NATO, the EU and Darfur: Separate but Together

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Introduction

The end of the Cold War brought about a number of changes in regional and international organizations and institutions. At the international level, we have seen an increased willingness on the part of the United Nations Security Council to deal with intra-state conflict and to do so by using operations that are multi-dimensional and geared towards a wider range of objectives. Similar changes have occurred at the regional level. A number of regional organizations have taken on new tasks in new geographic areas. Many of these regional organizations have also engaged in reform processes that have brought about institutional changes in both membership and mandate.

This is especially the case for NATO and the European Union where the end of the Cold War fundamentally changed the security landscape in Europe. As each organization has sought to address the resultant challenges relating to roles and functions, they have also had to adjust their relationships with one another. In expanding their roles and their geographic scope, the EU and NATO have found themselves increasingly crossing paths in their out of area activities.

It is in that context that we explore the roles of NATO and the EU in Darfur. Although their role in the crisis is relatively recent, it provides an early test of a number of issues and hypotheses discussed in this volume, in particular, the overall question of whether NATO and the EU operate jointly or separately in a complementary or competitive manner. In order to address this question, this chapter shall answer the following: what contribution does each organization make as regards Darfur?; Do these contributions represent a shift in their usual contributions to international crises?; And what is the impact on the international community when regional organizations like NATO and the EU increase their contributions and activities in a conflict zone outside their traditional mandates?

This chapter has four sections. The first section provides a brief overview of the situation in Darfur in order to provide the backdrop for the NATO and EU response. The second
section outlines the role of NATO and the third deals with that of the EU. In each case, the nature and rationale for involvement is examined in the context of ongoing changes in each organization. The final section addresses the issues raised by this examination and discusses some of their implications with respect to the inter-relationship of the two entities and the transatlantic relationship more generally.

1) The Crisis in Darfur – A Brief Overview

Sudan’s history is described as “troubled”, “conflict-prone” and “war ravaged”. This is especially the case for the western province of Darfur. In 2003, a Darfuri rebel alliance attacked government police and military outposts setting alight a firestorm of violence. At the centre of this conflict are the black, African Darfuri people, or zurga (an Arabic racial slur meaning “black”), who have been tortured, raped, murdered and chased from their villages by Sudanese-backed militia proxies called the Janjaweed. With 200,000 Darfuri dead and a further 2.5 million displaced and spilling into neighbouring Chad, the situation is untenable. As much as the international community recognizes that, indeed, “something” must be done, the Sudanese President, Omar al-Bashir, blocks attempts to bolster the 7,000-strong African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) even threatening in the

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1 The current rebel alliance includes the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The alliance is shaky at best. On April 8, 2004 in N’Djamena, a ceasefire and disarmament agreement was signed between these rebel groups and the government of Sudan. Both parties have violated the cease-fire consistently. See S/PRST/2004/18 and S/RES/1556 (2004). See also Somini Sengupta, “First test of alliance is Darfur: The AU may rise or fall on performance there”, International Herald Tribune, November 29, 2004; “Darfur rebels call for unity as clashes continue”, Reuters, October 18, 2006.
3 In Egypt, black African Sudanese are called “samara” - also a derogatory term. Historically, the racial divisions were largely meaningless. Racial ideology, however, has taken on particular significance. The categorization of Arab and Black/African Muslims is largely one of convenience. Through intermarriage and periodic migration, the categories do not apply to the reality of Darfur. No part of Darfur was ever ethnically homogenous. Nonetheless, the non-Arab origins serve as a rallying point. The legacies of slavery and colonialism have contributed to the invention of two classes of people with different privileges. Scarcce natural resources and environmental changes since the 1980s have further aggravated class and ethnic tensions.
5 On May 28, 2004, the AU decided to deploy a monitoring mission in Darfur to observe compliance with the N’djamen Humanitarian Ceasefire Afeeement of April 8, 2004 (AMIS). On October 20, 2004, the AU Peace and Security Council decided to enhance AMIS and to include in its mandate assistance to the process of confidence building and to the protection of civilians and humanitarian operations, and observance of compliance with all agreements signed between the parties since the ceasefire agreement.
summer of 2006 to expel the AU force.6 This political standoff between the government of Sudan and the wider international community has now lasted three years while the killing and razing of villages continues unfettered.

