We often seek to define Canada’s role in the world. Well, for whatever reason, we have one in Afghanistan. (Manley, 2007: 12)

**Introduction**

In January 2008, an independent commission under the chairmanship of Canada’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs, John Manley, published a report on Canada’s future role in Afghanistan (Independent Panel, 2008). The minority Conservative government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper had established this panel to review, analyze, and advise the government on Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan. The recommendations of the panel caused a storm of debate among Canada’s NATO allies. The report threatened the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) by saying that if the alliance was unable to support Canadian operations in the southern province of Kandahar, Canada should terminate its military operations in support of NATO’s International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF). It was clear to the panel that the current ISAF mission shows significant deficiencies. First, there are insufficient numbers of military forces deployed against Taliban insurgents. The panel stated: ‘[A] successful counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan requires more ISAF forces. Despite recent indicators of imminent reinforcements, the entire ISAF mission is threatened by the current inadequacy of deployed military resources’ (ibid., 35). The recommendation was to deploy 1,000 additional troops to Kandahar province to reinforce ISAF (ibid., 38). Second, the Manley report pointed to the lack of new equipment, such as medium-lift helicopters...
and high-performance unmanned aerial vehicles (drone aircraft) for the support and safety of Canadian soldiers. The conclusive recommendation of the panel was unequivocal: if those two main undertakings are not met in due time, ‘the Government should give appropriate notice to the Afghan and allied governments of its intention to transfer responsibility for security in Afghanistan.’ In short, the Canadian government then should leave its combat operations in Afghanistan.

Controversy over Canada’s role in Afghanistan, long an issue in partisan politics in Ottawa, seemed to reach ahead following the release of the Manley report as the Harper government indicated that it would introduce a confidence motion in the House of Commons asking for support for continuing the current mission (including the combat role) until 2011. The Liberal Party, the largest opposition block, reached a compromise with the government, and on 13 March 2008 the House of Commons passed a motion that extended the mission, calling for increased emphasis on aid and training of the Afghan forces, but leaving to the commanders on the ground the determination of the extent of the combat role. However, all of this remained contingent upon receiving the requested support from allies (see ibid., n. 2).

Nonetheless, the fact that one of the smaller NATO countries like Canada could demand conditions on its future commitments in Afghanistan beyond 2009 is highly unusual. Such behaviour is generally associated with NATO’s major powers, such as the United States, France, and Britain, not Canada. Nevertheless, Canadian contributions in Afghanistan since 2001 have brought Canada recognition among its allies. NATO’s chief spokesman, James Appathurai, replied to the Manley report with appreciation of Canada’s role:

Canada has played, and continues to play a very, very important role in a strategically important part of Afghanistan, and we would like to see that role continued. And certainly NATO will, to the extent that we can, support any efforts to provide more... to garner more forces, including for the south. We have a long-standing request to nations to provide additional resources, and as Canada will lead this effort certainly NATO will be supportive where we can.

Appathurai also said: ‘Let there be no ambiguity. Canada is playing a key role in this mission. We would like to see that role continue. We think Canada has accomplished a lot in Kandahar.’

This applause for Canada’s role in and commitment to NATO has come a long way. In the 1990s, the accepted wisdom among Canadians and Canada’s allies was that its military role within NATO had declined (Cellucci, 2005; Cohen, 2004). This analysis, however, appears to be inconsistent with Appathurai’s blessing of Canada’s current role in Afghanistan: assuming that the declinist school of Canadian foreign policy was correct that Canada indeed had declined
from world politics in the 1990s, the logical conclusion could only be that Canada remained a laggard after 2001 when the alliance contributed to the so-called War on Terror.

However, by closely examining Canada's record of international engagements in the 1990s, it could be argued that Canada never was a laggard in NATO but a committed, dedicated, and capable ally that did not shy away from its international responsibilities. While this may seem surprising given the cutbacks in Canadian defence spending in the 1990s and the withdrawal of Canada's standing forces from Germany in 1994, it should not be. In fact, during the so-called 'dark decade', Canada continued to make major contributions to European security in the Balkans. Canada did so because it perceived threats to international peace and security overseas rather than at home. Canada made its forces available through UN missions and through NATO. Its forces were engaged continuously in multilateral peace support operations to secure and maintain international peace. These missions gained increasing public support at home. While the Canadian Forces may not have been in great shape overall, they were nonetheless oriented towards deployments overseas, roughly similar in nature, although certainly not scale, to those of the US and quite unlike those of most other NATO allies, which were postured to defend their own European homelands. The Canadian bases in Germany were closed in 1994 and the Canadian government found itself with excess capability on its hands to deploy combat forces elsewhere in the world. Ottawa availed itself.

