The evolution and transformation of NATO has been a favorite theme within the international relations and history literature since the end of the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union, an event that caught many in both the academic and political communities off-guard, generated a rich and varied debate on the significance and meaning of such an event for the dynamics of world politics and the place of the transatlantic alliance within it. More specifically, as far as NATO was concerned, the end of the Cold War raised profound questions over its purpose and existence. NATO's persistence beyond the end of the Cold War proved a powerful source of both intellectual and philosophical enquiry. Through the 1990s an intense debate raged among academics and policy-makers alike as to NATO's future in a world characterized by uncertainty and the emergence of new security risks and challenges. Such debate was situated along a broad spectrum of opinion and theoretical interpretations, from neo-realist predictions of NATO's demise and decline, to neo-liberal reflections on NATO's institutional adaptation and more critical, post-structural debates on the role of the alliance. Contending discourses asked a set of basic questions that, remarkably in some ways, continue to persist today: what and who is NATO? How do we explain and understand NATO's ongoing persistence and evolution? What are the causal mechanisms that explain its transformation into a wider, almost collective security institution? What are the sources of discord and structural forces that are at work in weakening alliance unity and cohesion? What is NATO's identity in an evolving international system, in which the Euro-Atlantic area seemed doomed to lose some of its previous centrality? What is NATO for – and for whom?


Over the past two decades, much ink has been spilt in mapping the arc of NATO’s trajectory from Sarajevo to Benghazi, and in analyzing NATO’s operational activity and its process of transformation. The alliance’s Balkan missions generated a wealth of literature and debate; as did NATO’s enlargement process, while the war in Afghanistan is now also beginning to generate considerable political and academic reflection, as scholars and commentators seek to assess NATO’s decade-long mission and the legacy of Afghanistan for the alliance. One issue that, while not being ignored, has generated surprisingly little discourse is the impact of the attacks of 9/11 on NATO’s evolution and transformation. Filling this gap has been the distinct objective of this book.

In this sense, the volume distinguishes itself from the rest of the literature on NATO as it sets out to accomplish something different than simply provide the reader with another analysis of ‘where is NATO going’ or ‘what is NATO’s future’. Though not dismissing these questions, discussions of this nature proved unsatisfactory, not least because as such they tend to become mired in an endless and quite repetitive (and tiresome) cycle of debate over whether NATO remains relevant or whether it is likely to whither or decline with time, and what its likely future might be. In contrast, this project stems from a much more specific concern: to identify the impact of 9/11 on the process of NATO’s transformation and evolution. More specifically, we sought to ask whether 9/11 could be considered to constitute a paradigm shift for the alliance. As we outlined in the introduction, we chose to borrow from Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy of social sciences, especially his model of a paradigm shift, to tease out ideas and assumptions about how far 9/11 was not only a catalyst for change within the alliance, but also how it could be understood as fundamentally challenging existing ideas, beliefs and practices within the alliance. Kuhn, a natural scientist himself, argued that existing paradigms are challenged and eventually replaced, which causes what he called ‘scientific revolution’. Put differently, a process of growing anomalies with existing paradigms produces increasing dissatisfaction with conventional scientific practices and induces major procedural and conceptual reorientations, which ultimately leads old paradigms becoming increasingly unsatisfactory. If a paradigm is understood as a common intellectual framework, then in essence, the question we have asked in this volume is whether 9/11, and the events that flowed from it, caused the alliance to re-think existing assumptions and ideas about its role in international security affairs.

In some ways, the focus on 9/11 may seem surprising; after all, over a decade on the events of 9/11 are fading further and further from view, while the killing of Osama bin Laden and a gradual drawdown from Afghanistan are bringing to an end some of

---


4 On these questions see, for example, Gülnur Aybet and Rebecca R. Moore, NATO in search of a vision (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2010).
their more immediate and ferocious consequences. As time moves on and new events arise that capture the imagination or dominate media headlines, such as the economic crisis or the revolutions in the Arab world, it could be argued that the attacks on New York and Washington have less and less salience for the alliance. Moreover, while the collapse of the Soviet bloc marked the end of a major period in international history, ushering in profound changes to world order, the attacks of 9/11 happened on a single day, and did not lead to any substantive changes to world order in the same way the end of the Cold War did. But as Winston Churchill’s famous adage reminds us, history often turns on ‘events, dear boy, events,’ the second and third order consequences of which can often be more important than the event itself. 9/11 did indeed have major implications for both international stability and for the transatlantic alliance, which has been mired for the past decade in a deadly and protracted counterinsurgency in Afghanistan that is a direct consequence of 9/11. Moreover, it galvanized the alliance into a process of transformation that was not necessarily new in and of itself, but which took on a new direction and momentum as NATO sought to grapple with what some of its members saw as a shifting strategic landscape. Our central research question has thus been to determine if and how the terrorists, attacks on 9/11 could be conceptualized and understood as a paradigm shift—that is a significant modification that altered NATO’s past practices, normative predispositions, and identity in international security affairs. Specifically, the guiding questions we asked the authors to follow for their respective chapters were to investigate how much of a defining, significant moment or turning point 9/11 was for NATO? How, if at all, did it reconfigure its identity, how much of a strategic and operational impact did it have, and how did it affect the alliance’s relations with key actors and partner countries? The aim was that, exploring these questions, the volume would facilitate an understanding of the legacy 9/11 has left for NATO, and the wider second and third order consequences that it has had for the alliance over the past decade. As NATO begins to transition out of Afghanistan, these seemed important and timely questions to reflect on, and which could help fill something of a gap in the recent historical and theoretical literature on the alliance.