Concerns that precipitous action may jeopardize the fragile peace agreement for Southern Sudan (ending two decades of civil war) means the international community has approached the conflict in Darfur, at best, with caution, at worst, with dereliction.7 In response to concerns that genocide might be underway in Darfur, the UN Security Council asked the Secretary-General to establish a commission of inquiry to determine whether international human rights law and/or international humanitarian law was being violated and whether acts of genocide were occurring.8 The Commission’s report, issued in January 2005, concluded that the Sudanese government and the Janjaweed were responsible for serious violations of both human rights law and international humanitarian law. While a concerted campaign of violence directed primarily at Darfur's black tribes of African Fur, Maasalit, Jebel, Aranga and Zagha was taking place, the Commission concluded that the Sudanese government was not pursuing a “policy of genocide”.9

The conflict in Darfur is more complicated than is often reported. The Arab elite of northern Sudan (mainly Sunni) have supported a specific vision of history and identity that is based on Arabism and Islamism.10 In a 1965 speech, the first Prime Minister of Sudan, Ismail al-Azhari, asserted his vision for an Arab-Islamic identity for Sudan that has implications for today’s ethnic conflict; in essence, to be Arab is best.11 “Ethnic” origins, as a result, have taken on fabricated importance. Arab tribes in Darfur, account for a quarter of Darfur’s population, (or approximately 1 million people). They do not wish to be identified with the Janjaweed militia, responsible for the killing of black Africans.12 They are not so sure, however, that Western troops would make such a fine distinction between Arabs and Arab Janjaweed. A Western military “solution” to the current conflict may do more than embolden radical, Islamic elements in the capital of Khartoum. It could provoke fanatics outside of Sudan, including Al Qaeda, to become “involved” and further destabilize the region pulling in Chad, the Central African Republic, Egypt, Libya, Ethiopia and Middle East actors into the conflict.13

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13 William Wallis, “Arab fears of another western intervention as Sudan crisis deepens” The Financial Times, 8 March 2004. Mr. Wallis reports that it was, in fact, the Arab League that was the first to produce
Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party insists it is doing everything possible to minimize the violence and suggests the presence of UN troops would be a thin guise for a wholesale takeover of Sudan, likening it to the US “occupation” of Iraq. In October 2006, the government expelled the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative, Jan Pronk making its determination to limit UN involvement clear. Northern Sudanese are thriving economically and are largely insulated from the violence. Dubbed the “new Dubai” in reference to the runaway construction and opulence that has resulted from profitable oil sales, there is little domestic pressure from these Sudanese to force al-Bashir to change tactics.

While it has sought to limit the role of the UN, al-Bashir’s government has accepted peacekeepers deployed under the leadership of the African Union. The AU’s involvement in Darfur stems from the N’Djamena ceasefire agreement of April 2004 and the agreement on modalities that was developed in the following month. The AU’s role was to monitor and verify the ceasefire agreement. Within a few months it was clear that the situation on the ground required a more significant response and the AU mission was given a revised mandate and the number of authorized military troops and police was expanded from the initial 150 to 7,000.

Even with expanded numbers the AU mission has struggled and violence in the region has continued. At the time of writing, the Sudanese government is resisting proposals to merge the AU mission with a larger UN operation. In that context, the AU agreed to extend its mission there until June 2007. In the meantime, NATO and the EU are providing military, logistical and planning support to the African Union. It is this latter contribution on which this chapter focuses. “Let’s just do it” has been the call of an official report on the abuses in Darfur. Most other reports comment on the “supine” support of the Arab League.


16 CIA factbook reports Sudan has 1.6 billion barrels of proven oil reserves. See https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/su.html; Jeffrey Gettleman, “War in Sudan? Not Where the Oil Wealth Flows”, The New York Times, October 24, 2006. The economy in Khartoum is booming and despite US sanctions, Sudan’s GDP increased by 8% in 2005 according to the IMF.


NATO’s Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. But the question remains, what is “it” and what does “it” tell us about NATO, the EU and the transatlantic relationship?

2) NATO and Darfur

NATO’s mission in Darfur is a novelty for the alliance. It is the first time NATO has been directly involved in an intervention force in Africa. Unlike the EU, NATO’s process was fundamentally tied to questions of purpose rather than function. During the Cold War, NATO’s main purpose was as a defensive alliance in response to the clearly identifiable threat posed by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. This changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall, leaving NATO with no obvious purpose. Lord Robertson, the then NATO Secretary General, told political leaders that the alliance has two choices: either ‘go out of area’ or go out of business. It would appear NATO has chosen the former.