This threat perception also is the basis for allowing the government to uphold Canada's level of commitment after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and for emphasizing the importance of its expeditionary forces as the primary means to meet those threats abroad. Thus, for Canada, which is one of the few NATO allies that voluntarily deployed to the province of Kandahar, the Afghanistan operations have become the most salient dimension of its continued involvement in the Atlantic alliance. Indeed, Canada has demonstrated a dedication to the success of NATO that seems stronger than NATO’s collective commitment to itself. Only this fait accompli could explain Canada's role in the alliance today.

Our aim in this chapter is to challenge the accepted wisdom in the literature on Canadian foreign policy, namely, that Canada had retreated from world politics in the post-Cold War era and, specifically, from NATO. We offer empirical evidence for the opposite view and argue that the notion of the ‘decade of darkness’ is a misrepresentation; Canada was a committed ally and, relative to its size, contributed more to NATO than some of its major NATO allies. We present a revisionist analysis of Canada's role in the post-Cold War era, first, by examining the argument of the declinist school in the Canadian foreign policy literature. Then we analyze Canadian burden-sharing in the early 1990s, making particular reference to Canada's contributions to the humanitarian
crisis in the Balkans as well as to NATO’s military and political responsibilities. Finally, we trace Canada’s role in the Atlantic alliance from 9/11 to Afghanistan, finding that in this latter role Canada appears to be enacting NATO precepts in a manner more committed than other NATO allies.

**Canada in the 1990s: The Declinist Argument**

Distinguished historian Jack Granatstein (1998, 2004) and political scientist Andrew Cohen (2004) most eloquently represent the ‘declinist’ school in the literature on Canadian foreign policy. Indeed, their notion of an irrelevant Canada became a popular tool for explaining Canadian behaviour at home and abroad. Both analysts agree that Canada’s relative standing in world politics diminished in the 1990s. However, they come to this conclusion from different angles: Cohen argues that domestic political conditions pushed Canada into an isolationist foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. Held responsible for this decline is the government’s hesitation to fund key federal departments with international mandates, such as the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the Department of National Defence (DND). The underlying reason for the fiscal cuts was Canada’s budgetary crisis in the early 1990s that required fiscal restraint across the entire government. Particularly affected by these reductions were DFAIT and DND. The latter, for example, was forced to reduce its operating budget and to close its two bases in Germany.

Cohen suggests that Canada’s irrelevancy in world affairs is a novelty for Canada. In the 1940s and 1950s, during the ‘Golden Age’ of Canadian foreign policy under the leadership of then Secretary of State Lester B. Pearson, Canada was a vital international actor making a difference in world politics (see Hillmer, 2008; Nossal, Chapter 2, this volume). Back then, Pearson, Hume Wrong, and Norman Robertson (the latter two career civil servants in the Department of External Affairs) worked hard to have Canada recognized internationally as a middle power at a time when the country had the reputation of being the ‘helpful fixer’ or ‘honest broker’ in world politics. Since then, a debate has evolved in the literature about the explanatory value and veracity of the middle-power concept (see Nossal, Chapter 2, and Bosold, Chapter 3, this volume). However, according to the declinist school, this era ended with the post-Cold War era. In short, in the 1990s Canada is supposed to have vanished from world politics and has fallen behind on the list of the most influential countries in the world. Cohen (2004: 3) argues that:

> We did things abroad. We went to war, we kept the peace, and we died doing both. We fed, taught, and treated people in hard places, we brokered and proselytized in international councils. We bought goods from the corners of the earth and sold them there, too, and we became rich. We have a past. We come from somewhere.
Today, Canada is no longer ‘as strong a soldier, as generous a donor, and as effective a diplomat, and it has diminished us as [a] people’ (ibid., 2). Taken together, the fiscal cuts in the 1990s, according to the declinist school, resulted in a diminished international role for Canada. Particularly affected by the budget cuts was Canada’s military, which had become ‘undermanned, under funded, overextended, and ill-equipped’ (ibid., 27).

Granatstein agrees with Cohen. However, he argues that Canadian politicians and the public at large ‘killed’ the Canadian military. In particular, the generation of Lester B. Pearson can be blamed for having started this decline:

> What no one remembers any longer is that, when Pearson cobbled the force together, few in Canada cheered . . . . But Canadians never really understood what their peacekeepers were doing, why they were good at their jobs, and why they were needed. And because they fell in love with peacekeeping, Canadians began to fall out of love with the true purpose of a military—to be ready to fight wars. (Granatstein, 2004: 13, 14–15)

Since the era of Pearson, Canadians have elected governments across party lines that continued the neglect of Canada’s military and its foreign service. In the 1990s, Canadians starved the armed forces to the point where they had to ‘do more with less’: more operational deployments with less capabilities, equipment, and manpower.

Other analysts supported this view. Canada Among Nations, a well-acclaimed annual publication, argued in its 2002 edition that Canada was vanishing from world politics to the point where it became irrelevant (Hillmer and Molot, 2002). Others who have expressed similar views include Mel Hurtig (2003), Douglas Bland and Sean Maloney (2004), the Conference of Defence Associations (2002), a pro-defence lobby group in Ottawa, and the Conference Board of Canada (2000).

