues of research and an entirely redesigned research program on NATO burden sharing. Due to space limitations, this last step can only be exploratory rather than comprehensive.  

Conventional Thinking on Burden Sharing

The literature on Atlantic burden sharing is primarily dominated by rationalist theories and explanations assuming utility-maximizing states. It can broadly be subdivided into power-based and interest-based theories of international regimes (Hasenclever, Mayer, and Ritterberger 1997). The latter are associated primarily with neoliberal theories of international cooperation, and the former with realist theories of international relations, which have been extremely influential in the NATO burden-sharing literature (Donnelly 1992; Gilpin 1981; Grieco 1988; Snidal 1986; Snyder 1984, 1997, 2002).

Alliance Alignment and Management

Ontologically speaking, power-based theories often suggest system-level perspectives that are state centered and are concerned with traditional concepts of statecraft (e.g., the balance of power or balance of threat regimes), the nature of the international structure of states, and the polarity of the international system (Claude 1962; Gulick 1955; Haas 1953; Morgenthau 1948). They charge that the distribution of power resources among allies strongly affects the effectiveness and persistence of regimes, because in a balance of power regime, states either rival each other (balance) or bandwagon with a power bloc in the system (Jones 2003; Kaufman 1992; Walt 1987). While operating under conditions of anarchy and without the presence of an international political authority (Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller 1995; Buzan, Jones, and Little 1993; Oye 1986), the distribution and alignment of material power capabilities in the system establishes the motivations for revisionist states to challenge the existing order, which in turn affects burden-sharing decisions in alliance contexts. For neo-realists, the distribution of power is the key independent variable to understand international outcomes such as war, peace, alliance politics, and the balance of power. Balancing refers to a social act in which weaker states join either a stronger power or a coalition of powers (e.g., alliances). It also prescribes a hierarchy of international politics whereby a limited number of great powers dominate the structure of the international system while a larger number of middle and small powers engage in either balancing or bandwagoning behaviors. Stephen Walt reminds us that states usually balance and rarely bandwagon (Walt 1987), and the reason states wage war or challenge an alliance is because they are concerned about their own security and survival, and power is conceived of as a means to achieve greater national security (Waltz 1979).

In terms of alliance management (Snyder 1997) (e.g., inter-alliance bargaining over military planning, costs and financing, preparedness, and coordination in the event of crisis), this power-based logic suggests that an ally with large military capabilities can provide a surplus of security to the alliance and is likely to dominate it, while less militarily capable states are expected to enjoy the public goods the alliance provides without paying for it, which equals a behavior of free riding. Phrased differently, the distribution of alliance benefits, as
the sociological-psychological literature on coalition theories charges, are the result of relative capabilities of states (Caplow 1968). Moreover, allies that value the alliance the least or have better alternatives will be more inclined to lobby other allies for stronger alliance commitments or offer some side payments in alliance negotiations in exchange for sharing more of the collective burden. There are two principal sources of conflict in alliance politics (or bargaining): alliance entanglement and alliance abandonment (Mastanduno 1981; Snyder 1984), which have been labeled the “alliance security dilemma,” even though they may better be referred to as “trade-offs” (Snyder 2002). Both can be subsumed under the alliance dependence literature on NATO burden sharing.

At the same time, such a view provides scholars and analysts of international politics with a clear idea of what units of analysis are worth examining (or not). From a conceptual point of view, the focus of these power-based theories rests on major powers, and unless middle powers are engaged in serious balancing activities or show revisionist ambitions in the international system, they are irrelevant (Wight 1973, 1977; Wight, Bull, and Holbraad 1978). It is hardly surprising, therefore, that middle or small powers were not the primary units of analysis of burden-sharing studies during the Cold War.

Collective Action Model
Relying on public-choice theories in the field of rational institutionalism (Ostrom 1998; 1; Shesposle 2008), the seminal study of Olson and Zeckhauser conceives alliances as institutions that provide the common public good of collective defense. A public good is defined as the common interest of a group of individual actors (Olson 1965; Olson and Zeckhauser 1966). They charge that “[w]hen a nation decides how large a military force to provide in an alliance, it must consider the value it places in collective defense and the other nondefense goods that must be sacrificed to obtain additional military forces” (Olson and Zeckhauser 1966). Following a deductive logic of analysis, public-good theorists argue that if collective defense is assumed to be a purely public good, then the benefits of that public good are expected to be non-rival and non-excludable (Samuelson 1954). The former denotes a condition whereby a unit of the public good could be consumed by a member state without diminishing the availability of the good (and thus its benefits) for consumption by others. Benefits of a public good are non-excludable “if they cannot be withheld at an affordable cost by the good’s provider”—that is, no member can effectively be excluded from enjoying the good (Sandler and Hartley 1999).

In short, the non-rival and non-excludability assumptions mean that the exclusion of one member of the group from consuming the good is not feasible economically and that unless side payments or coercion are applied, large groups are less likely to produce collective goods. The opposite applies as well: The smaller the group, according to Olson, the greater the prospects to find sponsors, because at least one member of the group is expected to have sufficient interests in the good to provide payments towards it (1965, 49f).

The model provided two insights for the NATO burden-sharing debate. First, theorists noted that the more powerful states should disproportionately higher contributions insofar as their share of the collective burden is concerned. This is also known as the “exploitation hypothesis” (McGuire 1990; Sandler and Hartley 1995). In 1970, for example, the United States accounted for more than 70 percent of NATO’s defense spending while Germany, France, and the UK each assumed less than 6 percent of the burden. Analysts used this opportunity to make a causal link between the level of national defense spending and the issue of burden sharing (Oneal 1990a, 1990b; Oneal and Elrod 1989), and calculated states’ level of defense spending against their ability to pay (GDP) to measure national burden shares (Chalmers 2000).

Second, because of the imbalance of power in an alliance, there is a systematic tendency among middle powers to contribute less to the collective benefit of the public goods than they receive from it. This free riding or exploitation occurs when non-payers of the good continue to enjoy it despite their lack of payments. In such cases, the benefits of the public good were received regardless of whether payments toward it were made, which has negative effects for the collective welfare of the alliance. Nonetheless, theorists argued that the public good can be provided under two conditions (Olson 1965): First, those allies who value it the most are expected to contribute to providing it while those that did not are assumed to engage in free riding. Olson calls this the “privileged group.” In that case, individual states have an incentive to not reveal their demand for the good and conceal the value they attach to the good. Second, the public good can be provided in cases where the group of states is relatively small.

Joint Product Model
A variant of this public-choice theory—called the joint product model—explores Olson’s economic theory of collective action. Yet it retained a heavily rationalist flavor using primarily a comparative static methodology yielding a testable hypothesis, namely that states do not only contribute to the public good exclusively for public but also for private benefits (Hansen et al. 1990; McGuire 1990; Murdoch and Sandler 1982, 1984; Russett 1970; Sandler and Murdoch 1986; van Ypersele de Strihou 1967). Private benefits provided in collective action situations are not equally available to all members of a group; they can only be enjoyed by a few selected states. Moreover, some analysts have shown that as private benefits increase in importance, the likelihood of free riding declines (Sandler and Forbes 1980). Those private benefits could be subdivided into strategic or nonstrategic components or weapon types (Hansen et al. 1990). Following this logic, one could hypothesize that some states contribute to the public good, because they are striving to receive private goods (or benefits) from the major powers while avoiding being perceived as free riders (Betts 2003; Hartley and Sandler 1999).

However, the possibility of receiving private benefits makes the good impure. Moreover, the model suggests that there are degrees of purity in collective goods (Murdoch and Sandler 1982; Sandler 1977; Sandler and Cauley 1975; Sandler, Cauley, and Forbes 1980), or that a public good can be public within a country but private between countries, or impure both within and between countries (Pauly 1970).

Hegemonic Stability Theory
Following these (rationalist) lines of argument suggests that the internal asymmetry of an alliance can work to its advantage in a way that only an outstanding economic and political power has the ability to lead an alliance, to force payments upon allies, and to ensure the alliance’s effectiveness and robustness (Olson and Zeckhauser 1966, 134–35; Fröhlich, Oppenheimer, and Young 1971; Gilpin and Gilpin 1987; Thies 2003). Scholars in the field of international political economy (and subsequently international relations) made use of these insights and maintained that a so-called hegemonic stability theory can be considered an application of Olson’s theory of collective action and a specific theoretical account of international regimes (Hasenclever et al. 1997; Oneal and Elrod 1989). Like collective action theory, hegemonic stability theory also originated in the discipline of economics and was then imported into the field of international political economy (Kindleberger 1973). It also belongs to the family of power-based theories of international regimes (van Ham 1997) and charges that the effectiveness of international regimes is dependent on the unipolar configuration of power in particular issue areas (e.g., burden sharing). More specifically, hegemonic stability theory argues that international stability could be considered an international public good (Kindleberger 1973).
and seeks to explain under which conditions as well as when and why states pursue cooperation (or confrontation) in international regimes. Regarding the robustness of international regimes—that is, their resilience or “staying power” (Hasenclever et al. 1997)—it finds that when conditions of a unipolar power structure in a given regime disappear, the regime itself is likely to become ineffective or even break down. Regimes are established and maintained by actors who hold outstanding power resources (or a preponderance of power) that are relevant to the particular issue area. In turn, regimes decline or decrease their effectiveness—that is, when members stop abiding by their norms and rules (Underdal 1992; Young 1994)—when the power resources become more equally distributed across the group (Keohane 1980).

Duncan Snidal introduced two new variants to hegemonic stability theory—both of which had implications for NATO burden sharing. The first was that of a “benevolent leader” who provides the public good unilaterally while other members of the alliance are alleviated from sharing the burden of this public good or maintaining the regime (Snidal 1985). However, this “exploitation of the great by the small,” Snidal notes, does not necessarily mean that the hegemon’s net gains—that is, benefits received from the good minus its provisions—from providing this good is smaller than those received by the free-riding countries. In other words, the hegemon’s net benefits may well exceed those of the free-riders, which pays rents to the hegemon. This logic, however, does not denote that states would not cooperate at all; they do so, for example, by adjusting their policies in order to achieve common goals in the context of agreed-upon rules or regimes (“first-order cooperation” in specific issue areas that are mutually beneficial) (Keohane 1980). When costs to provide these rules are provided by two or more states, the literature speaks of “second-order cooperation” (Axelrod and Keohane 1986; Zangl 1994), which is logically impossible for hegemonic stability theorists, especially when it comes to questions of rulemaking and enforcement.

The second variant is the “coercive leadership model.” In line with Robert Gilpin’s work on war and peace, Snidal charges that the global hegemon is compelled to produce international public goods (Gilpin 1981). What distinguishes Snidal’s two variants of the hegemonic stability theory is that in the latter version the hegemon is not assumed to necessarily bear the costs for providing the public good simply because the interests in the good are so high that it bears the costs itself. Rather, because of its superior power predispositions, the global hegemon forces other states within the group to contribute to the supply of the good. This effectively means that the hegemon can “tax” or sanction other states for their inability or unwillingness to share the burden. While some analysts have asserted that the exploitation hypothesis may be inconsistent with the realist’s assumptions that states generally have a low tolerance for relative losses (which brings realism and especially neoliberal theories in close contact), it should be noted that contrary to neoliberal assumptions, the distribution of interests in the benevolent leadership model is based on power and resources and, thus, the distribution thereof. Second, the exploitation hypothesis does not imply that the hegemon necessarily experiences a relative loss to other states (even though this may be the case). To be sure, this form of taxation can occur at different degrees and levels of coercion (i.e., persuasion, bribes), and these two models are not necessarily mutually exclusive; a combination of coercive and benevolent hegemony is possible (Yarbrough and Yarbrough 1987).10

Theoretical Limitations of These Rationalist Theories of NATO Burden Sharing
The end of the Cold War problematized these static models of collective action, regimes, and order at the political level. This has been much overlooked in the literature on burden sharing. Some allies took the opportunity to complain about the imbalance of sharing the Atlantic burden (New York Times 1988a, 1988b; United States Committee on Armed Services 1988).

10 For a critique of Snidal’s models, see Alt, Culver, and Humes 1988; Lake 1993.

In this section, I summarize the explanatory weaknesses of rationalist theories of NATO burden sharing at the conceptual level; I have discussed them elsewhere in greater detail (Zyla 2015b, Chapter 2). The next section then discusses what a new research design on NATO burden sharing might look like to overcome some of the gaps identified here. First, with the end of the Cold War, NATO’s public good of collective defense received a new meaning, and crisis management in fragile and failed states became a new public good (Dorussen et al. 2009). Above all, it required NATO to have expeditionary force capabilities (rather than conventional forces) that were able to deploy to those new crisis-management missions and at the same time engage in state-building activities in war-torn societies (Farrell, Rynning, and Terriff 2013). NATO public-choice theorists recognized this but could not include this in their models by way of intervening variables. Naturally, they can only make inferences about those geopolitical changes; they are unable, however, to gain access to the new meanings that the new public good provided for each ally and how it defined their role, identity, and willingness to share collective burdens in the alliance.

Second, the public-choice model provides limited value for understanding state behavior in the post-Cold War era because, ontologically speaking, it focuses nearly exclusively on the material aspects of power. It clearly neglects nonmaterialist or social factors (causally) influencing states’ motivations for sharing collective burdens (March and Olsen 1998; Risse 2004).11 In other words, while power-based theories of international regimes focus exclusively on major wars and the balancing behavior of states, they deny an analytical perspective below the surface of the state, as well as an unpacking of the value and instrumentally rational motivations and interests of social agents within states and their definitions of burden sharing. Excluded from the analysis are variables such as status, prestige, recognition, values of freedom and democracy, the rule of law, and international justice in states’ burden-sharing decision-making processes. This is to underline that NATO burden sharing indeed is not an outcome but a social behavior showing agency. An interpretative research approach, I charge, would allow such perspective and enrich the debate.

Third, states do not exclusively seek relative but also absolute gains in their burden-sharing, decision-making process, following a logic of appropriateness. In turn, those practices must be contextualized in the explanations, in addition to what domestic variable analyses are able to offer (Bennett, Leggold, and Unger 1994).

Fourth, Olson and Zeckhauser’s rationalist theory and logic of collective-action employs are ontologically overly restrictive and make it hardly applicable to a real world setting: the defense of the alliance is not exclusively a pure public good—that is, fully joint and non-excludable; alliances are also known to produce more than one single public good (i.e., collective defense).

Fifth, the collective action models presume that allies decide on the size of their contributions in isolation (Russett 1970; Sandler 1977)—that is, without consulting with their allies and partners (Cornes and Sandler 1984a, 1984b)—and that they are engaged in only one activity at a time (Strange 1987). This is an oversimplification of reality that distorts the analysis of burden sharing (Oma 2012; Zyla 2015b). These assumptions are also unrealistic and analytically restrictive as allies regularly engage in both behaviors through, for example, negotiations in the North Atlantic Council etc. (Asmus, Kugler, and Larrabee 1993; Dufield 1994–95). Alliances are by nature cooperative, and their national preferences determine the extent to which they contribute to the Atlantic burden-sharing regime (Boyer 1993; Kimball 2010; Sandler and Forbes 1980).

Sixth, it is assumed that alliance defense is equally and efficiently produced among all allies and that those costs are exclusively of an economic rather than a political nature (e.g., Sandler and Shimizu 2014). However, this oversimplification actually ignores the potential benefits of multinational cost variation and the comparative advantage that states may
have in producing or contributing to collective goods. It also disregards, as Mark Boyer (1993) shows, the possibility of trading between smaller and major powers in providing the public good. Smaller allies may find themselves unable to devote a sizable amount of their armed forces or military equipment to a particular collective good. At the same time, they may make sizeable contributions in related issue areas (e.g., nonmilitary assistance for rebuilding war-torn states) and may indirectly contribute to the collective good. Put simply, collective-action theorists’ assumption is unidimensional; it excludes the possibility that allies produce more than one public good, that they trade those goods amongst themselves (Ibid., 32), and fails to explain why.

Seventh, based on the above, the public-good model can be characterized as rather static and unresponsive to processes of socialization that are undoubtedly taking place in an alliance (cf. logic of socialization and internalization; Christiansen, Jørgensen, and Wiener 2001; Gheciu 2005). In short, the new world order was not about increasing power capabilities, the balance of power, or bandwagoning and renders the old story of challenging existing orders obsolete. It is here where rationalist theories reach their explanatory limits.

Seventh, as numerous studies have shown, the collective-action model does not withstand empirical analysis, especially the strong free riding or the non-provision of the public-good hypothesis (Alfano and Marwell 1981; Marwell and Ames 1979, 1980; Sweeney 1973). The free-riding hypothesis also does not hold in other issue areas beyond NATO, as Eiko Thielemann (2003) very convincingly shows. More recently, others argued that in the context of the European security governance regime, poorer European states have not exploited the richer ones (Dorussen, Kirchner, and Splerling 2009).

In sum, against this backdrop, we can conclude that rationalist models of burden sharing clearly hit their explanatory ceiling. What is needed to push the explanatory envelope are studies that can explain and understand the social actions of burden sharing and the preference formation of states for or against sharing collective burdens. Above all, the power lust and zero-sum game argument of rationalist burden-sharing theories whose main tenets rest on power and interests that determine the degree of states’ material capabilities and influence abroad is too restrictive. Indeed, rationalists’ static assumptions about states’ power and interests portray a corset-like picture of international behavior that states are bound to follow. Above all, they assume that social actors’ preferences are stable over time, which helps theorists to construct epistemologically motivated theories of international relations (Hasenclever et al. 1997). Such ontology, however, denies an analytical perspective on the processes and ways in which national preferences (or interests) are formed, and how they (can) change over time. Therefore, it prevents a deeper explanation of social behavior.

Implications and New Directions

Due to the limitations outlined above, one must conclude that the ontological and epistemological assumptions of rationalist theories of NATO burden sharing are overly reductionist, parsimonious, simplified, and static. They clearly lack a post-positivist perspective that produces much richer and deeper causal explanations of state motivations for (or against) sharing NATO burdens—that is, to understand states’ intersubjective social structures and definitions of and motivations for (or against) sharing collective burdens. As Checkel (2007) reminds us, it is not merely the cost-benefit analysis that determines states’ motivations for collective action but also societal norms, values, and beliefs. Indeed, an interpretive approach to understanding the influence of social representation and power structures on states’ notions of distributive fairness in alliance is entirely missing from the burden-sharing literature. One could hypothesize, for example, that states might be motivated in their burden-sharing decisions by a logic of appropriateness (rather than consequentiality), suggesting that they are following institutional (NATO) rules, because they are seen as natural, expected, and legitimate or as fulfilling their obligations or living up to a specific identity in a security community (March and Olsen 1998). Put differently, I suggest, a qualitative, interpretative research design of questions of NATO burden sharing in a non-rationalist (or social) ontology and qualitative methods (e.g., discourse analysis or process tracing) would help us to understand 1) how each ally defines NATO’s public good domestically; 2) how and why collective burdens are constructed, and what burden sharing means for stakeholders; 3) what meaning states assign to NATO’s public goods and in what particular institutional and geopolitical contexts (Geertz 1973, 5); 4) what value-rational (rather than instrumentally rational) motivation drives states’ burden-sharing behavior (e.g., traditions, trust, reciprocity, responsibility, status) (Weber 1947); and 5) how national burden-sharing values are negotiated and potentially traded in NATO’s political marketplace of ideas and meanings.

