INTRODUCTION

It was no secret in Washington that President Bush was inexperienced regarding foreign policy and America’s relationship with other nations before he decided to run for President. He came to power with neither a foreign policy record nor foreign policy experience. During the presidential campaign in early 1999 he sat down for an interview with Andy Hiller, a reporter from the Boston local station WHDH-TV who asked him: “Can you name the president of Chechnya?” Bush replied: “No, can you?” (Daalder & Lindsay, 2003, p. 17). Bush’s lack of foreign policy experience was not surprising; his tenure as Governor of Texas was dedicated primarily to domestic issues and the President was also known for not travelling much outside of the United States prior to becoming President.

It is true that knowledge about foreign policy never pushed candidates into the White House. Domestic issues such as tax cuts, health care, minimum wages and the economy largely dominate American Presidential campaigns. American Presidents learn about foreign policy issues “on the job”. Bill Clinton, who today is seen in the media as a successful President, knew almost nothing about foreign policy issues. He campaigned through American cities with the slogan “It’s the economy, stupid!” trying to tell American voters that the economy is the driving force for American power. His famous line from 1992 led the world to expect that he would be a President who would not be heavily involved in foreign policy issues.

This chapter will look at the foreign policy of the George W. Bush administration. In doing so, it will make use of the foreign policy traditions developed by
Walter Russell Mead (Mead, 2002; McDougall, 1997) as a framework of analysis. According to Mead, American foreign policy, since the declaration of independence, can be characterized by four traditions. The first one he describes is Hamiltonianism followed by Wilsonianism, Jeffersonianism, and Jacksonianism. The two foreign policy traditions that are relevant for the analysis of this paper are Wilsonianism and Jacksonianism, both of which will be explained in greater detail.

This chapter will argue that America’s foreign policy under George W. Bush is deeply rooted in the foreign policy traditions of both Andrew Jackson and Woodrow Wilson. The analysis begins by explaining the ‘new fundamentalism’ in U.S. foreign policy after September 11th before turning to the analysis of the two relevant theories of US foreign policy Jacksonianism and Wilsonianism and how they relate to the current Bush administration.

THE NEW US UNILATERALISM

September 11th clearly changed the nature of President Bush’s agenda and America’s overall grand strategy. All of a sudden, foreign policy was on the top of the agenda list. Osama bin Laden and his terror network Al Qaeda dominated the news for months to come. In the immediate aftermath of the attack voices were raised calling for immediate retaliation. It was the American public that demanded the leadership of its commander in chief. However, 9/11 caught Bush and his advisors by surprise and the plan to go to war with Afghanistan was knitted together quickly. In the following months, the administration struggled to find an adequate response to the attacks. Despite the absent military planning, the global war on terrorism became the defining moment of George W. Bush’s Presidency. The problem he was faced with was how to best fight global terrorism to make the American homeland safer? As a first step, military doctrines and strategies were revised to prepare the American military for the global war on terror. The administration released a new National Security Strategy (NSS) on 20 September, 2002 that outlined strategies and tactics on how to best meet the threats facing the United States in the 21st century. In accordance with Goldwater- Nichols Department of Defence Reorganization Act of 1986, every President of the United States has to send a detailed report to Congress outlining the administration’s grand strategy. The NSS highlights the concept of pre-emptive attacks and declared that the President reserves the right of anticipatory military actions against any state that poses a national security threat to the United States. The President himself conveyed his visions for a new U.S. defence strategy in the State
The George W. Bush Administration and Traditions of American Foreign Policy

of the Union address on January 29, 2002, saying that “we must prevent the ter-
orists and regimes who seek chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons from
threatening the United States and the world.”¹ In the following months, Iran, Iraq,
and North Korea were added to the “axes of evil” list of countries that pose
a danger to America. President Bush explained this strategic vision in a speech at
West Point on June 1, 2002 in greater detail while the U.S. relied on the doctrines
deterrence and containment during the Cold War, these strategies are no longer
adequate in a post 9/11 security environment.