Indeed, the 1990s did not start well for Canadian foreign and defence policy.² The Mulroney government, while faced with a budgetary crisis at home, was forced to take actions to consolidate the federal budget. Even though all federal departments were ordered to save money, the Department of National Defence, while holding the largest single budget item, became the primary target for reductions. DND was forced to tighten its belt and cut expenditures. It did so despite the fact that the same government had promised Canadians in 1984 that ‘Canada will once again play its full part in the defence systems of NATO’ (Canada, 1984: 7). Despite the government’s review of Canada’s foreign and defence policies (DND, 1987), when it promised to invest more than $183 billion over 15 years towards the modernization of Canadian armed forces in Germany, it was faced with reality at the end of the decade. A lack of funds and of public support as well as high inflation rates contributed to cutbacks at DFAIT and DND. With the end of the Cold War, Canadians questioned the
rationale for large conventional militaries. A poll in 1995, for example, revealed that only 16 per cent of Canadians supported military investments, whereas redistributing Canada’s wealth to the provinces was supported by 73 per cent, followed by youth employment measures (66 per cent), and health care (64 per cent) (Greenspon, 1998). The Mulroney government cut the military budget in two sets: first, the procurement programs for new nuclear submarines, battle tanks for the 4 Mechanized Brigade in Germany, new helicopters, a long-range patrol aircraft for the navy, and 1,200 additional troops for the brigade in Germany all were cancelled in 1989 (DND, 1992). According to some estimates, this saved the Canadian taxpayer more than $1.3 billion per year. Canada also discontinued the Canadian Air–Sea Transportable Brigade Group (CAST) that was earmarked for the defence of Norway. Fifteen Canadian Forces bases in total across the country were closed as part of the fiscal consolidation process. The cuts took place at a time when Canada still had 6,600 troops forwardly deployed in Germany. The unilateral withdrawal of Canada from Germany cast doubts on Canada’s commitments to the alliance. This fear was shared equally inside DND.

In ‘Good Company’ and Pulling Its Weight: Canada and NATO in the 1990s

These cuts were made, however, with regard to the fundamental consideration that Canada’s national security policy was now being made in a new security environment. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 transformed the international system and changed the way states interact. As a consequence of these systemic changes, the level of tensions among Cold War adversaries began to ease. This affected the conduct of foreign policy, and neither Canada nor NATO remained unchanged. If the Canadian defence effort exhibited elements of decline in the 1990s, it nevertheless was more than pulling its own weight when measured against what other NATO allies were doing. Canada did what mattered most to the alliance in the 1990s.

Notwithstanding the withdrawal of Canadian troops from Germany, Canada remained an active ally in the ‘new’ NATO. In fact, the decision to close two bases in Germany was consistent with NATO policies. Like Canada, other NATO countries cut the size of their troops. According to John Lis and Zachary Selden (2003) they did so quite drastically. For example, American troops sent to fight in Operation Desert Storm during the Gulf War in 1991 did not return to their bases in Europe and were redeployed back to the United States. Generally speaking, the level of defence spending among NATO countries (measured against GDP) fell significantly; in the United States defence spending fell from 5.2 per cent on average for the years 1980–4 to 3.7 per cent for the 1990–5 period (see Table 12.1) (see Lis and Selden, 2003; NATO, 2003). France cut its
level of defence spending from 4 per cent on average for 1980–5 to 3.4 per cent for 1990–5 (ibid.). The United Kingdom lowered its defence spending from 5.6 per cent on average for 1980–5 to 4.7 per cent for 1990–5.

While defence budgets shrank, NATO’s military role became less important relative to its political functions, which have always been an integral part of the alliance but were less pronounced during the Cold War. During the Cold War, the numbers of troops and equipment, as well as levels of defence spending measured as a percentage of national GDP, were seen as an indicator of the extent of the member states’ devotion to the alliance. However, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 questioned these parameters of allied commitments. In other words, while military capabilities at one time were a solid indicator of how much a NATO state shouldered allied burdens, the size and capabilities of the military do not necessarily translate into international influence in the post-Cold War era. The alliance has had less need for military commitments that were designed for the Cold War. Instead, flexible and highly mobile troops were needed to complete a range of tasks, including peace-building and reconstruction, as well as fighting in wars. NATO’s London Summit in 1990, its first meeting after the fall of the Berlin Wall, provided guidance for NATO’s new role by endorsing co-operation with NATO’s former adversaries. There, NATO leaders officially determined an end to the division of Europe and offered countries from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) a 'hand of friendship'. The Soviet Union had become a 'friend' of NATO.