How would such a research design look? The strategic culture research program, I charge, has much to offer to NATO burden-sharing studies in order to explain its explanatory values and fill some of the gaps identified above. Strategic culture research is a relatively young body of literature and has attracted some significant interest over the past few years (cf. Berenskoetter 2005; Farrell et al. 2002; Giegerich 2006). To start with, it has shown, for example, how states’ deep-seated shared norms, beliefs, and ideas regarding the means and ends of national security have affected states’ behavior and constructed national identities (Lock 2010, 692). This could be relevant to understand NATO members’ burden-sharing practices and the values they hold vis-à-vis burden sharing in general.

Second, strategic cultures have been conceptualized as deeply ingrained, identity-derived collective expectations of what is appropriate behavior, which could be relevant, for example, to understand what things pay for when NATO is asking for funding or troops for military operations.

Third, strategic cultures are the “property of collectivities” (Duffield 1998) rather than individuals; that is, they are held and shared by most (if not all) members of society or its political elite rather than by individuals or dominant stakeholders. This is an important insight in the sense that it allows us to bridge the agent-structure debate in the context of alliances and explain member states’ behavior. It would provide a strong understanding of how ideational variables (intervening or independent) affect alliance behavior(s).

Fourth, because of their complex and interconnected integral components, strategic cultures are resistant toward change (Berger 1996; Eckstein 1988; Legro 1995; Lijphart 1980). They are unique to states, not transferrable, stable, and heavily depend upon specific societal contexts (Elkins and Simeon 1979). This is relevant with regards to NATO burden sharing as it would mean that cultural predispositions vis-à-vis NATO burden sharing do not change easily within states. One would thus expect a longitudinal cultural continuity, which could be studied.

Fifth, the strategic-culture literature allows analysts of NATO burden sharing to focus on the individual level of analysis (rather than the state). As John Duffield reminds us, institutional sources of national predispositions of alliances are “likely to reside in the central government organs charged with the formulation and execution of policy” (Duffield 1998). Indeed, they represent a “negotiated reality” of those societal predispositions, because political elites are not only the primary holders but also the gatekeepers of societal norms, beliefs and ideas regarding national security issues (“spokesperson”). Elites function as an aggregate panel that accumulates diverse sets of norms, beliefs, and values of civil society and processes and translates these norms in a publicly accessible language (e.g., through security strategies, policy white papers, or policy memos). Since (political) elites in the respective
parliaments and bureaucracies of NATO member states primarily make decisions on NATO burden sharing in a very specific social context, they become an essential focus of analysis for an interpretative research design on burden sharing as elites “homogenize” norms that are vaguely expressed and shared by members of society and weigh them up against one another. To understand how this process works, which social actors learn from their peers and how (e.g., through speech acts; see Barnes 2001; Neumann and Helika 2005) and establish the “other” in their own strategic identity (e.g., through discourses; see Freedman 2006) as well as how certain strategic values, beliefs and ideas are internalized and processed, is important to understand for burden-sharing researchers.

In sum, insights from the strategic culture literature might help us to better understand the normative continuity/discontinuity of burden-sharing norms in alliances and strategic behavior in alliances more generally, also over time (see Meyer 2005; Norheim-Martinsen 2011, 2013; Zyla 2015a). Moreover, an empirical analysis of burden-sharing norms and beliefs could predict (at least to a certain degree) whether the “strategic behavior of collective actor ‘a’ is possible on the grounds of defending a norm ‘y’ against violation” (Meyer 2005), which makes it theoretically and practically causally (Johnston 1995: 35). That is to say, strategic cultures can guide foreign policy decisions on burden sharing, reveal state intentions of or against sharing those burdens, and outline expectations and regulations of those burden-sharing policies and practices (Dannreuther and Peterson 2013: 2). Strategic culture can be seen/interpreted as a cause of strategic policy (e.g., how much to spend on NATO) and behavior (how much to share NATO’s various burdens). It also assumes agency, as well as social representation, which is analytically prior to considering burden sharing as a static outcome (the way the literature currently conceptualizes burden sharing). Indeed, the rationalist literature on Atlantic burden sharing, as discussed in the previous sections above, cannot account for cultural variables; this is due to their quest for parsimony (Bloomfield 2012, 437; see also Glenn 2009, 523).

Yet, as Bloomfield (2012) reminds us, while the strategic culture literature has achieved significant progress in understanding the influence of cultural variables in foreign policy decisions, there remain a number of gaps in that literature. This could be a treasure trove for burden-sharing researchers. To start with, there is the claim that strategic culture is conceptualized as being “too coherent” and “too continuous.” The former excuses the strategic culture literature having difficulties explaining abnormal strategic behaviors of states that are, perhaps, rooted in their deep cultural dispositions, their societies, or individuals. Some analysts speak of subcultures (ibid.; Massie 2008) that compete for influence over strategic decision-making and influence the respective national strategic culture of states; they are also less stable than the strategic cultures. All this needs further explanation, especially how, for example, political parties, ethnic groups, or national institutions affect these subcultures and determine how NATO burdens should be constructed in the domestic policy as well as what (military) operation and ally needs attention. The “too continuous” gap suggests that certain models of strategic culture do not allow for changes in strategic behavior suggesting strategic-cultural continuity and remain overly descriptive rather than analytical.

Second, while the positivist literature on burden sharing cherishes the quantitative measuring of variables (e.g., percentage of GDP spent on NATO etc.), the constructivist literature on alliances has yet to find an answer to the question whether ideas can be measured and ranked vis-à-vis competing ideas as well as how they can be compared to those material variables.

Third and related, it is far from clear at this point what kind of variables ideas are: intervening or independent variables? While earlier constructivist scholarship seems to suggest the latter (Wendt 1999), some strategic culture studies appear to suggest the former (Gray 1999).

Fourth, the literature on norms might also be a fruitful avenue to inform the post-positivist analysis of NATO burden sharing. Generally speaking, norms are defined as “inter-subjective beliefs about the social and natural world that define actors, their situations, and the possibilities of action” (Wendt 1995). Norms, according to Katzenstein, are social facts, which set standards of appropriate behavior and express the agents’ identities (see also Finnemore 2003; Katzenstein 1996; Klotz 1995). Thus, norms have an “oughtness” character—that is, a prescriptive element describing how things ought to be in the world (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). With regards to NATO burden sharing, can we, for example, conceptualize NATO’s current 2 percent benchmark that states ought to spend on common defense as an institutional norm? If so, how is that norm informed by state’s knowledge of their social and political relations (e.g., symbols, rules, concepts, categories, and meanings) that shape the way in which individuals construct and interpret the world? More generally, how do norms help those actors to situate themselves in relation to other social actors, to interpret their interests and actions, and to foster group identification inside the alliance?

Conclusion

The work of Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser has been extremely influential in studying NATO burden sharing and continues to be the starting point for almost any study on that subject. At the same time, as this article has shown, this scholarship left a significant gap in the literature, because it is heavily influenced by a rationalist epistemology that has transcended into other fields of study (e.g., international relations). It is particularly inspired by scholars belonging to the family of power- and interest-based regime theories and is primarily informed by deductive reasoning and methodological individualism. Above all, burden sharing is conceived as a static outcome rather than a social process where norms, values, beliefs, and culture can be considered a variable explaining states’ burden-sharing decisions and behavior. However, analytically speaking, these processes and especially states’ motivations or preferences for (or against) sharing NATO burdens are not only analytically prior to studying burden-sharing outcomes, they also require scientific explanations, contextualization, and intersubjective understandings, because they influence states’ foreign policy decision-making processes to the extent that states want to contribute to NATO’s public good. After having listed and discussed eight theoretical and conceptual limitations of the dominant rationalist scholarship on NATO burden sharing, the article suggested that we need a post-positivist turn in the NATO burden-sharing literature (Keohane 1988; Foucault and Merand 2012) in order to push the explanatory envelope and provide new insights into, for example, what normative predispositions states hold vis-à-vis NATO burden sharing, what forms of social representation are at play and in what particular situational contexts they unfold (or not). In short, the NATO burden-sharing literature needs a qualitative turn with a new epistemology that can push the analytical boundaries beyond quantifications of state contributions. I outlined in the last section an example of how the NATO burden-sharing research design could be pushed to new explanatory heights by leaning on the (constructivist) strategic culture literature.

REFERENCES


Success after Stalemate? Persistence, Reiteration, and Windows of Opportunity in Multilateral Negotiations

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Counter to conventional wisdom, stalemates in multilateral negotiations occasionally contribute to productive future negotiations. With evidence from the history of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), this article demonstrates significant and often overlooked processes within international organizations with large, heterogeneous compositions which have contributed to successful negotiations after stalemates, including reconsideration of failed proposals, reiteration of norms, and a special relationship to windows of opportunity. The article builds on scholarship on international negotiations, international organizations, and policy development. Despite large international organizations’ appearance of ineffectiveness during contentious periods, their role in laying constructive groundwork can prove catalytic even during short windows of opportunity.

Introduction

The productive potential of stalemates in multilateral negotiations is often overlooked. Scholarship on international negotiation suggests a wide range of factors that facilitate reaching multilateral agreements, such as leadership qualities, unequal power distribution among parties, commonalities among negotiating parties, issue characteristics, or conducive institutional arrangements (e.g., absence of consensual decision-making rules, distance from media, effective secretariats or working groups) (Narlikar 2010; Faure 2012; Druckman 2001; Zartman and Rubin 2000; Prantl 2010; Bercovitch and Lutmar 2010; Boyer 2012). Despite their obvious drawbacks, stalemates also merit attention for the foundations they sometimes provide for future negotiations. Under what conditions might failures in multilateral negotiations serve as opportunities and through which processes might stalemates contribute constructively to successful negotiations? With evidence from the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) /Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), this article counter-intuitively argues that stalemates can, in fact, serve a useful purpose.

Typically, stalemates are viewed negatively for reinforcing disagreements and for undermining the efficiency and reputation of an international organization (IO). However, a few scholars note that failure to reach agreement may sometimes be a temporary dynamic with

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2. The CSCE refers to a series of conferences among thirty-five states (the United States, European states, the USSR and Canada) that were launched in 1973. After developing a secretariat and permanent organs in the early 1990s, the CSCE became the OSCE in January 1995.
positive effects in subsequent decision-making processes (Boyer 2012, 221; Bercovitch and Lutman 2010, 239; Faure 2012, 357–58). Yet gaps remain in our understanding of how stalemates can serve as stepping stones for future progress in multilateral negotiations, and there is a dearth of empirical evidence on conditions under which these processes are (or are not) observed. The question of how a standing international body might facilitate “snatching victory from the jaws of defeat” has great empirical and theoretical relevance for the study and practice of international negotiation.

In what ways might stalemates perform useful functions? Jacob Bercovitch and Carmela Lutman argue that stalemates “create opportunities,” for, “if nothing else, they at least provide us with signposts as to the real state of the negotiation” (2010, 239). Similarly, Guy Oliver Faure states that incomplete negotiations can be constructive in “developing a channel for discussion, testing the other, knowing more about the other party and the overall situation, or getting recognized by the other as a legitimate counterpart” (2012, 357). Moreover, “actors are not inclined to naively reproduce the model as they would do in the case of a negotiation considered as successful or at least completed” (Faure 2012, 358). This article builds on these insights and elaborates additional mechanisms relevant to large multilateral conferences and international organizations that regularly convene like-minded and non-like-minded states.

One effect of stalemates in large multilateral conferences and in IOs with recurring meetings is that state representatives become acutely aware of points of agreement and contention at regular intervals. By issuing restatements of prior commitments and reconsidering failed proposals, negotiators intermittently probe the “ripeness” of a historical moment and keep norms alive for future negotiations (see Zartman 2008; Thomas 2001). If a change in political will occurs, representatives may be able to easily assess where they can break through impasses, in part because a structure is in place to facilitate actors’ willingness to cooperate. In other words, recurring multilateral meetings enable much groundwork to be done in advance (Hecht 2012). This feature is underemphasized in the literature. Although stalemates occur frequently in heterogeneous compositions, particularly in those with consensus decision-making rules, persistence is a valuable characteristic of negotiators that can generate significant rewards. When a large group of diverse states reaches agreement on a norm, it sends a signal of broad legitimacy underpinning the norm.

Regarding generalizability, although the empirical focus of this article is on multilateral negotiations on norms and policies for democratic governance and human rights, the analysis is relevant to other norm sets, including trade, development, or environmental protection. Beyond the CSCE/OSCE and UNGA, the findings are most applicable to multilateral conferences or IOs with large, heterogeneous compositions, such as the OAS or WTO (as opposed to IOs or groups with smaller, more homogeneous memberships, e.g., of democratic states, such as the EU or NATO).

The CSCE/OSCE3 and UNGA were selected because of their historic importance convening multilateral conferences and as large, heterogeneous IOs with wide variation in their ability to elaborate norms and implementation policies over time, as well as ample examples of stalemates. The CSCE/OSCE has been governed by consensus decision-making rules,4 while many decisions in the UNGA can be made by simple majority of those present and voting.5 This study does not aim to systematically analyze all of the factors that contribute to overcoming stalemates or that have influenced the development of democracy and human rights norms in the CSCE/OSCE and UNGA. Rather, by emphasizing the relevance of certain

3. While many IOs comprise member states, the CSCE/OSCE has comprised participating states. The CSCE/OSCE has operated without a legal founding document and legal personality, thus, its decisions have been politically, rather than legally, binding. Following accession of states of the former Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, as well as Mongolia, today the CSCE comprises fifty-seven participating states.
5. Many resolutions, however, are adopted by consensus. Important issues such as the budget, peace and security, admissions decisions, and elections to the UN Security Council are decided by a two-thirds majority.
opportunity (2007, 4–5; Kingdon 1984). For example, agreement on the IADC benefited from the convergence of three processes: a) anti-democratic practices of the Fujimori government in Peru in 2000 were identified as a problem, serving as a focusing event (and window of opportunity) for negotiators to extend the OAS democracy agenda beyond Resolution 1080; b) after Fujimori’s resignation, responses were conceived as the insertion of a “democracy clause” into the 2001 Quebec Summit document, and c) leadership was provided by Lloyd Axworthy, Thomas Pickering, César Gaviria, and Pérez de Cuéllar to identify and capitalize on the opening (Tomlin 2007, 6–10). Although a draft charter was blocked by stalemate at an OAS General Assembly meeting in June 2001, delegates achieved consensus after subsequent revisions and reconsideration on 11 September 2001 (Tomlin 2007, 11).

As Tomlin argues, “Typically, a policy window opens because the policy agenda is affected by a change or event in the political stream, or by the emergence of a pressing problem that captures the attention of decision makers” (2007, 5). Another example, albeit with a smaller group than the full UN membership, is the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which in 1998 was fairly quickly negotiated after several decades of stalemate as decision makers responded to prevent future atrocities and had gained support from experience with ad-hoc tribunals in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia (see Fehl 2004, 360–62). Moreover, negotiators must recognize and capitalize on a window of opportunity (Tomlin 2007, 5; Doener and Eidenfalk 2013, 392–93).

How can certain institutions facilitate overcoming stalemates? Scholars have noted that it is difficult to predict and identify a window of opportunity in advance (Doener and Eidenfalk 2013, 393; Mahoney 2000). Despite perceptions of inefficiency, reconsideration of norms or policy instruments provides multilateral negotiators with opportunities to probe the “ripeness” of a moment. If Proposition 1 is correct, I expect to find evidence of the continuity and evolution of aspects of states’ proposals as articulated at key CSCE/OSCE and UNGA meetings in prior years, which are subsequently re-inserted into negotiations which overcome stalemate and achieve a broad agreement to codify new norms during favorable policy windows. This article demonstrates that such mechanisms influenced the CSCE’s Charter of Paris, concluding documents of the CSCE Copenhagen and Moscow Human Dimension Conferences in 1990–91, and the development of election observation norms in the UN system.

A related, yet distinct proposition emphasizes the formal durability of agreements made in multilateral conferences and international organizations with large, heterogeneous compositions and the role of reiterative processes in overcoming stalemates related to the implementation of commitments.

Proposition 2: After norms are codified, multilateral conferences and international organizations with large, heterogeneous compositions that convene on a regular basis are well placed to ensure the (formal) perpetuation of their commitments. Norm restatements and reconsideration of failed policy proposals occasionally support negotiators in overcoming stalemates regarding the implementation of commitments during windows of opportunity.

The practice of issuing restatements of prior commitments and reconsidering failed proposals prevents earlier achievements from falling through the cracks and keeps them alive for future negotiations (see Thomas 2001, 196–97). As Thomas Farer argues, “Restatement is one way of rescuing [Article 25 of the ICCPR] from inanimation” (2004, 37). This imagery of saving a norm from starvation vividly conveys that norm restatements are often an important strategy for infusing new life into multilateral commitments and for potentially overcoming certain stalemates related to implementation.

Insights from international law underscore the significance of reiterative processes in maintaining the relevancy of an existing norm. According to Samuel Bleicher, “Re-citation can distinguish significant resolutions from the thousands of others that the [UN General Assembly] has passed” (1969, 453). Moreover, “the persistent re-citation of a given resolution indicates that it embodies a view of the community which has some continuity, rather than an ephemeral ‘accident’ of General Assembly politics” (Bleicher 1969, 453). A frequently reiterated norm is viewed to have more significant, timeless content and is expected to be more binding than others (Bleicher 1969, 454). Similarly, Wayne Sandholtz and Kendall Stiles argue that higher numbers of precedents exert greater influence, as do more recent precedents, which are viewed as more relevant to current negotiations than earlier precedents (2006, 17–8). Diana Panke highlights two additional motivations behind repeated UNGA resolutions: a) incrementalist strategies, in which negotiators repeat resolutions to optimize the language of the resolution or the number of supportive votes, thereby strengthening international law and b) symbolic politics, in which negotiators repeat resolutions to communicate positions on a controversial topic to broader audiences, or to single out and damage the reputations of certain states (2014, 2–5). If Proposition 2 is correct, I expect to find evidence of the reiteration of norms and reconsideration of failed policy proposals which contribute to overcoming stalemates and productive negotiations on implementation mechanisms during windows of opportunity. This article demonstrates that such processes influenced the CSCE Vienna Follow-up Meeting in 1989, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and creation of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).