The administration was split on how to meet the new terrorist threats – either
unilaterally using U.S. military power or in concert with other states. The State
Department debated with officials from the White House and the Pentagon on
the best strategy to eliminate terrorist threats while Colin Powel favoured the use
of diplomacy above the use of force preferred by Rumsfeld and Cheney. Bush’s
foreign policy is novel in accepting that “today Washington faces new threats of
such dire nature that it must escape the constraints of the multilateral structures
it helped build after World War II” (Nye, 2003, p. 64). The traditional ‘state-to-
state’ relationship transformed to a ‘state to non-state’ relationship. The use of
American military force was at the centre of this new doctrine. In the months
ahead, Bush’s foreign policy could be characterized by the predominance of the
military, the end of multilateralism, internationalism, and unilateralism. In 1999,
Condoleezza Rice published an article in Foreign Affairs outlining Bush’s potential
foreign policy (Rice, 2000, p. 57). At that time she was special advisor to the then
Presidential Candidate George Bush arguing that if George W. Bush was elected
President, his foreign policy would be “more realist”, meaning more focused on
America’s national interests. The new Bush administration, Rice argued, would
pursue key priorities ensuring that the American military was capable of deter-
ing war, projecting power as well as renewing America’s alliances (Rice, 2000,
p. 47). She accused the previous Clinton administration of deploying American
troops and risking the lives of U.S. soldiers in countries such as Somalia or
Rwanda where the United States had no national interest. The new Bush admin-
istration would correct Clinton’s approach and refocus on military missions where
America’s national interests were involved. During the 2000 Presidential cam-
paign, George W. Bush revealed that he would pursue a “distinctly American
internationalism”.² This ‘distinct foreign policy’, one can argue, is deeply rooted

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in classical Realism, which assumes that states are the principal actors in foreign policy. Therefore, the United States would focus on state-to-state relations rather than on internal policies in other states. Secondly, classical realists assume that the power of the state is essential in the conduct of foreign policy where the resources of power determine the interests of a state (Zakaria, 1998. p. 8-9). Inherent in this assumption is the logic that once states gain power it is their desire to expand territorially (McCormick, 2004, p. 210). Thirdly, classical realists focus on great power politics arguing that no great power should ever be able to dominate international relations. Therefore, the administration should oppose U.S. involvements in internal affairs of sovereign countries, humanitarian interventions, and involvement with international institutions (McCormick, 2004, p. 212). It turns out that the administration kept its promises after inauguration day. Washington rejected the Kyoto Protocol to control global warming, disagreed with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that limits the spread of nuclear weapons, and withdrew from the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM). In short, the United States was deemed to reduce the amount of entangling alliances that could have an impact on American sovereignty.

However, September 11th changed U.S. classical realist policies. The terrorist attacks clearly transformed the posture of U.S. foreign policy towards a defensive realism mixed with a form of idealism. Defensive realism basically shares the assumption with classical realists. However, the major difference between the two is that defensive realism highlights the importance of states’ insecurity, which is the driving motivation for them to act militarily (Zakaria, 1998. p. 8-10). Bush’s foreign policy was modified from a narrow definition of American national interests to a broader one (McCormick, 2004, p. 219). Lastly, idealist views and approaches made their way into U.S. foreign policy promoting the idea of regime change and the promotion of democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq. Distinct about America’s globalism was the stated notion that the U.S. reserves the right to act unilaterally despite strong opposition from alliance partners. In short, what was new about Bush’s foreign policy was the explicitness of this pre-emption approach and the tendency towards preventive strikes. The European media and governments were especially unhappy with U.S. views that alliances and other international agreements are only seen as necessary if they would America’s national interest. Germany, France, and a few other European countries accused the Bush

³ Idealists believe strongly in the affective power of ideas, in that it is possible to base a political system primarily on morality. The theory of idealism has its origins in the First World War when the widespread view was the military force cannot achieve the objective of keeping the peace. See Hillis, M., & Smith, S. (1990). Explaining and understanding International Relations. Clarendon Press, Oxford. See pp.16–20 for details.
administration of creating an American empire that was detached from moral values, partnership, and historical alliances and thus they called the U.S. isolationist. The Europeans disliked the notion in the new NSS that threats to national security must be dealt with pre-emptive strikes against any aggressor that tries to change the balance of power.