In the aftermath of the attacks, it certainly seemed that this was an event that was likely to alter existing dynamics within the alliance, as well as assumptions and ideas about its nature and role in international security affairs. It dealt a ‘strategic shock’ to its members, and on the surface, put the alliance on a novel path of invoking Article V, the collective defence clause of the Washington Treaty that had remained dormant throughout the Cold War. Although NATO had been transforming to meet the challenges of a post-Cold War world through the 1990s, a comparison of NATO pre- and post- 9/11 suggests, superficially at least, the emergence of a quite different alliance, one whose trajectory and development appeared to have ‘gone global.’ As Mark Webber highlights in the first chapter, by the end of the 2000s the alliance was running eight military operations simultaneously, on a geographical reach that extended from Pristina in the Western Balkans to Kabul in Afghanistan, something that was unheard of either during or right after the Cold War. An international campaign like the one run in Afghanistan with the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was something that was unimaginable during the Cold War where, as Michael Ruehle puts it in his chapter, "NATO existed in order not to be used." It was also a novelty in comparison to NATO's military operations in the Balkans, as ISAF could be considered the first 'real' out of area operation that was carried out beyond the European continent. Also, when simply observing NATO's practices since 9/11, it appears that the alliance has become a much more active rather than reactive international actor through, for example, an increase in its expeditionary operations and practices in crisis prevention. As Magnus Petersson writes, following 9/11 NATO adopted a much more pro-active and 'political approach' to security, developed a greater ability to conduct crisis management and civil emergency response, and emphasized the defence of values, rather than territory. Although the 'new security agenda' predates 9/11, Petersson argues that '9/11 strengthened, and acted as a catalyst' for NATO's increased engagement with non-traditional security challenges such as cyber and maritime security. In short, these observations in and of themselves could easily be interpreted as indicators that 9/11 did indeed alter the trajectory on which the alliance was travelling, setting it on a different path, one far more explicitly 'global' in orientation than ever before.

During the 1990s, NATO's focus was regional, focused on European security and the preservation of stability and security within Europe and on its periphery. Although alliance debates had begun over the degree to which NATO should act 'over the horizon' it was not until 9/11 that this debate gained prominence— with major consequences for alliance purpose, unity, and cohesion.

Such analyses attributes a degree of causality to 9/11 in acting as a catalyst for change within the alliance. However, the book elicited a more probing enquiry into the impact of 9/11, one that teased out, in a more nuanced way, whether 9/11 really was a path-breaking event for NATO, or whether it merely served to cast existing ideas or developments in a new light, but did not fundamentally set the alliance on a different path. Can it, in fact, be understood and considered independently of NATO's wider transformation since the end of the Cold War? We thus pushed our authors—sometimes perhaps to the limit of what is possible in such an edited volume— to investigate and contrast as much as possible the underlying assumptions, processes and practices that NATO was involved in before and after the terrorist attacks in order to be able to determine the significance of that event for the alliance and perhaps to get a firmer grip on the degree of that causal relationship. The obvious difficulty in establishing the argument that 9/11 was the primary event responsible for NATO's transformation, and to answer the research questions which we raised above is of a methodological nature; this is especially true for an edited volume project where analysts with different research trainings and methods are united. To be sure, the analytical diversity that this project presents was a conscious decision as it was the hope that such an approach would help to bridge the divide between historians and political scientists and the academic and policy world. In contrast to historians and policy experts, for academics, especially political scientists, the 'natural' starting point for any analysis is to seek assistance from either concepts or theoretical paradigms—in this case international relations theory—to help guide them through the various ontological
and epistemological viewpoints and assumptions that exist about the real world—in our case NATO and 9/11 broadly speaking. In other words, their ‘natural’ inclination is to make use of those analytical tools to produce explanatory values that policy experts, perhaps, may not be able to generate. Mark Webber’s chapter has ably performed this task, introducing the reader to the mainstream theories in the field of international relations that are applicable to answer the research questions noted above and to help us to explain and understand the significance of 9/11 for the alliance and NATO’s subsequent evolution. The emphasis here rests on mainstream, principally because the main attempts at providing a framework for understanding NATO’s post-Cold War and post 9/11 evolutions has come from mainstream scholars. This is not to dismiss or diminish the value of other, more critical and post-positivist approaches to thinking about NATO; but as Webber himself notes, while there may be scope for gendered, green, or post-structural etc. approaches to thinking about NATO, the ‘big three’ continue to have most to say of direct and practical significance for the alliance.