A critic might argue that alternative explanations, i.e., factors exogenous to IOs, such as shifts in power at the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the USSR, and democratic transitions underway in Central and Eastern Europe were responsible for international agreements on democratic norms and policies for their implementation in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, these explanations should not be seen as alternatives entirely beyond the scope of the present conceptual framework. My focus on windows of opportunity incorporates important aspects of structural change into the argument (see also Doers and Eidenfalk 2013, 392). Windows of opportunity opened at the end of the Cold War in the CSCE in part to due to changes in structural relations between participating states. The difference is that the point of departure in this article is internal to the institutional environment of multilateral conferences and international organizations. I do not claim that these are the only causal factors involved in overcoming stalemates. However, reiterative processes and policy windows merit greater theoretical and empirical attention in the study of multilateral negotiations, particularly on the subjects of norm development and multilateral policy implementation. The CSCE’s institutional structure was instrumental when CSCE participating states developed the most comprehensive set of democratic norms in the CSCE area in 1990–91, as will be discussed. The CSCE is particularly surprising as a venue for the emergence of a substantial democratic norm set given its consensus decision-making rules, large, heterogeneous composition, and history of stalemates. Resolutions in the UNGA have also benefited from reiterative strategies and illustrate dynamic tensions in norm development (see Sandholtz and Stiles 2009, 3). Proposition 1 and 2 would be challenged if exogenous structural changes or leadership characteristics were found to fully explain observed outcomes without any influence of endogenous institutional dynamics. However, the subsequent sections illustrate the significance of reiterative processes in facilitating normative change during windows of opportunity.

CSCE, 1975–89: Significance of Restatements and Negotiation Histories in Overcoming Stalemates

This section illustrates that following the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, although negotiations on human rights issues often encountered stalemate, failed proposals in CSCE meetings in the 1980s eventually contributed constructively to negotiations on implementing Helsinki commitments during windows of opportunity in 1986–89 (Proposition 2). As the foundational text of the CSCE, the Helsinki Final Act established a set of ten principles of equal importance for...
relations among CSCE participating states. Despite their contradictions, CSCE participating states set the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention (Principle 1) alongside “respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief” (Principle 7). CSCE mechanisms to implement the Helsinki principles initially consisted of follow-up meetings in Belgrade (1977–79) and Madrid (1980–83), the outcomes of which disappointed many diplomats and human rights activists. As Ambassador Yuri Dubinin of the Soviet Union argued: “The only positive decision adopted at the Belgrade Meeting was to convene another meeting of the same type, which was to be the Madrid Follow-up Meeting in 1980.” Expert meetings on human rights in Ottawa in 1985 and on human contacts in Bern in 1986 met similar frustrations and ended without concluding documents. Nevertheless, these meetings provided opportunities to review states’ implementation of commitments, to express concerns about human rights abuses, and to maintain inter-state communications. By contrast, the follow-up meeting in Vienna (November 1986–January 1989) was remarkable for the progress that delegates were able to make on human rights in 1989, a breakthrough attributed in part to the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union and changes in foreign policies of Warsaw Pact states. The 1989 Vienna Concluding Document included human rights standards and mechanisms formulated with greater specificity. The Vienna Mechanism enabled states to request information, hold meetings, and raise and discuss human rights violations among participating states (OSCE 2007, 92, 5–6). Moreover, three “human dimension (HD) conferences” were scheduled to take place in Paris (1989), Copenhagen (1990), and Moscow (1991), which would considerably develop a new set of democratic norms for the CSCE area.

It is clear there were both successes and failures in developing international commitments to implement human rights norms in the CSCE between 1973 and 1989. A critic might argue that the institutional structure remained constant during this period and, therefore, other factors must have been decisive. How and under what conditions were features endogenous to CSCE institutions influential in overcoming stalemates?

Evidence from CSCE meetings shows that lengthy negotiations in Belgrade, Madrid, Ottawa, and Bern resulted in finer-grained articulation of states’ positions, also formulated in response to critique and opposing perspectives. In 1989, while Warsaw Pact states remained committed to social and economic rights, there was a gradual opening to elaborating previously submitted proposals on civil and political rights. A window of opportunity was highlighted in 1989 by several diplomats who favorably viewed the decline of bloc-to-bloc politics and the increased number of proposals co-sponsored by previously adversarial states as contributing to a more productive working environment. As mentioned above, iterative consideration of norms prevents earlier achievements from falling through the cracks and retains the possibility of progress in a window of opportunity. At the opening of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting in November 1986, several state representatives commented on the value of the earlier Ottawa and Bern expert meetings in 1985 and 1986, despite their lack of tangible results. For example, Péter Varkonyi, minister for foreign affairs of Hungary, stated:

We feel that these [expert meetings] were useful, though some of them did not produce a written document. Nonetheless, the exchange of views has enriched the CSCE process with a number of important experiences, and we deem it necessary to consider at the Vienna Meeting the implementation of many proposals submitted in the course of those debates. . . . The results achieved at the meeting of experts and the proposals and ideas which were raised there and which met wide-scale approval can serve as an important point of departure for the work of the subsidiary working bodies of the Vienna meeting. Similarly, Sten Andersson, minister for foreign affairs of Sweden, stated, “Those meetings were not outright failures. It is true that they failed to reach agreement on concluding documents. But they provided opportunities for exhaustive, comprehensive and frank discussions. They helped leed shed light on the various ways of thinking and different priorities in the humanitarian sector.” And Archbishop Achille Silvestrini, secretary of the Council for the Public Affairs of the Church, Holy See, echoed: “The experience of the Meetings of Experts has been positive. Even if, unfortunately, these meetings did not conclude with the publication of a final document, they nonetheless allowed us to work out numerous solutions and reflections which constitute a wealth of material which remains only to be used and to bear fruit. The Vienna Meeting is called upon to give this material the necessary attention.” The number of diplomats expressing the value of failed negotiations is striking. In November 1986, Peter Jankowitsch, federal minister for foreign affairs of Austria, stated, “Austria sees these meetings as being very useful despite their regrettable lack of agreement on a final document. For especially in such controversial areas, where an agreement on substance is not always readily available, dialogue helps to elucidate our views on matters of principle.” And Paavo Väyrynen, minister for foreign affairs of Finland, added that “although proposals that do not reach consensus cease to formally exist after the respective meeting is over, they enrich the fabric of the co-operation within the CSCE and may prove timely in another context in the future.” The above statements support Proposition 2 and convey that negotiators benefited from the substance of prior intermittent meetings held during less conducive circumstances to overcome stalemates during the window of opportunity presented at the Vienna Follow-up Meeting and to strengthen the durability and implementation of Helsinki norms.

At the Vienna meeting’s closing session in January 1989, Jón Baldvin Hannibálsson, minister for foreign affairs and external trade of Iceland, noted that the meeting resumed the consideration of many proposals that had been tabled over the course of the prior follow-up meetings. While new proposals were also considered, the Vienna meeting’s progress was facilitated by a wealth of materials and insights generated from state representatives’ recurrent prior interactions. In January 1989, progress was likely but not predetermined. The CSCE served to constructively channel actors’ willingness to cooperate.

Without the CSCE, it is unlikely the international community would have developed similar mechanisms for monitoring human rights commitments in Europe and the Soviet Union in January 1989. The CSCE’s Vienna mechanism responded directly to Principle 7 of the Helsinki Final Act and evolutions in its third basket; thus, it was a unique product of the history of interactions within the CSCE. The EU and Council of Europe had much smaller memberships in the late 1980s. In the absence of the CSCE, higher levels of political will and engagement would have been needed to launch human rights monitoring mechanisms for the
CSCE region. Importantly, the CSCE facilitated regular meetings in which ambassadors and diplomats (rather than heads of state and foreign ministers) could negotiate incrementally on implementing human rights norms at the Vienna Follow-up Meeting of 1986–89. Exogenous structural changes at the end of the Cold War and leadership alone cannot explain the development of new democracy commitments. Instead, the CSCE institutions were instrumental by providing a foundation and structure for recurring negotiations through which, despite stalemates, participating states refined and elaborated their positions and capitalized upon a window of opportunity. The following section shows that this also provided a basis for new democracy commitments in subsequent years.

Persistence, Reiteration, and Windows of Opportunity: Codification of the CSCE’s Democratic Norm Set in 1990–91

In support of Proposition 1, this section illustrates that the CSCE’s institutions and recurring meetings facilitated the refinement of delegates’ positions, with which they benefited from a window of opportunity and codified a new set of democratic norms for the CSCE area, at the second Human Dimension (HD) conference in Copenhagen in June 1990, despite the CSCE’s consensus decision-making rules. At the Paris Summit of November 1990, the thirty-four heads of state and government publicly celebrated the end of the Cold War and in their speeches revealed the as-yet-untested opportunities for cooperation with human rights and democracy as key principles underpinning international relations. Whereas at the first HD conference in Paris in mid-1989, delegates could not agree on a concluding document, just one year later the same proposals were reconsidered and expanded. The Copenhagen Document of June 1990 delivered unprecedented agreement on democratic norms related to elections, rule of law, and human rights with high levels of specificity. It delineated the most comprehensive series of international commitments in existence at that time on pluralistic democracy, emphasizing, for example, judicial independence, civilian control of the military, separation between the state and political parties, the right of peaceful assembly, and set the stage for CSCE/OSCE work in election observation.19 Subsequently, in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, participating states declared: “We undertake to build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of government of our nations.”20 The Paris Summit of November 1990 also launched a new intensity in the CSCE’s institutionalization, including establishing a permanent secretariat and the Office for Free Elections in Warsaw, which would become the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in 1992 (see OSCE 2007, 6–7). The third HD conference, held in Moscow just weeks after the averted August coup in 1991, elaborated CSCE commitments to condemn the overthrow of legitimately elected governments, support judicial independence, professional conduct of law enforcement, freedom of the media, and rights during a state of public emergency. In the concluding document of the Moscow HD meeting, participating states adopted the Moscow Mechanism to strengthen the implementation and monitoring of human rights commitments. They also emphasized that “issues relating to human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy, and the rule of law are of international concern” and “categorically and irreversibly” declared that “commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension of the CSCE are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned.”21

The interests of CSCE participating states in responding to what they viewed as the major domestic political issues in Central and Eastern Europe, structural power shifts, lead-ership, or a conducive normative environment alone do not fully explain how the CSCE was able to codify new democratic norms so quickly in 1990. Here the institutional structures played a key role. When a window of opportunity opened after the fall of the Berlin Wall and new leadership emerged in Central and Eastern Europe, delegates were able to clearly identify where they could break through earlier impasses. Negotiations benefited from states’ positions that had been discussed and refined in advance. For example, Géza Jesszenszky, minister for foreign affairs of the Republic of Hungary, highlighted issues that previously failed to achieve consensus, yet were placed again onto the agenda and were agreed upon at Copenhagen in June 1990:

We continue to regard as valid the proposals which we submitted at last year’s meeting in Paris. Hungary is interested in the conclusion of the present meeting with the adoption of a document reflecting the spirit of the construction of a new Europe. . . . It should lay down the basic criteria of democracy and the rule of law . . . and it should refer to the importance of inter-state cooperation for the enforcement of democracy and the rule of law and for the creation of a European legal space, and . . . the concrete modalities of further developing the human dimension mechanism.”22 Eduard E. Shevardnadze, foreign minister of the USSR, likewise stated in June 1990, “We are hopeful that Copenhagen will help to set in motion the bank of proposals and ideas put together in Paris, which offer a good basis for elaborating a common position for all the countries participating in the Helsinki process.”23 Similarly, on behalf of the European Community and its member states, Gerard Collins, minister for foreign affairs of Ireland, stated in 1990:

At the Paris Meeting last year, many interesting and valuable proposals were put forward for improving the human dimension provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and the other CSCE documents. We had a first discussion of these proposals on that occasion and, since then, we have had the opportunity to study them further . . . the majority represent useful bases on which to continue our work.”24

The CSCE meetings in Ottawa, Vienna, and Paris in 1985–89 were eventually of great benefit to the preparations of delegates in Copenhagen and Paris in 1990 and Moscow in 1991, both for advancing new norms and elaborating implementation mechanisms (Propositions 1 and 2). Many of the proposals tabled at the 1990 Copenhagen Human Dimension meeting had been considered and refined at the 1989 HD meeting in Paris, which in turn built from third basket negotiations during the 1986–89 follow-up meeting in Vienna. In the words of Alice Némcová of the OSCE Prague Office: “It was like a reservoir that exploded at Copenhagen.”25

In their statements at the 1990 Copenhagen Human Dimension meeting, several diplomats highlighted the unique policy window in which the meeting took place. For example, Kjell Magne Bondevik, minister of foreign affairs of Norway, stated in June 1990: “The political changes in Europe have opened up a window of opportunity for further advancing the human dimension of the OSCE. Prospects for a successful outcome of this meeting are immeasurably better than was the case at the opening of the Paris meeting last year.”26 Moreover, in retrospect, we see the limited window in which consensus was attained. This window began to close at the end of 1991 with the end of Gorbachev’s presidency and the dissolution of the USSR and Yugoslavia, which created new international priorities and increased the number of CSCE participating states, making consensus in a group with more diverse priorities more difficult to achieve.

Without the structure provided by the CSCE and its history of earlier attempts to develop human rights and democracy commitments among ideologically divergent states, it is unlikely that such a comprehensive set of democratic norms would have been developed in 1990–91 by the international community for application in the CSCE region. The CSCE was the only regional institution at the time to comprise states of North America, Europe, and the USSR, and its norms applied to its participating states, whereas EU or Council of Europe norms applied to the smaller group of member states or states with membership prospects. Helmut Kohl, federal chancellor of Germany, made a similar, yet broader counterfactual argument at the 1990 CSCE Paris Summit: “Without the foundation laid fifteen years ago for a peaceful order encompassing the whole of Europe, it would not have been possible today to accomplish German unity and to restore the historical unity of our continent, as we are doing here in Paris.” CSCE institutions drew on their Cold War-era history of negotiations of human rights and democracy commitments between ideologically divergent states and were well placed to capitalize on changes in political will in 1990–91.

CSCE/OSCE from 1992 into the 2010s: Narrowing Windows of Opportunity, Increasing Stalemates, and a Return to Reiterative Processes

The following section further illustrates the interrelation between windows of opportunity and reiterative processes affecting policy implementation, supporting Proposition 2. Norm restatements contribute to norms’ durability, despite stalemates and even when policy windows to support implementation are limited. Consistent with Tomlin’s analysis discussed above, policy breakthroughs in the CSCE/OSCE have often corresponded to windows of opportunity created through a combination of focusing events with high profile media coverage, where policy solutions were available, and political will and leadership supported the launch of new institutions. Agreements in the CSCE of the early 1990s created institutions to respond more effectively to European security threats, including nationalism and xenophobia. For example, the 1992 Helsinki Summit enhanced the role of ODIHR and established a High Commissioner on National Minorities (Némécová 2010, 9). CSCE field offices began operating in 1992 in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina, Skopje, Georgia, Tajikistan, and Estonia and in 1993 in Latvia and Moldova. Windows remained in some policy areas after 1995, when the OSCE was buoyed from supervising elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina and assisting implementation of the Dayton Agreement. Several new field offices were opened in the mid-1990s and an OSCE representative on Freedom of the Media began work in 1997. However, broader debates on the future security architecture of Europe contributed to a narrowing window for policy development in the human dimension. Over time, differing opinions about Chechnya, NATO enlargement, and the use of force by NATO in Kosovo chipped away at political will to cooperate, and the 1990s ended with increased contestation and decreased efficiency of OSCE institutions.

In the 2000s, we observe a more stereotypical feature of IOs with large, heterogeneous compositions and consensus decision-making: frequent stalemates. Several points of contention during the 2000s, including on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, inhibiting consensus and clouded debates in other areas, including the human dimension. It also became clear that the OSCE would not evolve into an alternative to NATO and there were no signs of consensus on creating a legal basis for the OSCE, further fueling Russia’s dissatisfaction (see Ghebali 2005). Moreover, no OSCE summits took place between 1999 and 2010, an indicator of decreased political will to work through the OSCE in the decade. Essential components of a policy window—a powerful focusing event, an acceptable policy solution, and political will, and effective leadership—have only occasionally aligned favorably for the human dimension in recent years. In light of frequent stalemates, OSCE participating states in the late 2000s returned to a strategy employed frequently during the Cold War: issuing restatements of existing commitments (Proposition 2). An example of a restatement of democratic norms appeared in the 2008 OSCE Ministerial Declaration on the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), in which the OSCE participating states agreed, among others, on passages from the 1991 Moscow Document and 1990 Charter of Paris. The four-page Astana Summit Declaration of 2010 availed of a similar strategy, where the fifty-six OSCE participating states recommitted themselves to “the vision of a free, democratic, common and indivisible Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok, rooted in agreed principles, shared commitments and common goals” on the 35th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act and the 20th anniversary of the Charter of Paris. As Thaddeus Kontek, human dimension officer at the U.S. Mission to the OSCE in Vienna, explained, it is often possible to reach consensus on restating an earlier commitment because rejecting a previously agreed-upon norm can be difficult for any state to justify. States’ reputational concern for maintaining consistency in their positions corresponds with constructivists’ expectations. Just as restatements of human rights norms in the 1970s and 1980s kept issues on the agenda despite stalemates, restatements of democratic norms contribute to their institutional history and recurring negotiations may contribute to moving beyond stalemates if a window of opportunity presents itself.

United Nations General Assembly: Persistence, Reiteration, and Windows of Opportunity in Norm Development

A few brief examples from the United Nations General Assembly illustrate the applicability of Propositions 1 and 2 in a different context. Although stalemates have periodically forced delegates’ efforts to codify new norms or to develop implementation policies to lie dormant, as in the most contentious phases of the Cold War, the examples of Article 25 in the ICCPR and the establishment of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in 1993 show that, at times, states and UN agencies have been able to draw on the history of failed negotiation processes and benefit from windows of opportunity to overcome stalemates.

The factor of a common point of reference underpinning successful negotiations after stalemate—the aim of preventing the reoccurrence of a specific destructive event—was highlighted in Tomlin’s study of the IADC and is also relevant to the development of the UDHR in 1948. The shared horror of Nazi atrocities provided a focal point from which UN members agreed upon human rights provisions in the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the UDHR’s Article 21 in particular, as “the experience of the war had reinforced their belief that the cluster of rights spelled out in Articles 18, 19, 20, and 21 are universally the first ones dictators will seek to deny and destroy” (Morsink 1999, 69). It
is infrequently mentioned that in the general roll-call vote on the UDHR in 1948, delegates voted on the declaration article by article. Twenty-three articles were adopted unanimously with no abstentions, including Article 21. 35 Leaders such as Eleanor Roosevelt and Rene Cassin recognized the importance of capitalizing on the policy window presented by the international environment of the mid-1940s. Awareness that a window of opportunity was closing in the late 1940s led leaders to support finalizing the declaration quickly, especially when escalating U.S.–Soviet tensions in 1948 threatened to jeopardize agreement (Morsink 1999, 19).