During the 50th anniversary celebrations of the alliance in Prague in 1999, NATO decision-makers decided to reform the institution in order to address new challenges. The alliance was united in its desire to develop “new roles, new relationships and new capabilities.” Three years later, at the 2002 summit in Prague, NATO members approved the idea of NATO as an organization with global reach:

We are determined to deter, disrupt, defend and protect against any attacks on us, in accordance with the Washington Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations. In order to carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, upon decision by the North Atlantic Council, to sustain operations over distance and time, including in an environment where they might be faced with nuclear, biological and chemical threats, and to achieve their objectives.

While driven by the threat of terrorism and concerns about weapons of mass destruction, these shifts opened the door to NATO involvement in regions such as Africa and in ways that are now occurring with Darfur. In that sense, NATO’s support mission to the AU peacekeeping mission in Darfur is consistent with NATO’s new purpose and willingness to look beyond Europe. But on what basis is the decision to engage in this form of out of

22 Stephen Castle, “NATO poised for first African engagement in Darfur”, The Independent, April 28, 2005. James Appathurai, NATO’s chief spokesman, said: “What has to be decided is what the AU needs and what are already provided and whether NATO can add value. But certainly this is the first time NATO would be engaged in any significant way in sub-Saharan Africa.”
24 This was one of the results of the NATO Prague Summit in 2002. See Prague Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Prague on 21 November 2002, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/pr02-127e.htm, accessed on 6 December 2006.
area activity taken? Shortly after the initial decision to become involved, the NATO Secretary General explained the decision on humanitarian grounds.

The humanitarian imperative, the possibility to help put an end to the suffering of tens of thousands of civilians in one of the continent’s most fragile regions, motivates the NATO decision to take on this responsibility. It demonstrates that the alliance wants to put means and capabilities at the disposal of those who are striving to end this drawn-out war and bloody instability....We all have a responsibility to protect.  

But while the motive may be humanitarian, the contribution has been limited to a support function. NATO’s involvement in Darfur stems from a formal request made by the African Union on April 26, 2005 that NATO consider providing logistical assistance to its operation in Darfur. This request set in motion a series of decisions which saw NATO commit to short-term assistance for the AU that has since been renewed on a number of occasions with the current commitment lasting until the end of 2006. The NATO community reiterated this commitment most recently at the 2006 summit in Riga, Latvia leaving open the possibility that it might also be expanded:

NATO continues to support the ongoing AU mission and is ready, following consultation with and the agreement of the AU, to broaden that support. The Alliance is committed to continued coordination with all actors involved, in particular the AU, the UN and the EU, including with respect to possible support for a follow-on mission with airlift and training.

NATO’s commitment mainly takes the form of military support and capacity building at a distance. The alliance has been clear that it will not send troops to the region. NATO supplies tactical capabilities that allow the AU to airlift peacekeepers from AU member states into theatre. It also ensures that the AU has planning security for the force rotation processes. In April 2006, ninety airmen from the Ramstein airbase in Germany began carrying out the airlift mission to Darfur from a base in Kigali, Rwanda, and transported Rwandan peacekeepers into Sudan. According to reports in the media, Canada, the

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26 The request was made in a letter from the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union, Mr. Alpha Oumar Konare, to the NATO Secretary General. See “NATO to explore Darfur options”, NATO Update, 18 May 2005 available at http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2005/05-may/e0518c.htm, accessed 11 Nov. 2006.
Netherlands, Denmark, Italy, and Turkey are involved in the airlift.\textsuperscript{29} In addition to the airlift, NATO provides training and mentoring to senior military staff officers at a multinational military headquarters in Addis Ababa. The training lessons include courses on intelligence analysis, defence planning and technology, force generation, and situation awareness.

3) The European Union and Darfur

Since the 1990s, the European Union has been working to establish itself as the authoritative conflict resolution institution in Europe. In 1992, shortly after the end of the Cold War, the Western European Union, at the time the military arm of the EU, set out the ‘Petersburg Tasks’. The tasks became part of the \textit{Treaty of the European Union}, agreed in Amsterdam in 1999, and are thus an integral part of Europe’s security and defence policy. The “tasks” refer to the types of military missions the EU considers appropriate for interventions. These comprise: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and crisis management (including peacemaking).\textsuperscript{30} Since the development of the Petersburg Tasks, the EU has deployed military forces beyond Europe’s territory twelve times since 1999.\textsuperscript{31} Europe’s objectives for these missions were based on the Petersburg Tasks and often involved a humanitarian dimension. The first European Security Strategy, adopted in 2003, reinforced the Petersberg Tasks, stating that the EU should be more active with respect to the “full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention.”\textsuperscript{32}