**ORIGINS OF U.S. UNILATERALISM**

World War II left most European countries and their economies destroyed or severely weakened. This, quite naturally, had an influence on their domestic power: without economic statecraft, there would be no military capabilities and therefore no power to project. In addition, Europe's population was simply exhausted from fighting. The United States came out of the war with a powerful economy and a less exhausted military. America's economic prosperity reached for global economic hegemony in the decades to come while promoting free trade and markets around the world. Overall, it was Washington who created the post war environment of international institutions such as the Bretton Woods system, the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and others. In addition, after the war, Washington was the only government in place that possessed nuclear capabilities. The United States was not only stronger than anybody else; it was stronger than everybody else. In numbers, America's economy was nearly 50% larger (Hills & Smith, 1990) than those of its nearest competitor. Also, America's defence budget alone is equal to the defence budget of the next six NATO countries combined; it is also leading the world's educational institutions and research. Hollywood movies and shows are seen on TV and movie screens all over the world. At the core of the soft power concept is the ability to shape what others want by attracting them to America's values and culture (Nye, 2004, p. 16). This attractiveness of the U.S. will lead into greater cooperation with other countries. The message is clear: if America leads, others will follow.

As a result of this power growth, the United States refuses to play by the same rules as other states. Washington argues that this is the price that the world has to pay for the security guarantee (Ikenberry, 2004, p. 8). This new geopolitical remoteness after 9/11 can be found in Donald Rumsfeld's dictum that the "mission determines the coalition". In other words, previous long-time alliances are no longer considered necessary for handling international threats to American national security. "When it comes to our security we really don't need anybody's permission", he affirmed (Quoted in Baltz, 2003). The United States clearly dic-
tated the international agenda and determined where future threats were and how to deal with them best. Partners that were willing to join the United States in their effort to fight terrorism were welcome for their support. An ad hoc “coalition of the willing” would be created outside established international partnerships. In other words, the Bush administration created a system and credo in international relations, which sees the United States as the key player that does not seek compromises with other states (Cameron, 2002, p. 68). This is a Jacksonian element of foreign policy espousing the refusal of authority: nobody should tell an American what to do. The director of policy planning at the U.S. State Department defined the new doctrine as “à la carte multilateralism” (Cameron, 2002, p. 69).

This mix of realist theory and an America under imminent attack after September 11th led the United States to ignore international agreements and treaties. Acting unilaterally without difficult and complex alliance relationships would be the more effective tool for facing terrorist threats. Therefore, “coalitions of the willing” were created giving Washington the maximum flexibility it wanted. Contrarily, this also meant that America’s historical alliance partners were disregarded in their effort to fight international terrorism if they did not suit American interests or strategies.

**JACKSONIANISM**

American unilateralism is not a new phenomenon and has historical ancestors. Earlier forms of American unilateralism are named after Andrew Jackson’s Presidency. Even further in the past, the founding fathers foresaw entangling alliances that might limit America’s freedom of action (Lefler, 2004, p. 22). If the United States would act unilaterally, so their argument, it could pursue its own interests detached from British or French influences. Jacksonians are deeply suspicious of the rule of international law. They believe that the government should do everything it can to promote the political, economic, and cultural well-being of Americans.