In line with Proposition 2, the idea of an international bill of rights was kept on the agenda of the General Assembly’s Third Committee during the Cold War, which facilitated delegates’ negotiations toward the ICCPR in December 1966, when a sufficient thaw in Cold War tensions presented an opportunity. Restating parts of the UDHR’s Article 21, the ICCPR codified norms related to democratic elections in its Article 25. 36 If the UNGA had not been revisiting this agenda item, the international community might not have been able to draft and negotiate such a document with global scope before Cold War tensions resumed later in the 1970s. Regarding the policy window, Wiktor Osiantyński states that “although the drafting was almost complete by 1953, the covenants were shelved for more than 10 years because of ideological rivalry and the Cold War” (2009, 29). In those years, leaders from Africa and Asia were among the most vocal supporters of human rights, in tandem with quests for self-determination and global distribution of resources (Osiantyński 2009, 30–31). The debate changed in the mid- to late 1960s, when European states held fewer colonies and the U.S. civil rights movement, women’s rights movements, and student protests in Europe and North America helped to shift public opinion and states’ priorities in advancing international human rights, while the temporary easing of U.S.–Soviet tensions enabled more constructive negotiations (see Kennedy 2006, 185–88, 216; Osiantyński 2009 31–34). Moreover, as a diplomat argued in 1977: “The acceptance of the [CSCE Helsinki] Final Act [in 1975] was an important contribution to the entry into force in 1976 of the [UN] Covenants of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and of Civil and Political Rights, which had been drawn up as far back as 1966.”

Similar to CSCE strategy of restating Helsinki human rights norms during the Cold War in the CSCE, periodic restatement of Articles 21 and 25 of the UDHR and ICCPR maintained their relevance on the UN’s agendas and provided an opportunity to develop new election observation norms when delegates displayed greater political will. The year 1988 commemorated the 40th anniversary of the UDHR, and UN delegates cited this anniversary as an occasion to reflect on achievements and to rekindle dedication to commitments and strengthen implementation mechanisms. 37 In December 1988, the UN General Assembly first adopted a resolution entitled “Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections,” which restated key passages from Article 21 of the UDHR and Article 25 of the ICCPR, would become a recurring resolution in the UN, and would lay part of the normative foundation for the UN’s mandate to support democratic governance. 38 While many factors contributed to the development of the UN’s election assistance mandate (see Ludwig 2004; Kelley 2008; Hyde 2011; Hecht 2012), including the UN’s history of support for decolonization which conferred legitimacy and enabled it to assume this new role, recurring UNGA meetings facilitated negotiations on mechanisms to implement previously agreed-upon norms. The window of opportunity for expanding UN engagement in democracy support was underpinned by important expressions of demand by UN member states, which simultaneously requested boundaries on the extent of UN practices.

Although the policy window was supported by newfound common interests between the United States and Soviet Union and contributed to some significant developments in the UN in 1990–91 (e.g., authorization of a focal point to coordinate the UN’s electoral assistance), these developments pale in comparison to the more comprehensive democracy commitments in the CSCE in the same years. In the CSCE, the high water mark for democratic norms beyond free and fair elections to date appeared approximately in 1999–2000 (see Resolution A/RES/55/96) —nearly a decade later than in the CSCE/OSCE. What explains this divergence? The East-West divide spanned by the CSCE became less relevant at the end of the Cold War, yet UN bodies continued to contend simultaneously with North-South divisions. In 1990–91, much diplomatic energy was channeled to dilemmas in Europe, and the CSCE encountered a different window of opportunity to elaborate a new democratic norm set than the UNGA (Proposition 1).

Emerging after the Cold War-era stalemate, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) was an outcome of the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, established by UNGA Resolution 48/141 and adopted on 20 December 1993 (see Merts 2005, 8–12). During the Cold War, there had been several efforts to establish a high commissioner for human rights. UNGA Resolution 44/156 in December 1989 revived the process by requesting that the UN Secretary-General seek views of governments, specialized agencies, NGOs, and UN human rights bodies about holding a world human rights conference. 39 Ongoing discussions in the UN’s Third Committee and preparations for the 1993 Vienna World Conference facilitated states’ consideration of the post of a high commissioner and enabled them to act when conditions became more favorable. The history and negotiators’ persistence were highlighted by Emilia Castro de Barish, ambassador of Costa Rica, who explained her country’s position on the UNGA resolution 48/141 in December 1993: “We in Costa Rica feel very honoured to have been able to contribute to the adoption of this resolution through a long process that began in 1952 with the proposal by Uruguay, and continued in 1965 with that made by Costa Rica. That process came to fruition this year.”

Several delegates also credited the leadership and effective diplomatic skills of Ambassadors José Ayala Lasso, Eduard Kukan, Gilberto Saboya, and Chew Tai Soo in facilitating consensus. 40 Emphasizing the window of opportunity, Victor Marrero, delegate of the U.S., stated, “The Assembly’s action this year, after numerous past efforts to create an office of High Commissioner failed, is representative of a new spirit of cooperation and seriousness of purpose within this body.” 41 The process of periodic debate in the UNGA, even in the less conducive Cold War environment, helped to prepare the ground for negotiations in the early 1990s and for the OHCHR’s eventual acceptance in 1993, in line with Proposition 2. The above examples show that stalemates in negotiations in international organizations with large, heterogeneous compositions occasionally serve a useful purpose at later points in time. Standing bodies in such IOs are well placed to capture agreements among member states and to ensure that, once made, these commitments can be formally perpetuated and perhaps expanded during windows of opportunity.

39. Ibid., see Ludwig 2004, 170.
40. Resolution “Promoting and Consolidating Democracy,” see UNGA, 4 Dec. 2000, A/55/PV.81, pp. 14–16. However, the UN Human Rights Council, with its smaller, rotating group of forty-seven UN member states (and its predecessor up to 2006, the Commission on Human Rights, with fifty-three members) had more substantive resolutions on the subject, including CHR Resolutions 2000/47 and 2005/32, and HRC Resolution 19/36 (2012).
Conclusions
Counter-intuitively, this article has shown that stalemates occasionally have a silver lining and can contribute productively to future negotiations. Alternative explanations for successful negotiations—such as converging state interests, committed, skilled leadership, or the conducive normative environment after the Cold War have some explanatory power, yet alone do not explain the outcomes observed. In the cases discussed above, institutional features and reiterative processes enabled negotiators to take advantage of windows of opportunity, which opened in part due to changes in structural relationships among states. Given narrow or closed policy windows in many issue areas in the mid-2010s, it is worthwhile to re-examine the strategies employed during the Cold War.

Supporting Proposition 1, both in the CSCE/OSCE and in the UNGA, the practice of issuing restatements of prior commitments and reconsidering failed proposals contributed to agreements on the codification of new norms even during short windows of opportunity, particularly when recurring meetings enabled groundwork to be done in advance. If there are shifts in political will, standing bodies that convene diverse groups of states ensure that a structure is in place to facilitate actors’ willingness to cooperate, if present. Supporting Proposition 2, I showed that the durability and implementation of commitments in multilateral negotiations facing stalemate can benefit from reiterative processes, through which negotiators have periodic opportunities to probe the “ripeness” of historical moments and to revive failed proposals.

Certainly, there are many examples of stalemates that are never overcome. These types of stalemates were not examined in this article, because they reflect the more typical treatment of the subject. When negotiators are blocked by stalemates in large multilateral conferences or IO fora, they often seek a more favorable venue or smaller group of like-minded states instead of relying on the unpredictable, long-term processes highlighted above (Coleman 2013; Boyer 2012, 234; Cameron, Lawson, and Tomlin 1998; Hecht 2012). Yet there are disadvantages to abandoning international organizations with large, heterogeneous compositions. When negotiators decrease their engagement in these venues based on short-term calculations, this undermines the vitality of institutions with effects over longer time scales and sacrifices potential rewards of persistence highlighted in Propositions 1 and 2.

Re-endorsing or elaborating norms is significant in IOs with large, heterogeneous compositions, because high levels of support communicate norms’ legitimacy, signal states’ re-commitment, and convey broad expectations of compliance. Smaller IOs with like-minded member states (e.g., EU, NATO) may be similarly effective at using materials from previous negotiations and capitalizing on windows of opportunity; however, their agreements are relevant to their limited memberships rather than to the larger group. Although Cold War-era stalemates are perhaps more likely in hindsight to have been overcome in the post–Cold War era, the selected examples call attention to the significance of reiterative processes and policy windows in the study of multilateral negotiations and norm development. Additional empirical research could make fruitful comparisons to stalemates with different sets of causes than those underpinning the cases investigated above (e.g., stalemates that arise from failures in implementation) as well as to current trends. Future research on multilateral negotiation and diplomacy might add detail about ways in which the restatement of norms and reconsideration of failed proposals—in other issue areas, IOs, and time periods—may help state representatives to identify and capitalize on windows of opportunity.

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Regional Intergovernmental Organizations, Globalization, and Economic Development

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This study analyzes the effects of regional intergovernmental organizations (RIGOs), e.g., the African Union (AU), European Union (EU), or Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), on the economic development of member states in an age of globalization. The study is based on seventeen major RIGOs chosen from each of the continents/subcontinents in the world. In general, regionalism pursued by countries via their RIGOs (and regional free trade agreements) was found to have no independent and direct effect on economic development. The RIGOs instead were found to indirectly affect economic development via globalization, which has a strong positive effect on economic development. Based on the effect of collective RIGOs on the economic development of individual member states, the following four patterns were found: facilitating, impeding, suppressing (hidden), and noneffective. Collective RIGOs composed of developed member states were generally found facilitating economic growth, while those composed of less developed, or a hybrid of developed and developing, member states were not. Instead, the latter were found impeding, suppressing, or being noneffective in the economic development of member states. Globalization is multidimensional. A collective RIGO should help an individual member state enhance each of the multidimensional aspects of globalization, which turn out to be the true engine of economic development.

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to assess the effect of regional intergovernmental organizations (RIGOs), e.g., the European Union (EU), African Union (AU), and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), pursue the economic development of their respective member states. What might the differences be in economic development between the ASEAN member states and non-ASEAN member states, for example? What are the differences in economic development between EU and non-EU members? Can RIGO membership itself independently affect economic growth, regardless of other economic variables, such as investment, trade, and economic globalization?

Regionalism in international relations can be defined in diverse ways. Nye (1968) defined an international region as “a limited number of states linked by a geographical relationship as well as by a degree of mutual interdependence.” He defined regionalism as “the formation of interstate associations or groupings on the basis of regions.” Hurrell (1995) viewed regionalism as “identity or shared perception of being part of a definable region.” A general definition for regionalism in international relations is “the expression of a common sense of identity and purpose (e.g., economic, security, political, etc.) combined with the creation and implementation of regional institutions or organizations” (Regionalism).

The definition of regionalism is still heavily debated, but a general consensus includes the following three criteria (Karns and Mingst 2010). First, regionalism is viewed as the process by regional intergovernmental organizations in which regions are significant economic/political units. These units serve as the basis for cooperation, identity, and integration (Explain 2016).
Second, regionalism via the collective RIGO is realized by diverse, independent, individual sovereign member states. Third, this individual vs. collective dichotomy raises the question as to whether or not RIGOs can facilitate the economic growth of individual sovereign member states. ASEAN, for example, has a strong regional presence, but that collective institution lacks the ability to force its individual member states to coordinate policy and cooperate with each other. ASEAN is a collective institution built on the principles of unanimity and neutrality. Yet ASEAN member states, despite their regionalism, focus more on competing with each other for foreign direct investment (FDI).

The study of the effect of RIGOs on economic development has been critical since regionalism and globalization are closely associated. Regionalism via RIGOs is inevitably linked with globalization. Globalization is the increased interdependence of states worldwide, and regionalism allows this interdependence. For example, the EU, a supranational organization, gives member states the foundation for free trade and, therefore, a transition to reaching globalization. In light of the developments of growing regionalism and globalization, what might be the relationship between RIGOs and globalization in their respective effects on the economic development of individual sovereign member states? Can RIGOs have an independent and direct effect on the economic growth of their member states regardless of globalization? Similarly, can globalization have a significant effect on the economic growth of independent sovereign member states regardless of RIGOs?

Globalization is not unidimensional but multidimensional; it includes economic, political, cultural, technological, institutional dimensions, and more. In assessing the effect of RIGOs on the economic development of member states in the context of globalization, globalization should be understood as multidimensional rather than unidimensional.

This study of cross-comparative analysis of RIGOs covers all continents and subcontinents in the world: Europe, Africa, Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Pacific Rim, central Asia, North and South America, and the Middle East. The choice of RIGOs is based on the major organization(s) on each of the continents. For example, the EU in Europe, the AU in Africa, ASEAN in Southeast Asia, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in South Asia, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in central Asia, and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a free trade agreement between the U.S., Canada, and Mexico in North America. NAFTA was chosen because it is a regional, intergovernmental arrangement for free trade and for that reason is treated as an organization as well. That is, NAFTA is a trade bloc, which is a type of intergovernmental agreement. For that reason, NAFTA is also treated as a RIGO.

Each of these RIGOs from different continents is unique in terms of its purpose (e.g., economic, military, political, etc.) or in terms of its structure of organization: supranational, such as the EU, or intergovernmental, such as ASEAN, for example. Yet this paper solely aims to assess what difference RIGO or non-RIGO membership makes in the economic development of member and nonmember states.

Many Theories of Economic Development

Globalization is one of the variables assumed to affect economic development and growth. There are many definitions of globalization, yet the KOF Globalization Index is most widely used. The index is based on economic globalization, political globalization, and social globalization. Regardless of the type of globalization, the commonality that cuts across them is the interconnectedness and interdependence of international and transnational actors, including nations and peoples.¹²

The effect of economic globalization on economic development (economic growth and quality of life) has been controversial. It has both positive and negative effects. Globalization has negative effects on the less developed countries as it deepens inequality between the wealthy and the poor (Stiglitz 2003). Yet the positive side of economic globalization indicates that free trade and foreign direct investment (FDI), both of which are vital ingredients of economic globalization, have a positive effect on the economic growth of developing countries (Golkany 2007). Multinational corporations (MNCs) are undeniably important actors in globalization. Yet the role of MNCs in less developed host countries where they are doing their business has been controversial as well. It has both positive and negative roles (Nunnenkamp and Spatz 2003). Many actors are involved in globalization. Individual nation states and “collective” RIGOs play an important role in the process of globalization.

Each country has different reasons for joining international organizations. First, some countries are motivated to be members of RIGOs because the collective organization can bring them efficiency. That is, integration as realized by the collective international organization, be it economic, security based, or political, can bring about economies of scale (Abbott and Small 1999). Second, economic governance is the reason to join international organizations. Global governance is defined as “cooperative problem-solving arrangements” (Weiss 2000). Problem solving by collective international organizations benefits each member state. Third, international organizations serve as agents of social construction and constructivism. International organizations can constructively implement cooperation and interaction between nations regionally and internationally (Finnemor and Sikkink 2001).

Export-led economic growth is based on trade (export and import). The essential part of export-led economic growth is the terms of trade, which is measured by the ratio of exports to imports. Favorable terms of trade (greater exports than imports) enhances economic growth, while unfavorable terms of trade (greater imports than exports) has negative effects on economic growth.

Economic development is affected by political development. Differences in economic development are associated with whether a country’s political system is democratic or authoritarian. Democracy, with its higher degree of political freedom, as well as a free market economic system, was found to enhance economic development, while authoritarian and totalitarian political systems turned out not to be conducive to economic development (Russet 2005).

Yet this dichotomous pattern of economic development based on political systems has also been challenged. It is not necessarily political freedom and democratic political systems that enhance economic growth and development. Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS), all of which are still economically classified as developing nations despite their political clout in world politics, were documented as having rather successful economic growth in recent decades. They are also successful transitional economies despite their still authoritarian political systems (except probably India). The “Asian Four Dragons” (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore) were documented as very successful economies during recent decades while they were still politically authoritarian. It has been argued that the stronger role of government in authoritarian political systems can be conducive to an equality of income distribution for disadvantaged groups related to ethnicity, gender, or geographic region. A stronger government, albeit authoritarian, can still protect those vulnerable groups of people (Clements 2007).

The effect of defense spending on economic growth, quality of life, and domestic investment is inconclusive. Sivard (1991) argues that if defense spending is excessive disproportionate to economic capacity it can hurt economic growth and quality of life. Klaire (1987) found tradeoffs between defense spending and domestic investment, indicating that defense spending reduces domestic investment, which could have contributed to economic growth. Yet Benoit (1978) argues that there is empirical evidence of a positive effect of defense spending on economic growth in developing countries. Regardless of the time period (Cold War or post–Cold War), Kim (1996) found that excessive defense spending


² The KOF Index is based on three dimensions: economic globalization, social globalization, and political globalization. An overall index of globalization is based on the following five indicators: 1. actual economic flows; 2. economic restrictions; 3. data on information flows; 4. data on personal contact; 5. data on cultural proximity. The index is annually released by the KOF Economic Institute (Dreher, Gaston, and Maussert). See KOF Index of Globalization, http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/
has a negative effect on quality of life. Across the Cold War and post–Cold War periods, the negative effect remains unchanged regardless of population growth, urbanization, and ethnic diversity.

Ethnic composition (heterogeneous or homogeneous), urbanization, and population growth were found to have a significant effect on quality of life. Ethnic heterogeneity has a negative effect on quality of life (Collier 1999, 2007; Alesina et al. 2003). Both urbanization and population growth turn out to have a negative effect on quality of life as well (McNicoll 1995; Todaro and Stephen 2015, 330–44).

Which is more important in determining economic growth, human knowledge or natural resources? A knowledge economy is based on innovation, creativity, and ideas, which are important ingredients of economic development. Tocan (2012) argues that in economic growth via productivity and competitive sustainability, a capitalization on advanced knowledge is vitally important. Resource-led economic growth is based on the utilization of natural resources. Oil is one prime example of a resource that an economy could be based on.