In contrast to NATO, the EU has been thinking about Africa as a key policy area for some time. Many EU member states have longstanding relationships with a number of countries in Africa and are major aid donors. In October 2005, the EU published a “Strategy for Africa” that was adopted by the European Council. This is the first overall policy document on Africa developed by the EU. The Strategy uses the objectives of the \textit{Millennium Development Goals} as its foundation but draws other issues such as security into its framework. The crisis in Darfur fits within the EU’s proclivity toward

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\textsuperscript{31} The missions are Operation EUFOR – Althea (Bosnia and Herzegovina); EU Police Mission – EUPM (Bosnia and Herzegovina); EU Police Mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL “Kinshasa”); EU Mission in Congo (EUSEC DR Congo); EUFOR RD, Congo; EU Support to AMIS II (Darfur); EU PT in Kosovo; EU BAM Rafah; EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS); EU Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX); ACEH Monitoring Mission; Moldova and Ukraine, Border mission

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humanitarian responses in Africa\textsuperscript{33} and its longstanding attention to events in Sudan. The EU was one of the first international actors that actively supported the peace process in Sudan. In 1994, the European Union unilaterally implemented an arms embargo against Sudan, which was renewed by the European Council on 9 January 2004.\textsuperscript{34} The UN, in contrast, did not employ an arms embargo against non-government entities in Sudan (such as the Janjaweed) until July 30, 2004.\textsuperscript{35} Various member states of the EU have bilateral development relations with Sudan and the Darfur region. According to a press briefing by the EU, as of October 2006 this totaled more than EUR 115 million,\textsuperscript{36} underlining the fact that the EU, as a unit and through its member states, controls significant assets for assisting countries in post-conflict humanitarian and reconstruction efforts.

Europe’s involvement in the crisis in Darfur began with a request for assistance from the Secretary General of the African Union on 29 April 2005. The EU responded positively to the request and agreed, on 23 May 2005, “to lend all possible support to military, police and civilian efforts by presenting a comprehensive and substantial offer.”\textsuperscript{37} The EU sees the AU as the central actor in the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts and disputes in Africa, thus making support of the AU through the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) mechanisms a key objective.\textsuperscript{38} The request for assistance on the part of the AU, therefore, fits very easily into the EU policy framework.

The EU’s contribution has taken two forms: diplomatic and civil-military, both mainly concentrating on supporting the African Union peacekeeping mission in Darfur (AMIS I+II).\textsuperscript{39} At the diplomatic level, the EU appointed a Special Representative, Mr. Pekka Haavisto, in August 2005. He is responsible for coordinating Europe’s efforts and support on the ground in Sudan and reports back to the European Council.\textsuperscript{40} He also liaises with the AU, the Government of Sudan and other international organizations and represents the EU at the Abuja political talks. The Special Representative is supported in his work

\textsuperscript{34} By decision 94/165/CFSP of 15 March 1994 the European Union laid down a weapons embargo on Sudan. This embargo was renewed with the Council’s common position 2004/31/CFSP on 9 January 2004.
by an EU planning and coordination cell located in Addis Ababa where political, military and police advisors are situated.\textsuperscript{41}

A combined package of civil-military actions is aimed at strengthening support for the African Union in planning, equipping, training, and transporting AU troops. The EU has been involved in the AU Cease Fire Commission (CFC – which evolved into AMIS) with a French colonel serving as the vice-chairman. The civilian component of the EU mission includes various supporting actions for the police component of the AMIS II mission. Twenty-nine EU police officers serve as police advisors to the AMIS II police chain of command and offer training assistance to local police units.\textsuperscript{42} They are seconded from their national police force for six months. They serve at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababda, the office of the AMIS Head of Mission in Khartoum, the office of the Police Commissioner in El-Fasher, the three regional headquarters and the eight sector headquarters.

Militarily, the EU provided planning and other technical assistance to all levels of command of the AMIS II mission and also sent military observers. Currently, seventeen military experts and ten military observers serve in the area; an additional sixteen come from other countries such as the United States and Canada.\textsuperscript{43} The EU also provides strategic and tactical transportation as well as aerial observation. The EU provided airlift for seven African battalions and 430 civilian police officers. This operation is undertaken in close coordination with AU countries and NATO. The leading planning agency is the EU Airlift Centre in Eindhoven, the Netherlands, that closely coordinates with the NATO Allied Movement Co-ordination Centre at SHAPE. Tactical airlift capabilities are also provided through two Antonov aircrafts and two Boeing C212 and include the deployment of logistical assets. Material support includes communications technology, mobile generators, water purification capabilities, as well as medical supplies.