Jackson, then a general in the army, used pre-emptive strikes to secure the nation’s borders when he invaded the Spanish dominated Florida in 1818. The Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, told the Spanish Ambassador that Spain failed to restore order along the border and this raised concerns in Washington. Later, during the Cold War, pre-emptive, covert strikes against regimes in the Third World were a standard practice by Democratic as well as Republican presidents. In 1946, the United States, under the leadership of President Truman, prevented the Soviets from dominating Turkey and Greece after Great Britain had
withdrawn its aid to the conservative government in Greece. Later on, the United States launched covert operations handled by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Iran (1951), Guatemala (1954), Lebanon (1958), and Cuba (1960) to name a few (Prestowitz, 2003, p. 216-230). If the United States would not intervene, so went the credo, these regimes would fall under Communist dictatorship and would threaten the U.S. homeland. Later, this became known as the ‘domino theory’ (p. 478). In each of the cases where the United States intervened preemptively, either in the Americas, the Middle East, or Southeast Asia, the promotion of freedom of the people was always the driving force behind intervention (Leiler, p.23).

In general, Jacksonians are very sceptical about the federal bureaucracy and favour state autonomy. Partisans of this school of thought do not trust existing political departments, agencies, or the political elite (Mead, p. 225). Each U.S. State and local government should retain much more power than the federal government in Washington. The same can be said about the international community and the system of the United Nations. Jacksonians are sceptical about such supranational bodies that have the power to decide about the fate of the United States’ citizens. Their foremost principle is self-reliance (p. 231); that is the belief that America will make its own way through an anarchic international environment. This is called the individualistic moment of Jacksonians, the right to “think and live as one pleases” (p. 233) believing that hard work will pay off in the long term. Also, in foreign policy, the unipolar nature of international relations or hegemony by one state is much preferred by the Jacksonian school of thought, assuming that conflict will occur between great powers. In sum, one can argue that the Jacksonian school of American foreign policy is the source of recent hawkish foreign policy behaviour that is not well understood in Europe. However, Jacksonianism only becomes very hawkish when American national interests are threatened.

BUSH, JACKSONIANISM AND THE END OF MULTILATERALISM

 Historically, U.S. Presidents always believed in American military capabilities and strength to defeat foreign aggressors. The same applies to the War on Terrorism. The United States was confident enough to defeat a regime in Kabul that assisted and harboured terrorists. Even though the U.S. welcomed support from other countries, they were not seen as crucial for the overall success of the operation in Afghanistan. The United States did not have to rely on the support of European countries or others to wage war in Afghanistan. If partners wanted to join the coalition against international terrorism they were welcomed by Wash-
lington to do so. This was the birth of the term ‘coalition of the willing’. Nevertheless, the U.S. would not seek broad support among its partners. “Either you are with us or against us”, Bush bluntly explained America’s relationship with other states. His statement is a replica of the Jacksonian understanding of community. Jacksonians draw a clear and brutal distinction between members inside the community and those outside of it. “Through most of American history the Jacksonian community was one from which many Americans were automatically and absolutely excluded (…)” (Mead, p. 236). Jacksonian society draws an important distinction between those who belong to the community and those that stand outside. Their group members share a common code and someone who breaches the code through acts of criminal misconduct can be punished with or without the formalities of law (p. 236). However, the role of the government in Jacksonian terms is to promote the well being of its people with any means necessary, including the use of force. Therefore, Bush’s statement should not be a surprise to the international community. Even though Washington always underlined its commitment to collective security and multilateralism publicly, it acknowledged that the U.S. had the might and right to act unilaterally (Lefler, p. 23).

For better use of the military the Bush administration developed a new National Security Strategy outlining the grand strategy of the United States in the age of terrorism. The document, publicly called the ‘Bush doctrine’, emphasizes the need of the United States to cope better with terrorist threats through a combination of military power, better homeland defence, better law enforcement, and better intelligence (The White House, 2002). Again, at the heart of the doctrine is the concept of pre-emption and preventive action. Preventive actions are military actions for self-defence should rogue states attempt to threaten the United States. “While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self defence by acting pre-emptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country.” (The White House, 2002, p. 6). In the Jacksonian view there is absolutely nothing wrong about subverting foreign governments with U.S. military force or assassinating foreign leaders.