Savings-led economic growth is based on the notion that savings have a positive effect on economic growth. The savings are for future consumption—to be used to fix damage or impairment to the capital goods, which are important factors of production. Therefore, capital formation in preparation for “rainy days” is vitally important, and the savings are for capital formation.3 Corruption, which is also defined as a lack of transparency, distorts free-market systems. As a corollary, corruption increases the cost of business. Corruption is a major impediment to sustainable development as well (CleanGovBiz/OECD 2016, 2). Corruption is clearly detrimental to the global competitiveness of countries, which is an important determinant of economic development. Global competitiveness is measured by the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI),4 which measures the competitiveness and ability of domestic institutions and policies, which are important ingredients in determining economic development. Globalization has provided an opportunity to focus global attention on previously neglected issues, such as corruption and lack of transparency, as well as the global competitiveness of countries.

The review of literature thus far indicates that economic development is affected by many variables: globalization, regionalism and RIGOs, knowledge variables (knowledge economic index and knowledge index), corruption, global competitiveness (GCI), foreign direct investment (FDI), political freedom, economic freedom, savings, terms of trade, defense spending, and oil resources. The review indicates the following issues this study aims to solve: First, all the approaches to the theory of economic development reviewed so far indicate that the cause of economic development coalesces around a single variable (e.g., regionalism, globalization, oil, defense spending, knowledge economy, etc.). Based on these single-variable approaches, there is no way to identify a genuine independent effect of many individual single variables, including globalization or regionalism, on economic development. The review also indicates that there is no causal linkage among the diverse variables in analyzing their independent effect on economic development. This study aims to compensate for the weakness of the single-variable approaches. It is based on a multivariate analysis, in which many theories and variables are used simultaneously. It will identify a genuine independent effect of regionalism (RIGOs) on economic development, and it will assess how regionalism and globalization are causally associated in their respective effects on economic development.

Methodology

A. Dependent Variable (DV): Economic Development

Economic development, which is treated as a dependent variable (DV), incorporates both quantitative (economic growth) and qualitative (quality of life, standard of living, human development) dimensions of development. Economic development was measured by Per Capita GDP Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). In cross-national comparative analysis, Per Capita GDP based on purchasing power parity is widely used.

B. Independent Variable (IV): Regional Intergovernmental Organizations (RIGOs)/Regionalism

[Note: As previously indicated, regionalism is defined as the process by RIGOs in which “geographical regions become significant political and/or economic units, serving as the basis for cooperation, . . . identity,” and possibly integration (Explain 2016).]

RIGOs/regionalism is treated as an independent variable, which is hypothesized to affect economic development (dependent variable). Countries affiliated with a regional intergovernmental organization (RIGO) are coded as 1 while unaffiliated countries are coded as 0. Regionalism as measured by the dichotomous variable (1 or 0) is a dummy (nominal) variable. The following is a list of RIGOs, each one is listed with their respective number of member countries, as well as the name of the geographical region of each RIGO.

- Andean Community of Nations (ANDEAN): four countries, South American region
- Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC): twenty-one countries, Asia-Pacific region
- Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): ten countries, Southeast Asia region
- ASEAN plus Three: China, Japan, and South Korea (ASEAN+3)
- African Union (AU): fifty-four countries, African region (note: South Sudan became the African Union’s fifty-fourth member on 28 July 2011. Its data was not included in this analysis.)
- Caribbean Community (CARICOM): fifteen countries and dependencies
- Common Southern Market (MERCSUR): five countries
- Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): five countries
- European Union (EU): twenty-seven countries, European region
- Free Trade Agreement of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP): thirty-three countries (APEC plus TPP, proposed by China 2014)
- League of Arab States (LAS): twenty-two countries, Arab region (Middle East)
- Organization of American States (OAS): thirty-five countries
- Pacific Community (PC): seventeen countries and territories, Pacific region
- South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC): eight countries, South Asian region
- Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO): six countries, Central Asian region
- Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): twelve countries, Asia-Pacific region (ongoing: still waiting for ratifications by each of the twelve countries as of June 2016)

Variables Measured

1) Globalization—Globalization is multidimensional: there is economic, social, and political globalization. It is measured by the KOF Index of Globalization.5

2) Global Competitiveness/Global Competitiveness Index (GCI)—Measures a set of domestic institutions and policies for their respective global competitiveness. The index indicates a national (domestic) competitiveness worldwide.

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3. The Harrod-Domar model explains the effect of savings on economic growth. The model is named after two economists: Roy Harrod (English economist) in 1939 and Evsey Domar (U.S. economist) in 1946 separately developed their respective models but concurrently developed a variant of it in the 1950s, which is called “The Harrod-Domar model.”

4. Global competitiveness/Global Competitiveness Index (GCI): measures a set of domestic institutions and policies for their respective global competitiveness. The index indicates a national (domestic) competitiveness worldwide.

5. See Note 2 for the detailed measures of globalization.
Table 1. Factor Analysis: A Multidimensionality of Globalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(Economic growth variables)</th>
<th>Factor 1: Globalization-based</th>
<th>Factor 2: Savings-based</th>
<th>Factor 3: Oil-based</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KEI (5)</td>
<td>.950</td>
<td>(ns)</td>
<td>(ns)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ki(4)</td>
<td>.926</td>
<td>(ns)</td>
<td>(ns)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption (3)</td>
<td>.919</td>
<td>(ns)</td>
<td>(ns)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalization (1)</td>
<td>.910</td>
<td>(ns)</td>
<td>(ns)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global competitiveness (GCI) (2)</td>
<td>.870</td>
<td>(ns)</td>
<td>(ns)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic freedom (8)</td>
<td>.789</td>
<td>(ns)</td>
<td>(ns)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization (6)</td>
<td>.724v</td>
<td>(ns)</td>
<td>(ns)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI (9)</td>
<td>.713</td>
<td>(ns)</td>
<td>(ns)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political freedom (7)</td>
<td>.562</td>
<td>(ns)</td>
<td>(ns)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savings (13)</td>
<td>(ns)</td>
<td>.916</td>
<td>(ns)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terms of trade (10)</td>
<td>(ns)</td>
<td>.750</td>
<td>(ns)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Military expenditure (11)   | (ns)                          | (ns)                    | .864              |
Oil (12)                    | (ns)                          | (ns)                    | .820              |

Eigenvalue (%)              | 48.4                          | 19.2                    | 7.7               |

Note: Each of the nine (9) variables, loaded under Factor 1 with their respective factor loadings, is measured as follows according to their respective corresponding number in parenthesis.

(ns): nonsignificant

3) Corruption—Corruption is measured by the Corruption Perception Index (CPI); CPI ranges from 100 (very clean/transparent) to 0 (highly corrupt/nontransparent).
4) Knowledge Index (KI)—Measured by “education and human resource systems, the innovation system [as well as] information and communication technology (ICT)” (Knowledge Economic Index 2016).
5) Knowledge Economic Index (KEI)—The index is based on “economic incentive and institutional regime, education and human resources, the innovation system [as well as information and communication technology (ICT)]” (Knowledge Economic Index 2016). It is highly correlated with KI as well.
6) Urbanization (percentage)—Measures population size of urban areas
7) Types of political systems are classified by their respective degrees of political freedom—Not free, or highly authoritarian, is coded as 1; partly free, or authoritarian, is coded as 2; free, or democratic, is coded as 3.
8) Economic freedom—Based on economic freedom index indicating freedom in trade, business, investment, etc.
9) Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)—Indicates FDI inflow and based on net inflows, which is measured by new investment inflows minus disinvestment in reporting country.
10) Terms of Trade—Calculated by dividing the value of exports by the value of imports, then multiplying the result by one hundred.
11) Military Expenditure/Defense Spending—Military expenditure as a percentage of the GDP.
12) Oil (proven oil reserves/crude oil)—Based on countries with proven oil reserves.
13) Savings/Gross Savings—Measured by percentage of the GDP.

C. Control Variable (CV)
Globalization is a control variable to see how RIGOs/regionalism (independent variable) affects economic development (dependent variable) when the effect of globalization is controlled for. Globalization is also treated as an intervening variable between regionalism and economic development. The control variable is to see how the original bivariate “causal” relationships between the regionalism (independent variable) and the economic development (dependent variable) are changed/unchanged by the effect of globalization.

Table 1 shows factor loadings produced by the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). Only the factor loading highest across the three factors (Factor 1: globalization [multidimensional] based; Factor 2: savings based; Factor 3: oil based) is listed. For example, the KEI variable (0.95) is listed under Factor 1; the savings variable (0.916) under Factor 2, and the oil variable (0.82) under Factor 3. Under Factor 1, nine variables, including the KOF globalization index variable, were found to be the highest across their respective rows. The non-highest in each variable is shown as "ns" (non-significant). The highest variables are significantly correlated with each other under Factor 1. That is, the KOF index of globalization variable is significantly correlated with each of the other following eight variables loaded under Factor 1.

• Knowledge Economic Index (KEI)
• Knowledge Index (KI)
• Corruption/Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)
• Global Competitiveness Index (GCI)
• Urbanization (percentage)
• Economic freedom
• Foreign direct investment (FDI)
• Political freedom

Factor 1 is labeled a “multidimensionality of globalization,” encompassing all of the nine variables, including the KOF Index of globalization variable. The following are aspects of multidimensionality that are highly correlated with the KOF index of globalization:

1) Economic—Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is highly correlated with the KOF Index of Globalization.
2) Knowledge-Technological—The knowledge-technological variables (Knowledge Economic Index [KEI] and Knowledge Index [KI]) are an integral part of globalization.
3) Global Competitiveness and Political Development—The KOF Index of Globalization is also highly correlated with the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), which measures institutional, policy, and administrative competitiveness of a country at a global level. A higher competitiveness is also indicative of higher political development of a country at the global level.
4) Corruption Index—Lower corruption means higher transparency of political and administrative/institutional systems. Globalization incorporates transparency of political and administrative systems with lower corruption.
5) Urbanization—This is indicative of industrialization, as well as aggregates of the economy of a country that are highly associated with globalization.
6) Political and Economic Freedoms—Democracy, as realized by the political freedom and market-oriented economy, realized by economic freedoms, are correlated with globalization. Globalization means a high degree of these two freedoms as well.

Eigenvalue (percentage) at the bottom indicates the percent of total variance accounted for by each factor. Factor 1, with the largest percentage (48.4 percent), indicates the most dominant factor/pattern of all in economic growth, followed by Factor 2 (19.2%), and Factor 3 (7.7%), respectively. Factor 1 (F1), indicating that multidimensionality of globalization is independent of F2 (savings-based pattern/saving and terms of trade variables) and F3 (oil-based pattern/oil and military expenditure variables).
The 222 countries in this analysis are classified as member or non-member states of the seventeen RIGOs. This study is a cross-national comparative analysis of the 222 countries. Although it covers the 2005–15 period, the period is solely determined by the availability of data for each of the countries. Both bivariate and path analyses used in this paper are based on hypothetical causal relations between dependent (economic development), independent (regionalism) and control (globalization) variables.

**Models**

Based on the independent variable (IV/regionalism/RIGOs), dependent variable (DV/economic development), and control variable (CV/globalization), the following four hypothetical causal models will be tested.

[Note: As previously indicated, regionalism is defined as the process by RIGOs in which “geographical regions become significant political and/or economic units, serving as the basis for cooperation, . . . identity,” and possibly integration (Explain 2016).]

A. Model 1: Facilitating Regionalism.
   • Regionalism (IV) has, directly and/or indirectly, via globalization (CV), a positive effect on economic development (DV).

B. Model 2: Impeding Regionalism.
   • Regionalism (IV) has, directly and/or indirectly, via globalization (CV), a negative effect on economic development (DV).

C. Model 3: Suppressed/Hidden Regionalism.
   • Regionalism (IV) has been hidden/suppressed by the effect of globalization (CV) in its effect on economic development (DV).

D. Model 4: Noneffective Regionalism.
   • Regionalism (IV) has, directly and/or indirectly, via globalization (CV), no effect on economic development (DV).

**Results**

**FIGURE 1: Facilitating Regionalism (Model 1)**

A. Bivariate vs. Path Analysis

[Bivariate Analysis]

Regionalism → Economic Development

[Regionalism (IV) has positive (+) effect on economic development (DV)]

[Path Analysis]

Globalization

Regionalism

Economic Development

[Regionalism (IV) has no effect (0) on economic development, but has indirectly via globalization (CV) positive (+) effect on economic development (DV)]

B. Individual Cases: Facilitating Regionalism

[Note: Path coefficients used below are based on beta weight (standardized regression coefficients) produced by regression (simple and multiple) analyses via SPSS. The path coefficient indicates the magnitude of relations between the variables; (+) means positive, (-) negative relations.]

- EU (European Union)

[Bivariate Analysis]

EU → Economic Development

.305

[Path Analysis]

Globalization

EU

Economic Development

.632

.599

0

TOTAL effect: (632 x .599) + (0)=.379

- APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation)

[Bivariate Analysis]

APEC → Economic Development

.166

[Path Analysis]
Pattern 1: Facilitating Regionalism

The causal analysis in Figure 1 (A) above is based on bilateral bivariate as well as multilateral path analyses. These two causal diagrams are based on the following two assumptions: 1) regionalism has a direct effect on economic development (bivariate analysis), and 2) regionalism has an indirect effect on economic development via globalization (path analysis). Figure 1 (A) portrays a “facilitating regionalism.” In bivariate analysis, regionalism has a direct and positive effect on economic development. Yet when the effect of globalization is controlled for, as can be seen from path analysis, the original direct positive effect of the regionalism, which appears significant in bivariate analysis, becomes insignificant. Instead, the effect of regionalism on economic development was found to be indirect via the intervening effect of globalization. The collective regionalism (collective institutional design) has positive effect on the multidimensionality of globalization of individual member state. The globalization, in turn, has a positive effect on economic development as well.

This pattern of regionalism was found to have a positive effect on economic development, but the effect of regionalism on economic development is indirect, via globalization. No direct independent effect of regionalism was found. Regionalism was found to affect economic development via globalization, on which it has positive effect. And the globalization positively affected by the regionalism was also found to have a strong and positive effect on economic development. Regionalism/RIGOs increase globalization, which in turn has a strong effect on economic development. Regionalism was found to have no direct effect on economic development.

The causal analysis in Figure 1 (B): Individual Cases section above indicates that EU, APEC, TPP, and NAFTA are classified as facilitating regionalism. It turns out that each of these four regionalisms has a positive effect on economic development via the intervening effect of globalization. Regionalism has a positive effect on globalization, which in turn has a positive effect on economic development as well. Their original significant effects on economic development, as shown in their respective bivariate analyses, were reduced to zero (insignificant) when they were controlled by the effect of globalization, as shown in the path analyses. This indicates that each of the four regionalisms/RIGOs has positive effects on economic development via the intervening effect of globalization. Their indirect effect via globalization on economic development as shown in their respective “TOTAL effect” are: EU (.399), APEC (.129), TPP (.107), and NAFTA (.091). And the path coefficients indicate that the EU has the strongest positive effect (.399) on economic development, while NAFTA the least, yet still significant (.107). Their respective direct and significant positive effects on economic development as originally shown in their respective bivariate analyses were due to the intervening effect of globalization, on which each of the four regionalisms has a positive effect. And the globalization positively affected by the regionalism has a significant positive
effect on economic development as well. This means regionalisms have no direct independent effect on economic development, but only via the intervening effect of globalization. These four regionalisms can be labeled as “facilitating regionalism,” as they have a positive effect on economic development/growth via globalization on which each of these four collective regional intergovernmental organizations have positive effects as well.

**FIGURE 2. Impeding Regionalism (Model 2): TYPE 1 and TYPE 2**

_A. Type 1_  
[Bivariate Analysis]

Regionalism → Economic Development

[Regionalism (IV) has negative (-) effect on economic development (DV).]

---

[Bivariate Analysis]

Globalization

-     +

Regionalism → Economic Development

[Regionalism (IV) has negative effect (-) on economic development (DV) directly or indirectly regardless of globalization (CV)].

---

**Individual Cases: Impeding Regionalism**

[Note: Path coefficients used below (Types 1 and 2) are based on beta weight (standardized regression coefficients) produced by regression (simple and multiple) analyses via SPSS. The path coefficient indicates the magnitude of relations between the variables; (+) means positive, (-) negative relations. (0) means no relations.]

_A. Type 1_

- AU (African Union)  
[Bivariate Analysis]

AU → Economic Development

-.369

---

_B. Type 2_

[Individual Cases/Type 2]

SAARC (The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation)

[Bivariate]

SAARC → Economic Development

-.122

---
Pattern 2: Impeding Regionalism

As seen in Figure 2 (Type 1 and Type 2), AU, SAARC, ECOWAS, and PC were classified as “impeding regionalism.” In both bivariate and path analyses, this pattern of regionalism was found to have a negative effect on economic development. In path analysis, regionalism was found to have a negative effect on globalization, which in turn is strongly and positively associated with economic development: the lower the globalization, the lower the economic development. The impeding regionalism in Figure 2 is again classified into the following two types: Type 1 and Type 2.

AU is the “Type 1 impeding regionalism” (see Figure 2/Type 1), while others are the “Type 2 impeding regionalism” (see Figure 2/Type 2). The Type 1 features the original negative effect of regionalism on economic development in bivariate analysis still remains negative in path analysis with the globalization variable. This means regardless of globalization, AU regionalism still remains to have a negative independent effect on economic development.

AU was found in Type 1 regionalism. It was found uniquely to have a direct negative effect (-.369) on economic development, as can be seen in bivariate analysis/Figure 2. In path analysis, AU was found still to have a negative direct effect (-.133) on economic development regardless of globalization. AU was also found in path analysis to have a strong negative effect (-.429) on globalization; the globalization negatively affected by the AU regionalism has a negative effect on economic development as well. AU regionalism was found to have a positive effect neither on economic development nor on globalization. The “collectivities” shown by this pattern of regionalism realized by AU turn out not to be conducive to the economic development of individual member states. Regionalism by AU itself impedes globalization, which otherwise would have a positive effect on economic development. It was found that this pattern of regionalism is rather closed and parochial, incapable of increasing/enhancing a multidimensionality of globalization, which turns out to be a strong engine for economic growth.

As seen from bivariate analyses in Type 2/Figure 2, SAARC, ECOWAS, and PC were found to have direct and negative effects (-.122, -.154, and -.107 respectively) on economic development as well. Yet, unlike AU/Type 1, their respective significant direct and negative effects on economic development disappear when the intervening effect of globalization is exercised as seen in path analyses. Instead, the three regionalisms have significant negative effects on globalization, which has a strong and positive effect on economic development. This means the three regionalisms have a negative effect on economic development even via globalization.

There are commonalities and differences between the two types of impeding regionalism. As to the commonalities, both Type 1(AU) and Type 2 (SAARC, ECOWAS, and PC) have negative effects on globalization, which in turn has a strong and positive effect on economic development.
development. The only difference between the two types is that Type 1 still has a significant negative effect on economic development regardless of globalization, while Type 2 does not.