In addition, a key aspect of the EU contribution has been financial. The EU has donated more than EUR 242 million in support of the AMIS mission through the newly created African Peace Facility, which draws from the European development fund (EDF). The funding was allocated in 2004 to ensure payments of salaries, insurances, travel and medical costs for AU officers for up to eighteen months. This has proved a valuable resource for the AU but the greater than expected needs of AMIS have nearly drained the APF resources.\textsuperscript{44}

4) Issues and Implications: EU and NATO: Separate but Together?

\textsuperscript{42} These training missions include courses for senior command staff management training, train-the-trainers course and post-deployment course for all CIVPOL personnel in the eight sectors.
\textsuperscript{43} Currently, 32 Canadians are deployed in Operation Safari as part of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and 12 to operation Augural (AU).
What does this brief overview tell us about the state of play within and between the two European institutions? First, a rough division of labour emerges that is in keeping with former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s call for no discrimination, no decoupling, and no duplication in the post-Cold War NATO-EU relationship. NATO is regarded as the “muscle” of the two organizations, providing more of the strategic and tactical support to AMIS. The EU has focused on its expertise in civilian and humanitarian functions such as foreign aid and support to law enforcement. The EU enjoys the advantage of having a strategy designed specifically for Africa already in place. NATO’s strategy, on the other hand is reactive and has been adjusted developing as events in Darfur unfold. These contributions are in keeping with current NATO and EU mandates and policies.

While there is a division of labour of sorts, the type of response - aid to AMIS in terms of airlift, logistics rather than troops on the ground – has been largely similar in intent and effect. In spite of this duplication there appear to be no difficulties between the two actors. Quite the contrary: the separateness of the EU and NATO has made a difference on the ground by delivering more assistance to Darfur and AMIS than might have been the case had only one or the other of the organizations been involved.

Together, the EU-NATO missions in Darfur can be seen as a combined effort of the two security organizations. Both institutions appear to agree on the fundamentals of the mission and to be acting in consistency with a functional principle of international affairs in offering their institutional expertise to the AU instead of each carrying out duplicate operations. In this sense the EU and NATO missions are complimentary to each other. This complementary and functional approach to an international crisis also has implications for the transatlantic alliance in the sense that the combined operations of the EU and NATO in Darfur cause no ‘transatlantic stress’. There appears to be no rivalry between the two organizations as to who has the lead in Darfur. There is also no transatlantic outcry about weak European capabilities. The transatlantic link is, however, the one area where separateness does enter into the equation.

The Bush Administration has been consistent in its call for a greater international response to Darfur. The crisis continues attract high-level media coverage in the US and to generate significant pressure for action on the part of a number of domestic constituencies. The likelihood of a UN Security Council resolution authorizing a more forceful response on the part of the international community remains very low, as does the potential for unilateral US military action. Given these constraints it is not surprising that the Bush Administration has been advocating that NATO play a greater role in the crisis. At the time of writing, both President Bush and British Prime Minister Blair have

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45 In 1997 then Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, demanded that the following conditions for more autonomous European actions: (1) no duplication of already existing NATO forces; (2) no discrimination against non-EU but NATO members; (3) no decoupling from NATO.

made new calls for an international response citing the newly enshrined UN doctrine “responsibility to protect” as justification for (military – no fly zone) action. It is too early to judge how and whether these latest efforts will generate any greater response from the international community or lead to a shift in the willingness of the Sudanese government to consider other options. If, however, there is a move to stronger, more forceful action of some kind it will be NATO, by virtue of its “muscle” and its transatlantic nature, which is most likely to become the lead agency.

The crisis in Darfur and the international response to it is highly emblematic of many of the often contradictory trends in international crisis response that have developed since the end of the Cold War. On the one hand, the world summit of 2005 incorporated an acceptance of the responsibility to protect idea in its final document. On the other hand, Darfur – a clear example of the kind of crisis R2P was designed to address – continues to generate relatively little by way of international response, even when the world’s leading military power leads a call for action. The disconnect inherent in this scenario is compounded by the fact that the crisis is occurring in an institution-rich environment. The UN, NATO, the EU and the AU are all players. All have shifted their emphasis and their mandates to allow for a response to this kind of crisis. None, together or separately, appear willing or able to respond in any significant or sustained way.

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