The neoconservatives, advisors who surround President Bush, are skeptical about America’s alliances and rules of liberal internationalism. In the months after 9/11 the administration in Washington showed little evidence of supporting multilateral institutions or global engagement. America’s unilateral approach to international tensions resulted in a disregard for international institutions and international law. Even before terrorists struck New York, the administration announced that there would be no continuous U.S. engagement in the peace
processes in Northern Ireland and the Middle East. Washington also cancelled talks with North Korea about its intentions to acquire nuclear weapons. Instead, the administration announced that it would go ahead with its plans to implement a new missile defence system regardless of the views of its partners (Cameron, 2002, p. 69). In 2001 Bush revealed his opposition to the Kyoto protocol and other international agreements such as the pact to control trafficking in small arms, the establishment of an International Criminal Court, and the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) (Daalder & Lindsay, 2003, p. 65). Bush placed his decision to withdraw from the Kyoto protocol purely on domestic politics and argued, “It does not make economic sense for America.”

Bush’s foreign policy favoured retreating from existing international treaties and arrangements leaving America “unbound.” This would re-establish American primacy in the world as well as its sovereignty. This would create the freedom to provide worldwide security and stability. Again, Jacksonian influence can be found in this policy approach. Jacksonians believe that social welfare as well as foreign aid programs are ineffective. Further, international agreements, negotiations, and treaties are seen as inappropriate tools of diplomacy. The ‘political enemy’ should be met with full military strength rather than diplomacy. It was time, the Bush administration thought, to seek primacy again in order to strengthen America’s power.

Bush’s new foreign policy doctrine shocked the international community, especially European elites. Not only were foreign governments skeptical about the new foreign policy, but also the media. The Washington Post columnist Jim Hoegland wrote about the danger of Bush’s foreign policy: “In six months the US has rejected, in aggressively stated fashion, a half-dozen important global treaties and negotiations strongly favoured by the rest of the world. Bush leaves a first impression that while his government is not deliberately isolationist, it is comfortable with being isolated” (Quoted in Cameron, p. 70). A high ranking National Security Committee put it slightly different. The U.S. Commission on National Security was introduced by President Clinton. It published its report in 2001 arguing that because of America’s nature “the United States will increasingly find itself wishing to form coalitions but increasingly unable to find partners willing and able to carry out combined military operations.”

Again, putting Bush’s foreign policy into a historical perspective of U.S. foreign policy schools, Jacksonians have

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the least regard for international rules and laws and prefer any honour code in international relations rather than binding rules. Therefore, it is not surprising that while Bush follows this approach his taste for international diplomacy is rather numb. "Honour compels us to undertake some difficult and dirty jobs, however much we would like to avoid them" (Mead, 2002, p. 250).

WILSONIANISM

A second tradition in American foreign policy is named after President Woodrow Wilson.⁶ The spread of democracy around the globe and the rule of law were first famously introduced by the former President Woodrow Wilson in his Fourteen Points speech. Even though supporters of the Wilsonian tradition of U.S. foreign policy are known for their policies of spreading democracy and the rule of law, their deeper belief is that the United States has the right and duty to change the behaviour of the rest of the world. In fact, the United States has a natural right to project its values on other countries to create wealth and peace globally. Further, not only foreign policies of other countries should be of concern for the United States but also their domestic politics (Mead, p. 138). In other words, also Wilsonianism is also concerned about America’s national interest, not only Jacksonians. Having said that, Wilsonian’s guiding principles are a strong commitment to human rights and the rule of law, because democracies make better and more stable partners than dictators or monar chies.