**FIGURE 3: Suppressed Regionalism (Model 3)**

**A. Bivariate vs. Path Analysis**

[Bivariate]

Regionalism → Economic Development

[Direct effect of regionalism (IV) on economic growth (DV) is “insignificant” zero (0). There is no significant direct effect of regionalism on economic development (DV).]

[Path Analysis]

Globalization

0 +

Regionalism → Economic Development

[When controlled by globalization (CV), regionalism (IV) has a significant, albeit negative (-), effect on economic development (DV).]

**B. Individual Case: Suppressed Regionalism**

[Note: Path coefficients used below are based on beta weight (standardized regression coefficients) produced by regression (simple and multiple) analyses via SPSS. The path coefficient indicates the magnitude of relations between the variables; (+) means positive, (-) negative relations. (0) means no relations.]

- OAS (Organization of American States)

[Bivariate]

OAS → Economic Development

[Regionalism (IV) has no direct effect (0) on economic development (DV).]

**Pattern 3: Suppressed Regionalism**

The bivariate analysis in Figure 3 indicates that OAS has no significant direct effect on economic development. Yet in path analysis, once the effect of globalization is controlled, the effect of OAS regionalism on economic development now appears significant (-.127), albeit negative. The change from insignificant to significant effect indicates the original insignificant effect of the regionalism on economic development shown in bivariate analysis was due to a suppression effect of globalization. That is, globalization was found to suppress (conceal) the true relationship to “zero” between OAS regionalism and economic development. The true relationship now indicates a significant, rather than insignificant, effect of OAS regionalism on economic development. The original insignificant relations shown in the bivariate analysis were found due to the suppressed effect of globalization. Globalization has suppressed the true negative relationship to zero between OAS regionalism and economic development. This pattern of regionalism is labeled as a “suppressed regionalism.”

**FIGURE 4: Non-Affective Regionalism (Model 4)**

**A. Bivariate vs. Path Analysis**

[Bivariate Analysis]

Regionalism → Economic Development

[Regionalism (IV) has no direct effect (0) on economic development (DV).]
[Path Analysis]

Regardless of globalization (CV), regionalism (IV) still remains zero (0) in its effect on economic development (DV).

B. Individual Cases: Non-Effective Regionalism

1. Bivariate Analysis: The bivariate relationship between each of the eight “non-effective regionalisms” (FTAAP, ASEAN, ASEAN 3, MERCOSUR, ANDEAN, SCO, LAS, and CARICOM) and economic development all appears insignificant (0). For that matter, their respective bivariate relations were not individually diagramed here. Only the multivariate path analyses are portrayed below in “Section 2 Path Analysis.”

2. Path Analysis
[Note: Path coefficients used below are based on beta weight (standardized regression coefficients) produced by regression (simple and multiple) analyses via SPSS. The path coefficient indicates the magnitude of relations between the variables; (+) means positive, (-) negative relations.]

• FTAAP (Free Trade Agreement in Asia-Pacific)

TOTAL effect: (0 x .614) + (0) = 0

• ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)

TOTAL effect: (0 x .620) + (0) = 0

• MERCOSUR (Common Southern Market)

TOTAL effect: (0 x .619) + (0) = 0

• ANDEAN (Andean Community of Nations)

TOTAL effect: (0 x .619) + (0) = 0
Pattern 4: Noneffective Regionalism
As seen from Figure 4, ASEAN, ASEAN+3, SCO, LAS, MERCOSUR, ANDEAN, CARICOM, and FTAAP (proposed) are classified as a pattern of “noneffective regionalism.” They have no effect, whether directly, or indirectly via globalization, on economic development. These RIGOs/regionalisms were found to have no significant effect on economic development. Nor were they found to have any significant effect on globalization, which was found solidly and positively associated with economic development. These RIGOs share in commonality that their respective members are less developed countries (LDCs) and/or a hybrid of LDCs and developed economies.

Conclusion
Based on the four patterns of regionalism identified, except the pattern of facilitating regionalism, the other three patterns (impeding, suppressed, and noneffective) were found to be insignificant, suppressed, or negative in affecting economic development. A multidimensionality of globalization has been found to positively affect economic development. This is regardless of regionalism by RIGOs. Regionalism that can enhance globalization turns out to enhance economic development as well. Yet, regional collective intergovernmental designs pursued/realized by RIGOs, except in the facilitating regionalism, do not necessarily enhance globalization, which turns out to be a steadfast and strong engine of economic development/growth.

It turns out that RIGOs do not necessarily serve as a transition to globalization. Even facilitating regionalism was found to have no direct and independent effect on economic development. It was found to facilitate economic development via the intervening effect of the multidimensionality of globalization, on which it has positive effect. EU, APEC, TPP, and NAFTA were found to facilitate economic development of member states via globalization, on which they have positive effect. A majority of the member states of each of these four RIGOs are composed of developed member states. A collective institutional design/arrangement via RIGOs based on the membership of predominantly developed countries was found capable of facilitating economic development. RIGOs composed of primarily less-developed countries (LDCs) were found impeding, suppressing, or having no significant effect on economic development. AU, SAARC, ECOWAS, and PC, composed of primarily LDCs, were found to be impeding regionalisms. They were found to have negative or no effects on globalization, which turns out to be a strong and steadfast engine of economic growth.

RIGOs/regionalism, which is also highly heterogeneous/mixed in its composition of both developing and developed member states, such as FTAAP, ASEAN, ASEAN+3, Mercosur, and CARICOM, were found insignificant in affecting economic growth directly or indirectly.
via globalization. Even OAS (thirty-five member states), highly heterogeneous in its membership (developing and developed) in the continents of both North and South America, was found to be suppressed to zero by the effect of globalization. OAS was found to have no significant positive effect on globalization either. Regional collective designs arranged by the heterogeneous member states are not instrumental and nor effective in facilitating economic growth of each individual member state.

Regionalism based on regional intergovernmental organizations (RIGOs) should enhance globalization of an individual sovereign member state for economic development. A collective regional intergovernmental organization via its designs/arrangements should help an individual member state enhance each of the multidimensional ingredients/components of globalization, which turns out to be a steadfast and strong engine of economic development.

REFERENCES


Separation amidst Integration: The Redefining Influence of the European Union on Secessionist Party Policy

David Eichert

Despite the European Union’s hesitancy to support secessionist movements, European integration has inadvertently produced a novel opportunity for these ethno-regionalist political parties to strengthen their causes. Secessionist parties have realized that integration has created a reality where the costs of independence are much lower while the potential benefits of being sovereign in an integrated Europe are greater. In response to this change in structure, secessionist parties in Europe have become much more accepting of Europe than they were previously. This paper looks at the secessionist movements in Catalonia, Scotland, and Bavaria for evidence of pro-European responses to these new incentives.

Introduction

The process of European integration has been perhaps naively heralded by some as the end of national borders. According to this philosophy, statehood is less important and less desirable, and political goals can be accomplished at the European level without independent status. Economic and social policy are not wholly determined by states, EU law increasingly trumps state law, and there are ways for regional parties to achieve their political goals without complete independence. Some have even gone so far as to suggest that the European Union would evolve into a “post-sovereign” utopia of cooperating nations (Laible 2008, 1–2).

Despite this, however, many ethno-regionalist parties in Europe continue to seek to become independent states within the European system. Why do these separatist groups still want statehood given the various non-secession options available for change? Why, if the European Union is supposedly championing a post-sovereign mentality that discourages the creation of new states, are these ethno-regionalist movements directing their efforts towards winning over the European community? True demands for independence would seem to necessarily occur outside of the EU system, especially given the “democratic deficit” of the EU and the relative weakness of European state sovereignty today (De Winter 2001, 4).

I argue that European institutions have unintentionally offered separatist movements a unique opportunity to appeal for sovereignty at the European level. This happens because integration has lowered the cost of secession and increased the potential benefits of statehood. I further argue that European secessionist parties have identified this reality and have responded by changing their policies to be more supportive of European integration.

To test this idea, I used a historical analysis to ask two questions. First, have secessionist parties actually changed their policies over time to become more favorable to European integration? If so, were these changes the result of party leaders recognizing the benefits of European integration?

My analysis looks at the main separatist parties in three separatist regions: Catalonia, Scotland, and Bavaria beginning in 1967 (the year the Merger Treaty united the ECSC, Euratom, and the EEC) and continuing to the present day (2016). I chose these political parties because they once represented the full spectrum of opinion about European integration. While
the Catalan secessionist party Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) has always generally been in favor of greater European integration, Scottish National Party (SNP) leaders expressed ambivalence or mild hostility toward the idea in the late 1960s and 1970s. Moreover, the Bavarian separatist party Bayernpartei (BP) was strongly opposed to centralized European integration and for years campaigned against many of the EU’s core values.

In each of my case studies, I looked at how party policy on integration has changed since 1967. Did each ethno-regionalist party in fact alter its policies to become more supportive of European integration? If so, were these changes inspired by an understanding that European integration offers greater benefits to the goal of independence? I found that the secessionist parties in each region did change their policies to become more favorable toward integration and that party leaders’ conscious choices to support integration were reflected in both party practice and statements by party leadership.

My argument builds on the work of both De Winter (2001) and Laible (2008), who were among the first to point out that ethno-regionalist parties have become counter-intuitively pro-European. Both propose various forces that incentivize policy changes toward “independence in Europe,” with Laible proposing that “choosing self-government in the EU may provide the optimal means for nationalists to maximize sovereignty” (37). This paper builds on their proposed ideas of a causal link between EU structure and party policy by offering a more complete picture of the many incentives that have attracted secessionist parties.

This paper employs the terminology outlined in Dandoy’s typology of ethno-regionalist parties (2010), even though some of the works cited in this paper use different terms for the same type of political party (e.g., “nationalist,” “regionalist,” “minority nationalist”). Furthermore, this paper focuses exclusively on what Dandoy identifies as secessionist ethno-regionalist parties, or in other words, political parties that claim to represent a specific population group and hope to establish an independent state where a sub-national territory currently exists. These parties attempt to change the international community in a way that would eventually require official recognition by other states, “the redefinition of international borders, and the weakening of the host-state,” among other things (2010, 210–11).¹

Finally, it is important to note that this paper does not address the question of whether or not the European Union would actually admit newly independent states as members, either immediately (as some secessionists argue) or after lengthy bilateral negotiations. There is a good deal of disagreement about this topic and the situation currently remains hypothetical. Moreover, the situation of countries such as Iceland, which is in the European Single Market while outside the EU, or Montenegro, which uses the euro as currency without being part of the EU, further complicates any guesses about the ultimate fate of secessionist regions. Instead, this paper focuses solely on how secessionist parties imagine the role of European integration, both before and after an eventual declaration of independence.

Theorizing Strategic Benefits

How can secessionist regions benefit from European integration? What kind of incentives exist that could compel political leaders to change party policy? I have identified a non-exhaustive list of strategic benefits that European integration offers to secessionist movements, both before and after a hypothetical declaration of independence.

One immediate benefit of European integration is that participation at the European level provides legitimacy to secessionist parties, many of which begin as small fringe groups with little regional decision-making power and even less state-level power. As such, winning a seat in the European Parliament (EP) or gaining power within an EU institution allows secessionist parties to gain political visibility (Elias 2008). As De Winter and Cachafeiro point out, international organizations provide a space where ethno-regionalist parties can interact with each other, publicly advocate for each other’s causes, and train to become better politicians in general (2002, 492–94).

De Winter and Cachafeiro also argue that the European Union has created a space where these minor parties can set new agendas far from traditional ideological differences that usually monopolize local- and state-level political discourse. For example, the Latvian Russian Union’s sole member of the European Parliament (MEP), Tatjana Ždanoka, argues in Brussels for the rights of Russian minorities, free from the left-right divide that defines most of traditional Latvian politics. This distance provides secessionist parties “the opportunity to overcome traditional ideological differences and the ‘old’ party families in which some of these parties were and are entrenched” (2002, 496).

European integration also offers the prospect of weaker state systems of governance, which many secessionist parties view as an opportunity to circumvent allegedly “oppressive” national systems. Instead of trying to affect political change at the state level, ethno-regionalist parties can turn instead to European power structures. Dardanelli calls this new-found power a “systemic shift” and declares that the European Union has become a “positive alternative” to secessionist parties interested in guaranteeing their political power (2006, 140). A good example of this can be seen again in the case of Latvian-Russian politician Tatjana Ždanoka, who was banned in 1999 from running for a seat in the Latvian Parliament because of her prior involvement in the Communist Party. Despite this, Ždanoka could still circumvent state-level restrictions by running for a seat in the European Parliament, which she won in 2004 and has held since (Eglitis 2004). If Europe continues to integrate, greater sovereignty and decision-making capability will be taken from the state and given to the European Union, which creates an even greater political incentive for nationalist groups to Europeanize their policy.

Even for movements that lack the immediate possibility of statehood, there is a strong incentive to participate in the European process. Although the EU system is fundamentally comprised of states, it is also a complicated, multidimensional system of decision making with multiple entrance points. Secessionist movements can assert their claims within the European system without renouncing their long-term goal of statehood (Keating 2001b, 152). Similarly, for many of these small groups, the choice to not participate in the European process is simply not an option today. These groups must compete against larger established political parties that do not share their same interests, and even the most Euro-hesitant nationalist groups have accepted the current political reality. As Laible writes: [Secessionist] parties accept that they cannot change the EU or reconstruct it along lines that better suit their tastes unless they first achieve self-government. It is the fact that Europe continues to integrate, and not necessarily on terms that they like or that they believe are favorable to their constituents, that ultimately underpins nationalist arguments for immediate self-government (2008, 211).

After independence is achieved, integration also promises several important benefits. First, the European Union lowers the costs of secession by providing a way to ensure the economic survival of the seceding region. Before integration, the economies of many regions were almost entirely subsumed within the larger national economy. Secession for a peripheral economy before the establishment of the European Common Market would have entailed crippling economic isolation for the seceding nation. Moreover, retaliatory tariffs from disgruntled former powers against departed regions would have been equally disastrous (Keating 2001a). Today, however, European integration has reduced the risk of these international tariffs and trade barriers, which has in turn reduced the costs for ethnic-secessionist movements to secede (Champliaud 2011, 35). As Jeffrey has written, the “growing economic borderlessness” of Europe has created an opportunity structure where “central governments would not be able within the framework of EU rules to discriminate economically against restive or departed regions” (2009, 644).
De Winter takes this economic hypothesis further when he proposes that the “introduction of the euro solves the problem of monetary transactions costs that a new independent region-state would face,” such as creating and funding a new currency during a traumatic period of secession and state-building (2001, 9). Because of this, nationalist parties may reassure their voters that secession would not entail any drastic disruption in the regional economy (Keating 2001a).

The European Union system also makes it more costly for ethno-regionalists to be left out of the main decision-making positions in Brussels. Separatist parties have realized that statehood would result in greater representation in the European Parliament, a part in the rotating European commissioner post, and greater input about economic and political policy. These groups have also come to the bitter realization that small states like Malta or Croatia have more decision-making power simply due to their sovereign status (Gómez-Reino, De Winter, and Lynch 2006, 261).

Finally, the weakening of national borders also helps unify secessionist movements in areas where territory is currently controlled by more than one state. Examples of this may be found throughout Europe: the Basque people in Spain and France, the Hungarian populations in Romania, the Russian minorities in the Baltics, etc. In regions where there is an artificial border dividing an ethnic group, European integration has sparked interest in one day uniting separated regions. The creation of a “borderless” Europe has also facilitated communication and economic growth between divided nations, and ethno-regionalist parties on both sides of a border often coordinate their messages at the local and European levels (Keating 2001b).

Using this non-exhaustive list of incentives, I looked at how policies of the three separatist parties in Catalonia, Scotland, and Bavaria changed between 1967 and 2016. Each party responded differently, expressing varying levels of interest and enthusiasm in different incentives. Despite this, leaders in all three parties eventually grew to accept European integration, arguing that the benefits of “independence in Europe” outweighed the downsides of reduced sovereignty.

Catalonia

Catalonia is an autonomous region comprising the entire northeastern corner of Spain and a small part of southern France. Its capital is Barcelona, the second-largest city in Spain and one of the largest metropolitan areas in Europe. While the region has been considered part of Spain for hundreds of years, a growing independence movement focused on establishing a Catalan state in Europe may bring an end to that association.

The Spanish Civil War remains a particularly harsh memory for many Catalans, because it brought about the end of autonomy for Catalonia and the other minority regions of Spain. The majority of Catalans supported the Loyalists during the war, and the entire Catalan government was executed when fascists conquered the region in 1939. The Franco regime subsequently banned the use of Catalan and other minority languages, which were “Castilialized” in the new Francaist state. In later years, the heavy industrialization of the region brought in thousands of peasants from poorer Spanish regions, effectively diluting Catalan political power (Friend 2012, 95). Following the death of Franco, however, Catalonia’s status as an autonomous region in Spain was reestablished, and today the Generalitat (Catalonia’s government) has limited decision-making capabilities for the region (Champliaud 2011, 19).

Since the death of Franco, Catalan separatism has been spearheaded by the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, or Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC). As suggested by its name, the party supports left-wing policies and advocates for an independent Republican government in Catalonia (instead of Spain’s current constitutional monarchy). The party was origi- nally founded in 1931 and governed the newly formed and short-lived Catalan Republic until its abolition by Franco in 1939. While most of its leadership was killed or executed, the party survived as an underground political movement for decades and was formally reestablished in 1974. For years the party won 8–16 percent of the regional vote during elections and today is a leading member of the ruling pro-independence coalition Junts pel Sí (Together for Yes) (Marcet and Argelaguet 1998, 79–80).

While ERC strongly and vocally supports European integration today, this has not always been the case. During the democratization of Spain in the late 1970s, ERC focused instead on opposing the Spanish Constitution (ratified in 1978) and the new Statute of Autonomy (approved by referendum in 1979), asserting that both were inferior to their goal of complete Catalan independence (Argelaguet 2004). Despite this focus on other issues, ERC leaders were the first in the region to view European integration as a positive step forward for Catalan interests. One early ERC publication declared that an independent Catalan state in Europe was in line with “the direction of history” (Argelaguet 2004, 21). Furthermore, at the reorganization of ERC, Heribert Barrera (who would eventually be elected President of the Generalitat in 1980) briefly proposed creating an independent Catalonia that would share power with the European Community rather than with Spain. This proposal was largely a fear-based reaction to the oppressive Franco regime rather than a full-fledged strategic plan, since Europe was seen as the only feasible power that would be interested in protecting the Catalan people from further human rights abuses at the hands of the Spanish government (Champliaud 2011, 32).