NATO’s new institutions, such as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace program, facilitated the outreach process and

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managed the evolving security vacuum in CEE. These institutions were based on three pillars: dialogue, co-operation, and collective defence. Canada was responsive to this outreach process, and actively supported the Partnership for Peace program politically because it was in Canada’s national interest to do so. It provided Canada with (1) transparency and a democratic control of the armed forces of CEE states; (2) a network of military and defence-related issues; (3) a co-operative relationship between CEE states and NATO; (4) confidence-building measures among new and old allies; and (5) it helped satisfy the United States for more Canadian globalism and solidified the Canada–US relationship. Whether all of this made Canada the ‘linchpin’ in transatlantic affairs between Europe and North America is debatable. The idea of Canada’s being a linchpin evolves out of the Canadian literature but is entirely absent from the US or European literature.

Militarily, NATO forces were ordered to become more flexible, more mobile, and more adaptable for the new security environment. Crisis management and multinational rapid reaction forces replaced large conventional force postures. Canada quickly understood the new nature of NATO and put its armed forces under a transition process. Then Chief of the Defence Staff, General A.J.G.D. de Chastelain, noted that the ambition of the government and the Canadian Forces is to develop ‘general-purpose combat capable armed forces, stationed in Canada for the most part, ready to deploy anywhere in the world in defence of Canada’s interests’ (quoted in Jockel and Sokolsky, 1993: 391). Thus, it is not surprising that Canada was able to offer its services during an evolving crisis in the Balkans. It backed up its word with deeds and money when a major ethnic conflict unfolded in Southeast Europe that posed a significant threat: the crisis had the potential to seriously undermine European security (Mearsheimer, 1994–5). The transatlantic relationship also was strained (Vanhoonacker, 2001: 147–204). Canada’s chief interest was to contain this conflict. While the United States demanded from its European allies more commitments for containing an ethno-nationalist conflict beyond their doorstep, it was apparent that Europe on its own was unable to stop it (see Cohen et al., 2003).

It started on 25 June 1991 with a referendum on Slovenian independence in which 88 per cent voted in favour. The leadership of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) did not recognize this declaration of independence and used force to stop Slovenian secession (see Burg and Shoup. 1999). When the European Community failed to bring peace, the transatlantic alliance, represented chiefly by NATO, once again was called upon, this time, to help in a crisis-management operation. Canada was one of the first countries to answer the call, which marked the beginning of a deployment that lasted nearly a decade.

NATO’s bold diplomatic and peacekeeping initiatives in Yugoslavia heralded a more interventionist doctrine of international affairs. It set a precedent in justifying on humanitarian grounds an intervention into the domestic affairs
of a sovereign country. Canada was a strong supporter of a more active and interventionist NATO in former Yugoslavia, notwithstanding the fact that Canadian territory was not directly threatened by this crisis. However, Canada’s interests were affected and it became one of the most outspoken advocates of a forceful intervention (Gammer, 2001: 80–5). What the government hoped for was a more forceful Chapter VII mission, which is a UN-mandated peace operation designed to ensure the peace by force if necessary. In that sense a peace-enforcement operation differs sharply from a peacekeeping mission.

Canadians first participated in the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM), and then in the United Nation’s Protection Force (UNPROFOR) (see Maloney, 1997). UNPROFOR was a peacekeeping mission mandated to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid, to establish so-called safe-zones, and to negotiate ceasefires (United Nations Chronicle, 1995). Canada’s contingent—initially of 1,139 troops—(Operation Harmony) was tasked with monitoring UN Protected Areas (UNPAs) in Croatia (Bland and Maloney, 2004: 230). They were deployed to sector west, which, according to Carol Off, was one of the most dangerous sectors because it shared a hostile front line. Canada’s contingent to UNPROFOR went through six rotations and was a significant contribution. Canada was the fifth largest country contributing to UNPROFOR (see Table 12.2). In total, Canada sent 2,091 soldiers, 45 police officers, and 15 observers (ibid.). Only France, Jordan, the United Kingdom, and Pakistan contributed more troops than Canada.

In view of Canada’s fiscal situation, this commitment can be seen as a major contribution to upholding international peace and security in Southeast Europe. Furthermore, Canadian soldiers were better equipped, in relative terms, than some of its UNPROFOR allies. Canadians, for example, were the

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<td>748</td>
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only ones having armoured personnel carriers, which made the Canadian contingent to UNPROFOR a fully mechanized brigade (Hewitt, 1998: 54). In 1993, Canadians encountered some of the worst fighting of the entire UNPROFOR operation when caught in the middle of the battle for the Medak Pocket (Off, 2004).

After the humanitarian situation had worsened and the Serbs disregarded NATO’s list of compliances, the alliance answered with an air campaign (Operation Deliberate Force), which led to the Dayton peace agreement of 5 October 1995. In 1996 NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) replaced an increasingly weakened and incapable UNPROFOR force. Canada sustained its Balkan commitments and dispatched 1,047 troops to IFOR (Bland and Maloney, 2004: 233). The Canadian contingent consisted of a mechanized infantry company, an engineer squadron, and a national support and command element. Thus, Canadians helped to enforce the Dayton peace accord.