In comparison to Jacksonians, Wilsonians also see the United States as the principal actor in international relations, setting values and paradigms according to their theory (LaFeber, 1994, p. 302). When the First World War reached its height, it became clear to President Wilson that the United States could no longer stay outside of the conflict; “they could no longer withdraw from world affairs”, as one historian put it (LaFeber, 1994, p. 303). Even though the President deployed troops to fight Germany, he ordered the entire administration to avoid mentioning the United States as an “allied” partner; he insisted that the U.S. was only an “associated power”. This clearly indicates that Wilsonians want the United States to be detached from entangling, permanent alliances that would reduce U.S. sovereignty and flexibility. Again, we can find unilateralist tendencies in Wilson’s presidency. President Washington preached: “Put not your trust in allies, especially those who are stronger than you” (McDougall, 1997, p. 57–59). Instead

⁶ See Mead for an elaborate description of this tradition and also McDougall, W. (1997) for details.
Washington's credo instead was to trust yourself. The essence of unilateralism at that time was to make American foreign policy independent from its European heritage, Britain and France in particular. Washington's doctrine was to stay out of European wars and trying to avoid, once again, permanent, entangling alliances. This became known as the 'Monroe Doctrine' in 1823 (p. 57–59). President Woodrow Wilson pursued the same policies in World War I, when he issued a public statement urging Americans to be neutral (LaFeber, p. 285). Therefore, it is quite surprising that critics accuse the current administration of being isolationist (Zakaria, 1999; Barry, 2001). The United States never pursued isolationist policies; it was always entangled with other countries. Complete isolationism was and still is impossible, because the U.S. depends largely on foreign trade to sustain its domestic economy by primarily importing raw materials. During Washington's time, most tax revenues came from tariffs imposed on the goods imported into the country. Today, foreign investments are needed to keep the economy alive. “A current account deficit indicates that the United States is consuming and investing more than it is producing” (The White House, 2003, p. 60; Bergsten, 2005). In addition, America's net international investment position has moved from a 10% surplus in the late 1970s to a trade deficit of almost 20% GDP in 2001.⁷ The most recently released numbers show that the U.S. trade deficit rose above the $600 billion mark to about $618 billion for the year 2004, or more than 5% of the GDP. Further, the report to the President recommends to Congress that the current trade deficit and an increase in America's foreign debts are not sustainable in the long term. These developments mean in reality that the United States has to borrow about 500 billion dollars from Europe and other countries (Prestowitz, p. 285). By far, this cannot be called isolationist, but it could lead to it if the US blames other countries for these deficits.

**BUSH AND WILSONIANISM**

Elements of the Wilsonian tradition can also be found in Bush’s foreign policy. Afghanistan and later Iraq were the most recent examples where the United States engaged in nation-building, trying to spread democracy. Overthrowing a dictator and a corrupt regime is one thing, but ensuring the effective functioning of a new bureaucracy is another. Over the last fifty years, Afghanistan has been devastated.

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by civil war and a major Russian invasion in the 1980s. The per capita gross domestic product of the economy was about $150 per year which drove many Afghans to leave the nation state to live across the border in Pakistan. To help the Afghan people, the U.S. committed $4.5 billion dollars over five years for rebuilding the country. Bush’s strategists thought that once the threats to liberty had been removed, peace and security would flourish in every corner of the world. This objective had strategic as well as moral origins. Strategically, poverty, crime and corruption could pose a threat to American national security. Morally, poverty in the world affected American values: “A world where some live in comfort and plenty, while half of the human race lives on less than $2 a day, is neither just nor stable” (“The National Security, p. 21”). The core belief of the Bush administration was that once you give people the opportunity to make the same choices as Americans made two hundred years ago, they will choose democracy, freedom, and free enterprise. President Wilson could have said the same thing. In other words, the U.S. nation-building policy is rooted in a Wilsonian view of the world that President Bush has mixed with Jacksonian tones. Wilsonians see democracy as a cornerstone in their foreign policy, because it prevents states from going to war with each other and opens opportunities for societies to prosper. Monarchies and dictatorships are unpredictable forms of government where the will of the people is not reflected and tows the entire country into instability. Therefore, the support of democracy abroad is not only a moral duty of the United States, but also a “practical imperative”. Wilson himself said: “We are participants, whether we would or not, in the life of the world. The interests of all nations are our own also. We are partners with the rest” (Quoted in McDougall, p. 122). This was Wilson’s rationale for going to war with Germany, to let Americans fight “to make the world safe for democracy.” (p. 122). Wilson advocated, among other things, “political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike” (p. 124). Wilson himself was not a pacifist; his ideas of world peace were idealistic with a mix of realism. Wilsonians were proven correct after World War II when the United States helped educate Germans on how to be a democratic country. Ever since, the Wilsonian voice in American Foreign Policy has not been silent. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq can be seen as the latest application of the tradition.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11th, Bush’s foreign policy shifted towards regime change in the Middle East and Afghanistan. The President made these policies one of the cornerstones of his foreign policy. The purpose of the war in Afghanistan and later on in Iraq was to change a suppressive regime into a prosperous democracy. The spread of democracy, freedom and economic liberalization would prevent these countries from becoming a threat to U.S. national
security. In this sense, it is a fundamental, global security imperative for the administration.