In the first post-Franco parliamentary elections, ERC won fourteen out of the possible 135 seats. Despite this strong start, however, the 1980s were a period of decline for ERC, as the party was overshadowed by Convergència i Unió (CIU), Catalonia’s other main ethno-regionalist party. In 1984, ERC lost all but five parliamentary seats, and two years later the party failed to win any representation in the national election to the Spanish Parliament.

During this time of upheaval, party leaders continued to support the idea of some kind of European intervention in Catalonia. Much of this language focused on the economic advantages of Europe. For example, in 1982 Heribert Barrera announced that Europe could provide a source of economic stability and called for “the modernization of our economic structures [as] a necessary condition in order to be competitive in Europe,” which would in turn ensure the “survival” of an autonomous Catalonia (Parlament de Catalunya 2010, 104). By 1983, ERC leaders were advocating for Catalonia to join the European Common Market, citing the economic advantages of opening Catalan industry to the larger European continent (Parlament de Catalunya 2010, 51). Spain did eventually accede to the Common Market on 1 January 1986, although the powerless ERC had very little role in that process (Fundació Josep Irla 2012).

That year was one of rebirth for the party thanks to the work of Josep-Lluís Carod-Rovira and Àngel Colom, two ERC members. Following ERC’s disastrous performance in the general election that summer, Carod-Rovira and Colom drafted the Crida Nacional, a call to reform and re-found the historic ERC. The document was signed by over seventy Catalan leaders and rededicated the party to the goal of independence. Notably, the Crida Nacional employed new language which put the party on a new path toward “independence in Europe.”

The idea of a free Catalan country, within a free and solidary Europe of Nations and Peoples, is the idea capable of mobilizing our most energetic: the unsatisfied youth and older generations who believe in a new popular and national dynamic that is impossible to realize under the current legal framework (Fundació Josep Irla 2012, 8).

This language was a major turning point for ERC. On one hand, it recognized that it could tap into a growing demographic of youth who were disillusioned after a decade of Spanish democratic rule. More importantly, the party acknowledged the potential of Europe to become a stable political backdrop for a free Catalan state. At the very least, Europe could be a forum for protecting the rights of nations and peoples, rather than states and national governments. As Carod-Rovira would write the following year, “A person who craves legitimate aspira-
tions such as peace and freedom” could find answers in “the process of national liberation in Europe” (Fundació Josep Irla 2012, 13).

The Crida Nacional and subsequent mobilization efforts successfully reinvigorated ERC. Carod-Rovira established a youth wing of the party, which had as one of its founding principles the goal of creating a democratic society that could “only be possible in a free, sovereign and united Catalonia within a Europe of Nations” (Joveuuluts d’Esquerra Republicana). ERC also joined ethno-regionalists from Galicia and the Basque Country to run in Spain’s first European Parliamentary elections in 1987. ERC’s alliance, called “Per l’Europe de les Nacions” (For the Europe of Nations) won an impressive 1.7 percent of the Spanish vote and seated one MEP, who quickly joined the European Free Alliance (EFA) in Brussels. This representation in the European Parliament allowed ERC to advertise their causes abroad and gain legitimacy. For example, shortly after the 1987 election Angel Colom traveled to Brussels where he coordinated with the EFA and other NGOs to organize the first of many conferences on stateless nations in Western Europe (Fundació Josep Irla 2012, 15).

Over the next few years the party continued to consolidate its role as the main secessionist party in Catalonia, as various smaller pro-independence groups joined the ERC. By 1992, ERC was the third-largest political party in the Generalitat and had established branches in Valencia, the Balearic Islands, and French Catalonia. The party also began to expand their understanding of what integration could mean for them, with one ERC leader arguing that full European integration was key to Catalan independence:

“...when is free movement in Europe of people, goods, and capital... when the defense of peace becomes unified with the [European Community], as will inevitably happen... when it will be necessary to have a single currency and a single currency system;... when you reach the end of European integration;... when it is necessary to have a single currency and a single currency system;... when the Spanish government will no longer have any powers” (Palau 2014, 113–15).

The 1990s saw the continued growth of ERC. Although the decade was marked by violent separatist conflicts in the former Soviet Union and the Balkans, ERC continued to win local and regional elections by campaigning for a “Europe of the Peoples,” with one leader announcing, “If we [Catalonia] are ready to share sovereignty, it is better to do it with Europe” (Giodano and Roller 2002). Moreover, in 1993 (the year following the ratification of the Maastricht treaty), ERC argued that statehood was necessary for the full realization of their political rights:

“Current states are the only voice present at the United Nations or in important questions like European unity, international conflicts, or European solidarity. Stateless nations, therefore, have no voice regarding the construction of a united Europe... the Catalan nation should be added to all European bodies... Catalonia must participate on an equal footing with the other nations of the world, in all international forums both governmental (UN, UNESCO, FAO, UNICEF, WHO... ) and private (international Olympic movement, international sports federations... )” (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya 1993, 28–29).

ERC further emphasized this message of disenfranchisement during the 1999 European Parliamentary elections. Joining with three other ethno-regionalist parties in Spain, ERC argued for a utopian version of the EU where regions like Catalonia would be given the same state-like political power as France or Spain. ERC also pointed out how the current state-based EU system disadvantaged non-sovereign regions: “The size and population of some [EU member states] is lower than that of [Catalonia], so it is impossible to claim that the small size of our people does not allow for the exercise of their collective rights” (Cuè 1999).

ERC continued to push their agenda during the 2000s, winning over 16 percent of the regional vote in 2003 and forming a coalition government that controlled the Generalitat until 2010. During this time, party leaders maintained their focus on Catalan independence in Europe while campaigning at home and in Brussels for a weaker Spanish state, even arguing that EU institutions like the Committee of the Regions lacked the necessary decision-making power that Catalonia deserved (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya 2007).

The global recession in 2008 revealed the weakness of the Spanish state and strengthened popular support for secession. ERC leaders such as then-MEP Oriol Junqueras argued that their vision of independence in Europe made economic sense:

There is a growing body of academic research which supports the assertion that smaller nations are better equipped to deal with economic difficulty in the longer term. This is particularly relevant during this current time of economic difficulty when we see how, for example, the size of the Spanish state has not helped avoid recession. Catalonia is nearly contributing 10 percent of its GDP to Spain each year and yet the state has hugely increased its debt, threatening the euro and euro stability. Catalan independence is clearly in the EU interest” (Borgen 2010, 1,031).

That same year a new initiative was launched aimed at uniting the French and Spanish parts of Catalonia. Since the early 1990s, ERC leaders had toyed with the idea of using European integration to strengthen Catalan ties across the border. In addition to establishing ERC headquarters in French Catalonia, the party also campaigned on the idea that Europe could erase the reality of the border.

With the exception of Andorra, which boasts its own state, obtaining the independence of the Catalan nation within a United Europe is a fundamental objective... The Catalan nation is currently one of the many stateless nations in Europe where borders do not correspond to reality (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya 1993, 27–28).

In 2008, ERC leaders such as Josep-Lluís Carod-Rovira spearheaded an initiative to unite Catalonia under one economic initiative, called the Pyrenees-Mediterranean Euroregion. The project, like other Euroregion projects, aims to boost innovation and development in the region. In addition, however, the project is a way for ERC to circumvent Spanish rule and coordinate with French Catalans on mutually beneficial projects. Carod-Rovira made reference to this in the 2008 development plan for the Euroregion, in which he wrote:

“It is by overcoming borders, by solving problems affecting citizens living close to each other on either side of an imaginary political line, that regional cross-border cooperation becomes the living example of what the European construction should be. The European Union has diluted its internal borders and has made regional cooperation an economic priority” (Generalitat de Catalunya 2008, ii).

In 2012, CIU won the Catalan Parliamentary elections but lacked enough seats to form a majority government. As a result, CIU entered into a coalition with ERC, which allowed ERC to sponsor a nonbinding referendum on Catalan independence in late 2014. While a majority of Catalans chose not to participate, over 80 percent of voters supported the idea of an independent Catalan state. The ensuing secessionist fervor resulted in the dissolution of CIU, and in 2015, ERC and other Catalan secessionists created the Junts pel Sí (Together for Yes) pro-secession coalition, which won the most seats in the 2015 parliamentary election.

In late 2015, the Catalan Parliament passed a secession resolution for complete independence from Spain by 2017. While the Spanish government maintained that secession would be impossible under the Spanish Constitution, Catalan leaders celebrated, with the head of Junts pel Sí announcing, “There is a growing cry for Catalonia to not merely be a country, but to be a state, with everything that means” (Wilson 2015).

While the future of Catalan independence is unclear, it is obvious that ERC has realigned their policies to take advantage of the benefits offered by European integration. While the party was never hostile toward Europe, over time party leaders grew to recognize the political and economic incentives of establishing a united Catalan state in an integrated Europe.
done by Westminster. However, today the party has changed its policy and actively advocates for a sovereign Scottish state within the European Union. The decision to change policy was done very methodically and openly in response to new incentives to cooperate with Brussels, thanks largely to the support of Jim Sillars and other politicians in the 1980s.

The modern Scottish independence movement began as small groups began organizing in the years following WWI (Bodlore-Penlaez 2011, 44). Two of these small political parties—one supporting devolution, the other supporting complete independence—merged in 1934 to form the Scottish National Party (SNP). Initially, the party had very few opinions on political issues; it was nonideological and lacked a clear position on the best form of Scottish government. It also ignored right-left debates and spent most of its efforts explaining why its nationalism was different than that of Hitler or Mussolini. SNP continued to barely exist for several decades, winning few votes and raising little money until the 1960s (Lynch 2013, 1–50).

During this period SNP leaders expressed a kind of general and vague support for some form of European integration. However, SNP opinion turned against British membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) when it became a real prospect. Scottish nationalism emerged in the form of a vision for closer ties to the rest of Europe, viewing it as an assault by the British government and others on national sovereignty. Furthermore, there was a vague opposition to European integration, because nationalists feared that Scotland would be isolated on the periphery of a new European market (Champliaud 2011, 35). Instead, SNP enviously pointed to the Scandinavian countries in the European Free Trade Association, which all enjoyed a high standard of living outside of the European Community (Keating 2001b, 58; Goldie 2010, 3–17).

The early SNP proposed the idea of two “mother nations” on the island of Great Britain, which were to be linked by an economically interdependent customs union (Bartkus 1999, 190–91). By the early 1970s, SNP leaders extended this vision to include an independent Scotland at the head of an “association of states of the British Isles,” which would cooperate over economic and social issues. Most importantly, this customs union would not be linked to the European Community and would allow Scotland to reinterpret its relationship to the continent free of Westminster’s influence (Wilson 2009, 47).

The customs union idea gained little support, and in 1975, British citizens held a referendum on continued British membership in EEC, which eventually passed. SNP opposed the referendum on an alleged technicality, stating that it conflicted with the 1707 Treaty of Union. The party spent the year campaigning against the referendum with the slogan, “No voice, no entry” (Hepburn 2009, 193). After achieving independence from Westminster, leaders argued, Scotland could make the decision about EEC membership themselves (Keating 2001b, 58). Of course, despite the opposition to the referendum, SNP leaders were not necessarily opposed to the European Community; rather, they objected to being forced to join the European Community as part of Great Britain (Lynch 2013, 196).

Regardless of SNP efforts, the referendum passed, and SNP leaders were forced to rethink their position in a Europe, which was quickly leaving them behind. Four years later, SNP won their first seat in EP, which was filled by Winnie Ewing (Hepburn 2009, 193). Despite this, the SNP remained ambivalent about cooperating with other regionalist and nationalist groups, which they viewed as not committed enough to the principle of complete independence (Lynch 2006, 248).

The 1980s saw a methodical and purposeful reversal of policy by many SNP leaders towards European integration. The legacy of opposition to the 1975 referendum remained strong among membership of the SNP, and only after great debate did the SNP adopt a tentative pro–European Community position at their 1982 conference (Laible 2008, 106–07). Several factors influenced the change. First, many Scottish separatists viewed Thatcher’s Britain as oppressive and stifling, and Europe presented a way around Westminster’s restrictions. This was further supported by Winnie Ewing’s work in the European Parliament, which granted SNP leaders access to the workings of the EU (Hepburn 2010). Finally, it was the work of SNP party leaders, and especially that of Jim Sillars, that convinced the party to change its stance towards Europe (Lynch 2013, 197–98).

For Sillars, the debate about Scottish independence was no longer “merely an affair between nations on the island of Britain” but rather an issue of greater importance (1986, 185). Sillars was convinced that it was necessary to have Scotland’s voice represented within the European Community. For example, he argued, “As the European Community develops and extends its influence on policy, it is essential that Scotland has a seat at its top table where issues are considered and policy decisions are made.” Because England had different interests than Scotland, he argued that “it is of first-class importance that the Scots . . . contribute directly to the discussions and take part in the formulation of new structures and policies” (1986, 188–90).

Sillars also argued that active participation in the European Community made political sense. Luxembourg, Ireland, and Denmark all had smaller populations than Scotland, and yet they “have a direct say and vote at the Council of Ministers. They take their turn to chair the Council” (1986, 186–87). At the time, Ireland occupied the Presidency of the Community, influencing and setting the agenda on greater centralization. Why, then, was Scotland hesitant to join these debates? (Sillars 1990).

Furthermore, Sillars believed that Scotland would pay a heavy economic price if it did not actively push for its interests in Europe. Without proper Scottish representation in the decision-making processes of the community, Scottish interests would suffer. He wrote, Scotland contributes most to Common Market fish stocks, and oil from Scottish waters will figure largely in any attempt to create a common energy policy. Yet Luxembourg, with a smaller population than Edinburgh, and without either a coastline or an oilfield, will have greater say on these vital Scottish interests than the Scottish people (1986, 186–87).

Most importantly, Sillars emphasized the economic gains the new European Community could provide, because England “takes” 80 percent of Scotland’s manufactured goods, “the essence of independence,” according to Sillars, was based in the custom union with England (1986, 183–84). Simply leaving the customs union would destroy Scotland’s economy; instead, Scotland’s independence would be based in the new European market. He said: Along with others, I campaigned against entry to the EEC, and many feel our judgment has been vindicated by events . . . Scotland is now as much a part of the European Community as she is a part of the United Kingdom . . . When one repeats the question about the customs union in the context of the European Community, then it becomes quite awesome. The reality is no longer an arrangement between Scotland and England. The customs union is now Europe-wide, embracing twelve states with a total population of around 270 million people” (1986, 185).

This new European customs union could ensure that there could be “no financial, commercial or trading discrimination against a Scottish government and its people in any part of the Community,” resulting in “continuity and lack of disruption” to the Scottish economy (Sillars 1986, 186). Sillars’ statements echoed those of Gordon Wilson, then-leader of SNP, who argued that “within the common trading umbrella, the move to independence can take place smoothly and easily” (Hepburn 2009, 193–94).

 Armed with this analysis of European-Scottish relations, Sillars and other SNP leaders built support within the party for the idea of Scottish membership in the European Community. The change was gradual and painful for the staunchest opponents of Europe, but by 1986, SNP’s National Council announced that the Single European Act was compatible with Scottish independence (Laible 2008, 107–08; Lynch 2013, 197–98). By 1988, SNP adopted the slogan of “independence in Europe,” announcing its increasing support of Europe to the world (Hepburn 2009, 193–94).

Support for greater European cooperation increased during the 1990s. Winnie Ewing became chairperson of the European Free Alliance in 1991 and thus could better direct advo-
SEPARATION AMIDST INTEGRATION

In Bavaria, offers an interesting view into how Euro-ethnic autonomy (Ford 2007, 285; Hepburn 2008). The two parties had very similar platforms that emphasized conservative Bavarian values and success was the result of stealing massive numbers of voters from CSU, given the fact that election and 17.9 percent of the vote in the 1950 Bavarian Parliament election. Much of this for an independent Bavarian state. The party was organized in 1946 and was one of the most all been forced to develop a position on how Bavaria should interact with the rest of Germany. While traditional issues like religion and the right/left divide still influence poli-
tics in the region, there is also perpetual debate on Bavaria's semi-autonomous status. The state's ruling party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), has long advocated for greater Bavarian autonomy within a federal German state, and the other major political parties in the state have all been forced to develop a position on how Bavaria should interact with the rest of Germany (Hepburn 2010).

Bavaria

As has been shown, both ERC and SNP increased their support for European integration as party leaders identified the various strategic benefits offered by integration, but what about a Euro-ethnic party—one whose fundamental principles clash with the “ideology” of European integration? The Bayernpartei (BP) in Bavaria offers an interesting view into how Euro-

Bavaria is the largest state in the Federal Republic of Germany, covering almost one-fifth of the country's total land area. The state is also the second-most populous in Germany, and its capital city Munich is one of the wealthiest cities in the European Union. Bavarian culture is distinct from the culture other parts of Germany and a strong Bavarian identity has evolved since the region was first organized as a duchy in the sixth century.

Politically, Bavarians are much more conservative and Catholic than voters in other parts of Germany. While traditional issues like religion and the right/left divide still influence poli-
tics in the region, there is also perpetual debate on Bavaria’s semi-autonomous status. The state’s ruling party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), has long advocated for greater Bavarian autonomy within a federal German state, and the other major political parties in the state have all been forced to develop a position on how Bavaria should interact with the rest of Germany (Hepburn 2010).

The Bayernpartei (Bavaria Party, or BP) is the sole political party in Bavaria to advocate for an independent Bavarian state. The party was organized in 1946 and was one of the most successful parties in post-war Bavaria, winning 20.9 percent of the vote in the 1949 Bundestag election and 17.9 percent of the vote in the 1950 Bavarian Parliament election. Much of this success was the result of stealing massive numbers of voters from CSU, given the fact that the two parties had very similar platforms that emphasized conservative Bavarian values and “anti-Prussian” autonomy (Ford 2007, 285; Hepburn 2008).

Reeling from this unexpected loss of power, CSU launched a strong campaign of internal reform and outreach, which stole the vast majority of BP voters and thrust the party into obscu-

rity. By the 1960s, BP was only capturing 5 percent of the Bavarian vote and was last elected to the Bavarian Parliament in 1962 (Paterson 2014; Hepburn 2010, 103–04). The party floundered at the fringe of Bavarian politics for the next fifteen years, winning less than 1 percent of the Bavarian vote in election after election. Finally, after winning only 0.4 percent of the vote in the 1978 state election, party leaders seriously discussed dissolving the party (Hepburn 2008).

During this period of chaos and obscurity, BP had a fairly negative view of European integration. This had not always been the case. In its early years, immediately following the carnage of WWII, BP supported the idea of an independent Bavaria cooperating within a larger European system. By 1947, BP was proposing the idea of a “United States of Europe” to the American occupiers (Hepburn 2010, 121). Despite this initial support for some kind of cooperation, BP quickly and strongly came to oppose the direction that Europe was taking.