In December 1996, a Stabilization Force (SFOR) replaced IFOR and, again, Canada did not shirk its international responsibilities. It maintained its troops in the Balkans through Operation Palladium. This time, the government increased the number of troops to help stabilize the region. SFOR, like IFOR, operated under the authority of UN Security Council Resolution 1088. Canada sent 1,327 troops to SFOR. This commitment pushed the Canadian Forces to their limits: nearly all Canadian army units rotated through SFOR (ibid., 234). Canada’s relative standing in SFOR, again, was noteworthy. With its contribution, Canada ranked eighth of 18 countries in total (US Department of Defense, 2000: II–9).

In 1999, a second crisis shadowed the Balkans, this time in Kosovo. The conflict started in 1998 when ethnic Albanians began attacking the Serbian minority. The response of the Milosevic regime in Serbia was to violently repress the Albanian population, which created more than 400,000 refugees and caused 2,500 deaths (Congressional Research Service, 2001: 2).

As in Croatia and Bosnia, the Kosovo crisis posed a significant threat to the transatlantic alliance, in that NATO’s most fundamental values were at stake. Again, Canada did not shy from shouldering some of that responsibility and was the seventh largest contributor (of 18 nations in total) to the 78-day Kosovo air campaign. Ottawa sent 18 CF-18 fighter jets and paid all of its own logistical costs. Although Canada provided only 2 per cent of the 912 jets, it flew 10 per cent of NATO’s sorties (37,000 in total). In addition, Canadian fighter jets, besides those of the US, were the only ones technologically capable of carrying precision-guided munitions. Thus, Canadian equipment provided NATO with a comparative advantage. Combining the contributions for the ground and air campaigns, Canada ranked third out of 13 countries in total. This was a disproportionate contribution to the NATO operation and one that Canada often does not get credit for.
In addition to its military commitments, Canada also was engaged diplomatically and financially in bringing stability and peace to the Balkan region. Relative to its size, Canada made a large contribution to the UN peace forces, which was used to pay for the common costs of the Bosnia and Herzegovina command. It gave $515,939 or 9.58 per cent of the total budget and was thus the third largest contributor (UN, 1996).

Moreover, as noted above, the new international security environment demanded that NATO’s armed forces fulfill new roles and responsibilities. Large, conventional military force structures with highly inflexible, inefficient, and largely immobile troops had become outdated. Instead, capabilities for NATO’s crisis management strategies established new demands in the post-Cold War environment. Thus, a state’s contribution to NATO’s rapid response forces can be seen as a benchmark of allied burden-sharing. NATO’s forces were now sectioned into reaction forces\(^1\): rapidly deployable forces, main defence forces that are the ‘classical territorial’ defence forces, and augmentation forces earmarked for reinforcement functions. NATO’s rapid response units are the forces that carry out NATO’s new crisis management strategies. These units include multinational command structures and formations, such as the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Land Force, the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps for ground forces, and the Immediate and Rapid Reaction Forces (Air). The ACE force consists of 5,000 troops and is supplied by 14 NATO states. Canada promised an infantry battalion group. In addition to the land forces, NATO also maintains standing naval units, for example, the Standing Naval Forces Atlantic (SNFL). This force consists of six to 10 destroyers and frigates. Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States each send one ship on a permanent basis. Canada’s relative commitment to the NATO Reaction Force (NRF) ranked sixth among 16 allies (Congressional Budget Office, 2001).

In addition to more mobile and flexible forces, there was high demand for more UN peacekeeping forces in various global hot spots. Perhaps a more accurate indicator for measuring a country’s relative commitment to these missions is the percentage of a country’s total labour force made available to these peacekeeping operations. According to the numbers in 1999, Canada ranked sixth out of 26 countries that sent peace support personnel to UN peacekeeping operations (US Department of Defense, 1999: III–15). Canada, in fact, ranked higher than some of its major allies, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany, and Canada’s 1999 contribution included a 15.8 per cent increase from 1998.

In addition to contributing to forces and operations, NATO also needs to sustain its common infrastructure, such as the headquarters building in Brussels, NATO’s operational commands, and other costs. The salaries of NATO’s international staff (NATO’s civil servants), as well as of the support personnel,
also need to be paid. The monies for this budget come from NATO member states. More specifically, NATO’s budget is divided into three sub-budgets: the civil budget, the military budget, and the security and investment program. The level of contribution to the operating budget can be interpreted as an indication of the commitment states made to maintain NATO’s operational effectiveness. In 1999, Canada contributed US $53.7 million (of US $1,114.8 million in total), or 4.8 per cent, to NATO’s common budgets (Congressional Budget Office, 2001). This placed Canada sixth among 19 NATO allies in 1999.