Moreover, the United States has sought to establish market economies that would open highly regulated markets in the Middle East and foster entrepreneurship. Bush’s view was that a healthy economy is the best source of global stability. In theory, liberal democratic states have been able to maintain peaceful relations amongst themselves, but are prone to wage war against non-liberal/democratic regimes.⁸ Therefore, the contemporary world is characterized by three major ideas: peace, democracy, and free markets as the optimal way to organize political life (Mandelbaum, p. 62). During the Cold War, these ideas had a serious rival – Communism. Since Communism’s horizon declined democratic peace has no serious competitor to fear. These three values of political life brought peace and stability to the American people. Therefore, it is not a surprise that the Bush administration endorses them as universal values which are applicable in all corners of the world and all nations should enjoy a life in peace and wealth. Bush’s foreign policy suggested that the absence of democracy and the rule of law in the Muslim World is a serious factor for instability and radicalization of Islamic groups. Hence, the new National Security doctrine emphasizes the goal of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. President Bush believes that free trade in the Middle East as well as free markets will create more employment opportunities and higher income. This economic growth would also raise educational standards and employment. Further, the promotion of peace, democracy and free markets is not restricted to the Middle East region, but applicable worldwide.

CONCLUSION

This paper argued that U.S. foreign policy under the current Bush administration is deeply rooted in the Jacksonian as well as Wilsonian tradition of U.S. foreign policy. In fact, as the paper has shown, the current U.S. unilateralism under the George W. Bush administration is not a new phenomenon in U.S. foreign policy; it has its roots in Andrew Jackson’s policies. In the early 1800s President Jackson secured the nations’ borders to the south with a pre-emptive military strike. Jack-

sonians are deeply suspicious of the rule of international law as well as entangling alliances. They are skeptical about internal bureaucracies and prefer the nature of international relations as unipolar and self-reliant. In fact, as this paper claimed, President Bush’s concept of “coalitions of the willing” is a replica of the Jacksonian denotation of communities, which is very hard to enter. In essence, the Jacksonian school of thought in American Foreign Policy is the source of the recent hawkish foreign policy of the George W. Bush administration.

The paper also compared current U.S. foreign policies with the Wilsonian tradition of U.S. foreign policy. Wilsonians believe that the United States has the right and duty to change the behaviour of states that threaten the balance of international stability. Further, the United States possesses the natural right to project American values on other countries to ensure peace and stability in the world. Recent examples of President Bush’s Wilsonianism are the spread of democracy and nation building operations in the Middle East. Wilsonians hold the belief that democracy prevents states from going to war with each other and that it opens opportunities for societies to prosper. This would prevent undemocratic states from becoming a threat to U.S. national security. Therefore, the spread of democracy around the globe is seen by supporters of the Wilsonian tradition as well as the current Bush administration as a fundamental, global security imperative.

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