As European integration became more invasive during the 1970s and 1980s, BP actively campaigned on a platform of strengthening regional decision-making power and pushing back European encroachment. In addition to not competing in the first EP elections in 1979, the party continually emphasized its commitment to what it termed as “Bavarian values.” BP leaders decried the “foreign ideologies” of pro-Europe German leaders and advocated for an ethnically homogeneous Bavaria that could resist being overcome by immigrants and foreigners (Bayernpartei 1993, 80–86; Hepburn 2010, 117).

By the early 1980s, BP had adopted an even stronger Euro-sceptic platform, opposing what they viewed as the creation of a multicultural centralized European state that would threaten Bavarian culture and political independence. Interestingly, this policy change occurred while many other ethno-regionalist parties in Europe were turning toward Europe and embracing the benefits of integration. Despite this, BP resisted, speaking out against the European “ideolo-
gies” of cultural diversity and free trade. The party also resisted joining the European Free Alliance, instead preferring to create bilateral ties with other Alpine ethno-regionalist parties in South Tyrol and Austria (Hepburn 2010).

By the time the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992, BP had stopped pushing so hard to reverse integration. While the party still espoused several radical policies (such as restrict-
ing non-Bavarians from voting in elections or promising to expel large numbers of foreigners from an independent Bavarian state), party leadership also began to warm up to the idea of a Bavarian state in Europe. Party leaders, such as Wolfgang Johannes Bék, recognized that Europe offered distinct advantages in the fight for Bavarian independence that could not be obtained through the “detour” of Bonn or Berlin. The party also began competing in EP elections, winning 0.8 percent of the vote in Bavaria in 1989 (Bayernpartei 1993, 103).

By the 1990s, BP began to advocate for a “Europe of the Regions” and campaigned on slogans like “The Heart of Europe: an independent Bavaria” and “For Europe: Bayernpartei” (Bayernpartei 1993, 126). Despite this espousal of Europe, BP had a very specific vision for EU reform that included the establishment of a regional commissioner post in the European Commission and a Bavarian “representation” in EC that could promote Bavarian interests. These policy changes reflected BP’s reluctance to trust Brussels; furthermore, BP General Secretary Hubert Dorn emphasized that the party’s plans were simply a “stepping-stone” toward gaining power and independence. By the end of the decade, BP changed their rhetoric again, instead calling for a “Europe of Small States” that would include an independent Bavaria (Hepburn 2010, 122–23).

During the 2000s, BP gradually increased their acceptance of the European Union, even though the EU still reflected the centralized bureaucratic organization that it had so fiercely opposed for years. Part of this decision was made out of desperation: BP had no choice but to accept the EU in a 2009 EP electoral campaign ad, for example, the party claimed that 80 percent of laws that apply to Bavaria came from Brussels, underlining the importance of putting BP representatives in EP (BP 2009). Similarly, in a statement the party said:
In its current centralized, bureaucratic and undemocratic form we reject the EU. However, the consequence cannot be that we do not participate in the European elections. This is because the EU exists, whatever we may think of her reality. It determines our lives, every day. Its influence will grow dramatically in the coming years and will threaten more and more of our personal freedoms. Therefore, it is essential that the BP strives to create its own EU mandates, to participate in these decisions, and to be able to control the direction in which we imagine (2014).

BP leaders have also bitterly acknowledged how Bavaria’s dependent status restricts its political power. At one point the BP web site listed all the EU member states that are smaller or poorer than Bavaria and yet enjoy greater political power (Hepburn 2010).

There were other strategic reasons why BP became more accepting of European integration. One was a recognition that integration draws power away from Berlin. This realization has become central to the party’s independence efforts, even making its way into the party’s “Ten Points” statement, which calls the German national level “superfluous” (Bayernpartei 2016). BP party leaders also recognized the political advantages of having an independent Bavarian state in Europe. A major voice for this change was Peter Fendt, former economic spokesman for the party, who explained how the EU could benefit Bavaria:

Bavaria would have twenty-five members in the European Parliament. . . . Currently Bavaria has eleven members in the European Parliament. More importantly, Bavaria would have a seat and be able to vote in the European Council . . . [as well as] a seat on the Commission and one seat in the European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance. . . . Moreover, Bavaria as a member state would have a significant voice in European Union policy. The democratic deficit would be reduced significantly for Bavaria” (2007).

Today, BP still campaigns on a platform of a different EU but is much more accepting of integration than it was during the 1970s and 1980s. The party continues to push for a confederal model of EU member states where major issues like defense and foreign policy are handled jointly but (as one BP statement says) regulations such as “the size of European cucumbers” are left up to the individual states (Bayernpartei n.d.). Despite this, official party platforms call for the establishment of “a truly Free State of Bavaria, seceded from Germany and embedded in a European Union formed according to the principle of subsidiarity” (European Free Alliance 2011). Florian Weber, current BP leader, went further by saying, “One of my main political aspirations [is] obtaining an independent Bavarian state within a European confederation. This might initially look a little unusual, but looking at the bare facts . . . it becomes clear how necessary such a step is” (Bayernpartei 2013, 6).

BP also turned to the EU for legitimacy. While the party has yet to win a European election, the party joined EFA in 2008 and now works closely with other ethno-regionalist movements in Brussels and throughout Europe. The party used this cooperation as a way of legitimizing their campaigns, stating in one publication, “Many regionalist parties now work together across Europe. They are united by the idea of a Europe of regions, a truly modern Europe, which consists of smaller sovereign regions.” BP also frequently touts their membership in the EFA, with party publications featuring pictures and quotes of party leaders alongside other ethno-regionalist European parties, and pointing out that EFA MEPs also represent BP in Brussels (Bayernpartei 2013).

One important question to ask is why BP turned against integration in the 1980s when so many other ethno-regionalist parties (including SNP) did the opposite. A significant part of this decision can be explained by the existence of CSU, Bavaria’s ruling party. Even though CSU espouses greater devolution of powers and not complete independence, both parties have very similar economic and social plans (in comparison, ERC’s main competitor in Catalonia is CiU, which espoused right-wing policies different from ERC’s leftist agenda). As BP struggled to survive during the 1980s, it was forced to differentiate itself from a much better-funded and better-organized CSU by adopting more radical policies.

Of course, some of BP’s skepticism toward Europe is likely due to other factors, such as the inflexibility of leadership. Furthermore, BP remains reluctant to embrace the EU, especially when compared with ERC and SNP. Despite this, it is clear that BP leaders have adapted party policies as they have slowly recognized some of the advantages of integration.

Conclusion

Despite the apparent logical conflict between Europe’s independence movements and the growing “post-sovereign” European system, Europe’s secessionists have gradually grown to accept the advantages of integration. All three parties in this study recognized the necessity of participating in Europe both before and after independence was achieved. The three parties also have come to the realization that the EU system allows secessionist groups to weaken and circumvent the national state. Other incentives were more or less attractive to each party depending on its situation and ideology: ERC, for example, was eager to embrace the possibility of integration uniting the region, while SNP was more interested in the economic advantages to independence in Europe. While European integration offers a diverse range of incentives to secessionist parties, it is clear that each of the parties in this study became less skeptical of Europe over time.

This systemic change has important ramifications for government leaders and nationalist parties alike. The increase in nationalist power in several regions of Europe means that government leaders must think carefully about new EU policy changes. Secessionist parties may very well determine the future of the European system and, eventually, the meaning of sovereignty in Europe.

REFERENCES


Dijkstra: International Organizations and Military Affairs

by Sten Rynning, University of Southern Denmark


Hylke Dijkstra has written a highly interesting book that deserves to be widely read. The book examines the dilemma faced by states that enjoy the support that international organizations (IOs) offer but also struggle to control them, and it concludes that states tend to be too restrictive in their control measures. The book is well written and the conclusion is refreshing, if contestable.

The essential argument of the book draws on principal-agent theory. Fearful of “agency loss,” the argument goes, states use various “control mechanisms” that do enhance control to an extent but entail costs that can ultimately undermine policy (p. 13). Dijkstra first develops this framework of analysis and then tests it on three cases: the UN, the EU, and NATO. Moreover, each case—the secretariat of each international organization—is examined in two contexts: a generic one of institutional development and a concrete one of mandate-shaping for a military operation.

Principal-agent theory is well known, but this analysis of military cooperation at the international level is nonetheless novel. In setting up the secretariat of an IO, states seek to overcome costs of cooperation but simultaneously create an agent likely to develop distinct institutional and policy interests, which they must then control. Dijkstra steps into uncharted territory by applying this logic to the heart of military cooperation, bringing his theory into dialogue with the literature on national interests and alliances. The overall conclusion of the book offers a corrective to the mainstream emphasis of the latter literature: states tend to be too restrictive in their approach to international secretariats on account of national interests, and states could gain in terms of policy effectiveness by delegating more power to these secretariats.

There are two main empirical sections in the book, both of which compare UN, NATO, and EU developments in light of three theoretically anchored mechanisms for curtailing secretariat agency: non-delegation, generic rules, and shadow bureaucracies.

The first section looks at institutional development. The UN Secretariat turns out to have been particularly constrained by non-delegation and generic rules—resulting in the quite well known history of hampered UN capacities in matters of peacekeeping. NATO’s Secretariat (International Staff) is by and large controlled via generic rules, while that of the EU (the military component of the European External Action Service [EEAS]) is more broadly constrained. The UN and EU cases thus run on parallel tracks of widespread constraint, perhaps, the conclusion offers, because they are in a phase of creation and “because creation brings about more uncertainty” (p. 209).

The second section compares secretariat influence and control in cases of mandate negotiations. The UN Secretariat experienced its marginalization in the design of the UN mandate behind the force to support South Sudan’s independence in 2011. The culprit in this case was the U.S., which used its elaborate “shadow bureaucracy” to table a draft resolution that
“differed considerably” from that suggested by the secretariat (p. 148). NATO’s International Staff was constrained in the case of the 2011 Libya intervention, first by NATO’s late entry into the game and then by the elaborate generic planning rules that skewed institutional power in favor of NATO’s military authorities. Finally, the EU’s anti-piracy mission ATALANTA demonstrates a case of secretariat marginalization by way of non-delegation, an approach developed by the UK through 2008 as it found itself marginalized in its opposition to an EU mission. Therefore, it came up with the idea to offer to run such a mission through a national UK operational headquarters rather than a proper collective EU mechanism.

The overall conclusion is, as mentioned, that states tend to impose unnecessary costs on themselves by way of their choices of restrictive control. Costs are inevitable in principal-agent relations, but based on these case studies, Dijkstra concludes that secretariats actually do not unduly grow in size, can offer smart ideas for policies, and can professionalize the coordination and management of interstate relations (pp. 213–14). There are exceptions, of course, and EU enthusiasts will be alarmed to note that they mainly concern the EU. Still, the point is clear: states could benefit from enhanced IO secretariat agencies.

Dijkstra finds that interstate rivalry is controllable, even as national rivalries run deep. In the case studies, we repeatedly encounter French investments in the EU; UK reservations on the EU; U.S., German, and other interests in maintaining the status quo within NATO; the struggle by new NATO members to gain an institutional foothold; mistrust from the global south toward the perceived dominance by the north of the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations; and so on. Nonetheless, Dijkstra’s starting point with the rationale for cooperation (principal-agent theory) leads him to plead for the rationale of further cooperation.

Analysts, such as myself, who predominantly work with the international and institutional consequences of political diversity—what Stanley Hoffmann once termed “the logic of diversity”—will find this conclusion thought provoking. It is probably possible to engender common approaches by way of secretarial buildup, but the potential of secretarial buildup is probably also strictly limited. Focusing on secretarial capacity is in a sense putting the cart before the horse: secretarial capacity flows from the underlying alignment of national political priorities—from the sense of international order that particular states support.

Underlying political alignment would explain why NATO’s International Staff works fairly well in this comparative perspective and also why the EU and the UN are struggling. But even NATO is like the EU and UN: vulnerable to outsized membership, having expanded now to twenty-nine member states. The trusted fallback option of appealing to U.S. leadership is wearing a bit thin, though it may still last. The rise of China, populist politics, and other factors certainly create a situation where NATO visibly experiences the same disintegrative pull as these other organizations.

Hylke Dijkstra should be commended for inviting this dialogue between rationalist theory and theories of power politics. The latter will question his policy conclusions and the reach of his empirical observations, but this is part of the dialogue. The bottom line is that every analyst of international cooperation will benefit from Dijkstra’s careful assessment of institutional trends in the UN, NATO, and the EU. The book is well written, with admirably clear case studies, and the invitation to dialogue deserves to be taken seriously.

Adam Hug’s book examines the enormous challenges facing international institutions in promoting human rights and good governance in the former Soviet Union (FSU). Each chapter outlines the role of a different organization or institution, highlights major challenges that it faces, and asks how it can better perform given significant political, economic, and strategic constraints. The editor then summarizes the key recommendations for the organizations, which include the EU, Council of Europe, OSCE, economic institutions, national parliaments, and NGOs.

After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, a host of international organizations rushed into the region to facilitate the “transition” toward a market economy and Western liberal democracy. At the time, many academics worked in the field of “transitology” and tested theories of “democratization” on the newly independent states. Twenty-five years later, the reality is that there has been little or no such political “transition” in twelve of these countries (i.e., all the former Soviet countries minus the Baltic states). In fact, in several cases, we have witnessed the consolidation of authoritarian regimes and the partial withdrawal of international institutions. In parallel to this evolution, scholars now write about the diffusion of non-liberal norms, methods, and institutions across the region—and beyond.

The authors in this collection lament what may be more accurately termed the qualified failure of these organizations rather than the institutional “blindness” referred to in the book’s title. They take the normative stance that security across the region would be enhanced by improved human rights and governance, a view that is not shared by the regimes they are examining. The collection does not engage with the theoretical scholarship on the topic but instead succeeds in giving detailed, critical and up-to-date assessments of these organizations’ human rights promotion capabilities. This is important and timely as global governance today seems to be increasingly dominated by geopolitics, realpolitik, and hard security interests.

The authors show that overall, despite some positive contributions (they highlight, for example, the Council of Europe’s [CoE] Venice Commission, which gives independent legal advice to states), Western organizations’ mandates and policies have become more limited, pragmatic and less focused on human rights. The EU, for example, now prioritizes stability and economic ties in its European Neighbourhood Policy and in its approach toward Central Asia. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has seen the erosion of its “human security” agenda and the ousting or degradation of its field missions throughout the former Soviet region and is currently facing myriad challenges in trying to deliver impartial and independent election monitoring. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

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(EBRD) is still rhetorically committed to fostering transition in states “committed to multiparty democracy and pluralism” but continues to invest in authoritarian Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.2

The authors are in agreement that the degradation of the human rights agenda is partly the result of Russia’s and other states’ strategies to counter democratic norms, policies, and “Western interference” in their sovereignty. For example, it is well known that Russia has passed a series of laws designed to limit the cooperation of Russian NGOs and the West, such as the 2014 “Foreign Agents’” law and the law on “undesirable organizations.” In 2015, another law was passed that declares rulings of international bodies are “impossible to implement” (p. 49) and that the Russian constitution may take priority over international law.3 The implementation and ramifications of this latest law remain to be seen, but together these developments point to Russia’s complete pushback of what it perceives to be any Western encroachment on its (legal) sovereignty.

Many of the authors also focus on how the West and its own rhetoric and practices are sometimes complicit in post-Soviet authoritarian resistance. For example, Russia’s rejection of the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECHR) rulings is shown to have been partly influenced by London’s own questioning of the court’s judgements (in relation to prison voting).

Other chapters highlight the political nature of the organizations (for example, one chapter details Azerbaijan’s “capture” of the Council of Europe), the inconsistencies of the institutional approaches, and the “mixed messages” that the various actors are sending. For example, the chapter on the EU traces the downgrading of its “value agenda” but also shows how the partial retreat in values is less evident in the European Parliament (EP), which is more vocal on human rights issues but has little impact on decision making. In turn, the different bodies within the EP (delegations, committees, political groups) are convincingly shown to take positions that are often not in alignment and are sometimes undermined by political, financial, and other pressures. Thus, for example, political groups in the EP include politicians with different agendas (including some from former Soviet states) who informally shape debates on human rights. Parliamentary delegations have included politicians sympathetic to post-Soviet regimes who have acted to undermine resolutions.

The only real weaknesses of the book stem from the fact that the chapters are quite short and most use examples Russia or Azerbaijan (the chapter on the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative focuses on Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan). The book as a whole fails to capture the different dynamics governing each state’s unique relations with the various institutions. Also, because there are eleven chapters, each of which examines a different organization or institution, the publication as a whole sometimes loses its coherence. Thus, the very interesting chapter on Interpol, and its current reforms to address human rights issues, is a related but a very different issue, since the organization’s mandate is to respond to terrorism and crime. There is also a chapter that uniquely examines a regional (non-Western) institution: the Interparliamentary Assembly of CIS. It is interesting that this institution continues to be active, and its symbolic and legitimizing role could be fruitfully compared to other post-Soviet institutions (e.g., the Collective Security Treaty Organization [CSTO] and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization [SCO]).

As mentioned above, the authors do not attempt to engage with a more sophisticated literature on diffusion, promotion, countering, or implementation of norms and practices. Instead, they are concerned with developing a series of recommendations for those actors engaged in promoting human rights in the former Soviet region. Some of these recommendations are more practical and realistic than others. For example, a chapter on the limited role of UN global human rights institutions calls for helpful practical changes, such as writing up findings in local languages. There is a general call for more transparency within organizations and a specific call for EU parliamentary delegations and groups to be more carefully vetted in terms of both composition and leadership. This may be important and possible, but it would have only a minor impact on EU objectives and implementation. It is even less likely that OSCE would change its decision-making process such that only key decisions are taken by consensus, as is recommended by one author. At the end of the publication, the editor highlights many varied recommendations, some very general and some much more specific. These include, for example, that European nations show a greater understanding of the political impact their domestic criticisms of international institutions can have on the debate in FSU countries and that regional and global development banks provide clearer incentives for lending for democratic development and governance reform.

How can the human rights agendas of Western organizations become relevant, clear-sighted, and effective? This book does not provide definitive answers but does engage the reader with critical and thought-provoking analysis and develops some clear signposts to lead the way. In 2016, Western organizations’ raison d’être, policies, and practices are increasingly under attack in the context of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and military involvement in Ukraine; Brexit and the rise of conservative and nationalist politics in Europe; and sanctions on Russia and the dramatic decline of remittances for many post-Soviet states. This publication is a clarion call to pay attention to how and why organizations have not been meeting their human rights commitments and to rethink institutional goals, design, and implementation.

2. However, the EBRD is no longer in Uzbekistan, has limited relations with Turkmenistan, and has frozen its lending to Russia since its military incursion in Ukraine.