Peace, security, and stability were clearly the priorities of NATO in the early 1990s. As part of NATO’s ‘hand of friendship’, the alliance also donated aid to Central and Eastern Europe. Between 1991 and 1997, Canada gave US $251 million, or 5.94 per cent of its GDP, in support of nation-building projects in CEE (ibid.). This placed Canada fourth out of 17 nations in total. Only Germany, Denmark, and Norway offered more economic aid to CEE than Canada. 12

In the post-Cold War era, Ottawa, largely with public support, had been dispatching forces overseas to participate in increasingly robust peacekeeping operations. Notwithstanding the fact that this meant the Canadian Forces engaged in some of their heaviest fighting since the Korean War, the peacekeeping myth did not go away (for a recent discussion, see Granatstein, 2007: ch. 2). Canadian peacekeeping was good politics for the government in Ottawa and kept the critics of Canada’s armed forces at bay. Nevertheless, when it joined the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001–2 to topple the Taliban regime, Ottawa was operating in line with Canadian defence policy and the military experience of the 1990s. ‘Here was still another multilateral “peace-enforcement” operation in a troublesome area of the world’, which saw Canada deploying forces alongside traditional allies and friends in an operation that was fully sanctioned by both the UN and NATO (Jockel and Sokolsky, 2008: 103–4). Moreover, despite the cuts and budget reductions of the 1990s, Ottawa, as foreseen in the 1994 White Paper (DND, 1994), had the expeditionary forces to deploy. It sent six naval vessels, multiple aircraft, and 2,000 troops (see Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, 2008; Lang and Stein, 2007).

The mission in Afghanistan was in Canada’s national interest as that country was proven to have provided safe haven for international terrorists who continued to pose violent threats against Western cities and infrastructure, including those in Canada. Thus, the Canadian decision to deploy forces to Afghanistan in the fall of 2001 and early 2002 cannot be explained simply as an attempt to please Washington. All Canadian governments since 2001, as well as many Canadians, see the incidents of global terrorism that have arisen from radical Islam as a threat to Canada. The Martin government put it succinctly in the 2005 defence policy statement by saying that ‘an increasingly interdependent world has tightened the links between international and domestic security, and
developments abroad can affect the safety of Canadians in unprecedented ways. Today's front lines stretch from the streets of Kabul to the rail lines of Madrid to our own Canadian cities' (Canada, 2005: 5). One pro-defence pundit has said bluntly: 'We are at war', J.L. Granatstein noted. 'Ultimately the war against Islamist terrorism is our war' (Granatstein, 2007: 74).

Moreover, the decision to participate in the Afghanistan mission was in line with the approach to national security that had been championed by Lloyd Axworthy, Canada's Foreign Minister from 1996 to 2000. Garnering a large measure of popular support, and reflecting on the character of the UN and NATO operations of the 1990s, Axworthy had argued that the meaning of security had changed. It was no longer the security of states that was at risk, but that of the lives and rights of individuals, even from their own governments. Thus, Canada should be prepared to use its military to promote 'human security'. As Axworthy explained: 'When other means of addressing the threats have been exhausted, robust measures (including military action) may be needed to defend human security' (Axworthy, 1999). The atrocities committed by the Taliban and by the terrorists they harboured met the human security interventionist criteria.

In Washington and elsewhere, the regime of Saddam Hussein was viewed as another oppressive regime that mistreated its own population for its own benefit. Consequently, during the run-up to the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 and believing that Ottawa shared this view, the George W. Bush administration had put out its diplomatic feelers to elicit support from Canada. The Chrétien government dithered until the eve of war. As two analysts put it: 'To say the least, the Canadian government was hedging its bets and ducking the hard question until the very last minutes' (Brunnee and Di Giovanni, 2005: 378). It appeared in retrospect that Canada had worked with two strategies. Through diplomatic circles the US government was made to believe that Canada would support the mission in Iraq. The Canadian military, assuming the government would join Washington in an attack, co-ordinated with the US Central Command to send a Canadian battle group of 600–800 troops to Iraq. These steps were taken notwithstanding the fact that Canada's Minister of National Defence was publicly on record to committing 1,000 Canadian military personnel to the NATO-led ISAF mission. His commitment, in turn, meant that Canadian ground forces were not readily available to fight with the US in Iraq. Paul Cellucci, who then was the US ambassador to Canada, contends in his account of his efforts to secure Canadian participation that '[d]espite the obvious hesitations about the prospects of an invasion, we believed that Canada would be with us even without a second UN resolution on Iraq' (Cellucci, 2005: 135). At the same time, Canada's diplomats at the Canadian mission to the UN worked around the clock to solicit international support for a compromise resolution on Iraq. In retrospect, and in light of later revelations,
it is evident that the United States was given no clear indication as to what the Canadian position was on the invasion of Iraq.

It was, therefore, still something of a surprise to Washington when, on 17 March 2003, the Prime Minister told a cheering House of Commons that Canada would not participate in the war. Coming after what seemed to be an inconsistent Canadian approach, the method by which the final decision was made illustrates a consistency in Canadian national security policy, namely, that decisions are made at the highest level, in either the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) or the Privy Council Office (PCO), and not in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Indeed, during the 1990s DFAIT worked at arm’s length from the PMO and PCO. The focus of the department had shifted to international trade issues, exploring ways of accessing new markets for Canadian businesses. NATO policy was of minor importance, if at all, to the department.

From the standpoint of the Bush administration the problem was not so much Ottawa’s decision not to contribute forces but Prime Minister Chrétien’s stated reasons for this decision. The Prime Minister openly rejected the US policy of regime change and associated Canada with the strong opposition coming from some other NATO allies, notably Germany and France. Moreover, Mexico and Chile, countries in a region of increasing interest to Canada, openly opposed the attack. Above all, Ottawa voiced its concern about what it saw as the unilateral nature of the invasion. In his remarks in the House of Commons, Chrétien criticized the United States for its lack of a clear UN mandate. What the Prime Minister did not mention was that a few years earlier, in 1999, the Canadian government had sent military forces to fight against Serbia, also without the explicit endorsement of the UN.

In addition, in spite of Chrétien’s ‘no’, Canada indirectly supported the US by sending 31 exchange officers to serve with American and British ground forces in Iraq. Also, Canadian ships sailed to the Persian Gulf in support of enforcing UN sanctions against Iraq. Ironically, despite Ottawa’s loud protestations that it was unwilling to join the ‘coalition of the willing’, Canada made a larger contribution than some who did join.

Still, Canada was acutely aware that steps were required to respond to Washington’s irritation over how Ottawa had handled the Iraq issue. Not surprisingly, then, almost immediately after the ‘no’ to Iraq, the Chrétien government had moved quickly to say ‘yes’ to deploying the promised forces to the ongoing mission in Afghanistan. In a sense, the new deployment to Afghanistan had become Canada’s substitute for participating in the Iraq war. Chrétien’s successors, Paul Martin and Stephen Harper, continued to demonstrate to Washington, and to the American people and media, that, notwithstanding the recent disagreement over Iraq and despite unprecedented criticism of Canada in right-wing American media outlets, Canada has been
a good ally. The embassy in Washington mounted a vigorous public relations campaign, which included placing posters in the Washington, DC, transit system assuring Americans that Canada took the War on Terror seriously and made a major contribution to the war in Afghanistan. More concretely and importantly, both the Martin and Harper governments increased the level of defence spending and pledged to expand the Canadian military. They began to act on the military advice offered by the new and more forceful Chief of the Defence Staff, General Rick Hillier, who wanted to ‘transform’ the Canadian military by placing greater emphasis upon war-fighting and the need to provide the weapons to make this possible. The Martin government, acting on the recommendation of General Hillier, not only renewed the mandate in Afghanistan but also sent forces to the dangerous south. The Harper government, which came into office in 2006, fully endorsed that position and stayed the course.

Given the current number of American troops deployed and additional ones about to be dispatched to Afghanistan, the overall Canadian contribution of about 2,800 may not seem significant. Nonetheless, Canada’s contributions to ISAF represent the fourth largest commitment of a NATO ally. Only the US, Britain, and Germany send more troops. Canada also is one of the few countries that engaged in combat. Thus, when measured qualitatively rather than quantitatively, Canada’s ranking as an ally is high.

Canada was able to afford this commitment as its economy had recovered from the recession in the early 1990s. Since the end of the fighting in the Balkans, the Canadian Forces also had no other major military commitment overseas. Nonetheless, for a total force of 60,000 personnel, the Afghanistan commitment is a significant burden. DND’s internal bureaucracy has pointed out that the Canadian Forces cannot undertake any other major military operation in the near future.

The Afghanistan operation also has been the first test of Canada’s new military doctrine of a ‘three-block war’, in which the armed forces must be prepared to engage in the full spectrum of conflict, including peacekeeping, peacemaking, and assistance in humanitarian relief. The concept was first developed by General Charles Krulak of the US Marines. As noted, the Canadian version of the doctrine is rooted in the experience of Canadian service personnel in failed and failing states in the 1990s. During these conflicts, Canadian soldiers were called on by other allies, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations to perform a variety of tasks. Moreover, although the Canadian version of three-block war is based on human security, Canadian Axworthians were not eager, for their part, to recognize that human security dovetails very nicely with the arguments of the Bush administration and US neo-conservatives that terrorism can best be fought by encouraging democracy, development, and human rights in the Middle East’s trouble spots.
Conclusion

Canada’s contributions to the war in Afghanistan are just the latest demonstration, albeit the most dramatic and costly, of Canada’s commitment to NATO since the inauguration of the alliance in 1949. Though criticized in some circles for being a laggard, especially after the Cold War, because of deep cuts in defence spending and force levels, Canada did maintain an expeditionary capability. Ottawa used its diminished forces to shoulder a significant portion of the burden through its peace-enforcement missions in Balkans in the 1990s in support of European security and NATO when and where such support was most needed. When the post-Cold War decade ended, Canada had also gotten its fiscal house in order and enjoyed budgetary surpluses and a growing economy. Thus, despite the many problems that beset the Canadian Forces, Ottawa was strategically, politically, and materially predisposed and able to deploy military forces to Afghanistan again in 2001 when Canada was called upon by its allies to make a contribution in blood and treasure. This commitment spurred the Canadian government to markedly increase defence spending and to afford the forceful and outspoken Chief of the Defence Staff, General Rick Hillier, greater influence over the defence policy in general and the operations in Afghanistan in particular. The men and women of the Canadian Forces have risen to the challenge and the confidence placed in them, demonstrating a military prowess that has earned them the justifiable praise of allies and a newfound pride among the Canadian people.

During the Canadian federal election in the fall of 2008 Prime Minister Harper made a surprising public announcement that a re-elected Conservative government would withdraw Canadian troops from Afghanistan by 2011. The Conservatives won the election but with another minority government. In the Speech from the Throne of 20 November, which opened the new Parliament following the election, the Harper government stated that it would be ‘transforming Canada’s mission in Afghanistan to focus on reconstruction and development, and to prepare for the end of the military mission there in 2011’ (Canada, 2008). The following day, at a meeting in Canada of countries with troops in southern Afghanistan, the Minister of National Defence, Peter MacKay, was asked how Ottawa would respond to a request from US President-Elect Barack Obama for ‘additional help’ in Afghanistan. MacKay responded that the US would have to look to other countries rather than those ‘already carrying a disproportionate share of the load’. ‘The reality is’, he stressed, ‘there are other NATO doors that president-elect Obama should be knocking on first’ (CBC, 2008). Nevertheless, Ottawa has indicated that it will continue to contribute to the goal of promoting development, democracy, and stability in Afghanistan.

A consistently committed ally in war and peace, including during the 1990s, Canada is indeed now behaving in a manner more NATO than NATO.
when it comes to the alliance’s stated objectives with regard to Afghanistan. The sacrifices, as well as the willingness of the government to expend political capital in the face of a still ambivalent public, have surely earned Ottawa the right to demand that there now be more NATO in Afghanistan.

Notes

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1. This notion became particularly popular after Canada helped to mediate international conflicts such as the Suez Crisis in 1956. See, e.g., Chapnick (2005).
2. To be fair to the declinist school, it should be acknowledged that their analysis extends beyond the Canada–NATO relationship. Yet, implicitly or explicitly, it still is a pivotal part of that analysis.
3. This sum excludes the money spent for training the forces in Germany. See, e.g., Rempel (1992: 232).
4. The literature on the Gulf War and the composition of Operation Desert Storm is vast. Collins (1991) provides a succinct overview. For US forces not returning to Germany but to the United States, see Campbell and Ward (2003). For a greater analysis of the transformation of post-1989 forces, see Moskos et al. (2000).
5. This change of the notion of security has been affirmed by the NATO Secretary-General, Javier Solana. See ‘Press Point of Mr. Javier Solana, NATO Secretary General, and Minister Igor Rodionov, Russian Defence Minister’, Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers Session, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 18 Dec. 1996.
6. As one aide to Secretary-General Manfred Woerner said, Woerner convinced NATO leaders that the window of opportunity to help shape the new democracies of CEE was very small. Interview with Jamie Shea, NATO Headquarters, 18 May 2007. For a detailed account of an evolving NATO in the 1990s, see, e.g., Kay (1998). Others accounts include Haglund (1996); Asmus (2002); Sloan (1989, 2002); Asmus et al. (1993).
7. Charles Moskos, while analyzing and comparing the transformation of Western armed forces, noted that Canada was one of the first countries that successfully transformed its armed forces to a post-modern military. See Moskos et al. (2000: 9).
8. Lenard Cohen counted a different number of Canadian troops and came to 1,035 in total (see Cohen, 2003: 127). The official DND number is 1,029, according to an interview with a DND official, June 2007.
9. The numbers provided by Bland and Maloney in Campaigns for International Security, it should be noted, are not identical with numbers available from other publications or official government documents. Cohen (2003: 127), for example, counted 1,800 troops as Canada’s contribution to SFOR. DND lists 1,641 as the official number (interview with Senior Officer of DND, Finance Section, 2007).
10. Numbers have to be treated with caution. Daalders and O’Hanlon (2000: 4), for example, counted ‘nearly 40,000’ sorties.
11. All references to statistics and organization relate to the 1990s.
12. More specifically, the numbers for France between 1991 and 1997 are US $219 million (or 5.18 per cent), for the United Kingdom US $106.5 million (or 2.52 per cent), and for the United States US $244.6 million (or 5.79 per cent). Congressional Budget Office (2001).
References


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**Additional Readings**