But theory, if not supported by adequate empirical and historical evidence, is merely enough to produce insights into processes and practices. Indeed, the explanation of historical processes and social dynamics by nature require much more than developing or testing theoretical paradigms or models, namely the formulation of historical narratives that construct temporal and causal patterns of decisions and actions, and evaluate prevailing discourses and the motivations of those involved in the decision-making processes. Right after Mark Webber’s chapter, Carl Hodge provided us with a thick narrative reading on the uncertainty and political turmoil that NATO experienced in response to the Cold War’s end, thus setting the stage for the more specific analyses that come in later chapters and that try to determine the significance of 9/11 for the alliance from different angles of NATO’s activity. Rather than simply re-telling NATO history, Carl has placed those historical evolutions of NATO into their situational contexts. Michael Ruehle’s chapter adds to this narrative by providing an insider view and examining the challenge that 9/11 posted for the alliance most generally. In that sense, both chapters set important historical benchmarks against which the insights of the other chapters of this volume can be compared to and to develop more specific trend lines of NATO’s development and practices.

9/11 as a paradigm shift for the alliance?
At this point the reader is entitled to ask her/himself what this theoretical and methodological skirmish all means in terms of producing novel explanatory value to either explain or understand (or both) the meaning and impact of the (terrorist) attacks on 9/11 on New York and Washington on the alliance. While there is no—and perhaps cannot be—a single answer to this question in writing projects like this, there is indeed what scholars called a ‘golden thread’ that runs through the chapters in this volume. Most authors seem to concur that the terrorist attacks on 9/11 did not fundamentally alter prior existing NATO paradigms. Rather, they accelerated social, organizational, and political forces that were already under way
and that NATO had engaged with prior to 9/11, most notably because of exogenous and endogenous pressures, such as the Cold War’s end, the revolution in military affairs (RMA) and even demographics. No doubt, as Terry Terriff’s chapter illustrated, the alliance underwent fundamental organizational, cultural, technical, and political transformation processes that changed NATO’s appearance and the nature of the organization as an international security actor. But issues like terrorism, non-state actors, weapons of mass destruction, fragile and failing states, burden sharing, climate change, energy security, migration, and emerging global powers were on NATO’s agenda much before 9/11. This transformation was largely induced by a rapidly changing and increasingly globalized international security environment that at times perhaps fundamentally altered the way NATO acted externally in world politics. It also affected the alliance internally in terms of adjusting its decision-making processes, command structures, and military postures, to name just a few.

The fact, for example, that the alliance now places a lot of emphasis on networks and preparing itself for a net-centric-warfare against increasingly non-state actors and threats cannot be causally attributed to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. It is also an issue that has been with NATO for a very long time before (i.e. in the Balkans) and that, as Alan Dobson and Steve Marsh remind us in the their chapter, the alliance started to address in its 1999 Strategic Concept. In other words, the importance of networks for the conduct and management of international crisis operations is not a novelty for the alliance, but an issue that it has tried to address for some time.

Equally, as Bastian Giegerich notes, the fact that NATO has put interorganizational cooperation—that is those with other supra- or regional organizations like, for example, the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), the Organization for Security and Co-Operation (OSCE)—at the centre of its latest Strategic Concept were not issues that surfaced explicitly because of 9/11 or processes and experiences following those events. As Giegerich reminds us, practices of cooperative security were first adopted by NATO in the early 1990s and in the context of the Balkan wars in the 1990s. There, NATO did show an extensive degree of cooperation with other international organizations, above all the United Nations (UN), the EU, and to a lesser extent with the OSCE. Giegerich’s empirical evidence also suggests that in the overcrowded space of international crisis management competing interests of states and the bureaucracy of international organizations produce a state of institutional overlap in functional terms. This, in turn, leads to inter-institutional rivalries that hampers cooperation among institutions, and makes NATO’s future cooperative security practices rather difficult to implement.

Magnus Christiansson blows into a similar horn by examining practices and patterns of international cooperation in the domain of defence. He notes that the ‘specialization by default’ (rather than choice) of NATO forces is the result of ongoing fiscal constraints of the NATO member states that started with the end of the Cold War, and were accelerated by the attacks of 9/11, and the mantra of cashing in the peace-dividend. Even though Magnus did not specifically address
NATO-EU relations in his chapter\(^5\), it is evident from examining that relationship just on the surface that questions of burden sharing, right of first refusal (NATO or EU), US leadership and EU autonomy in transatlantic, strategic posture of the armed forces, the gradual emergence of the EU as a strategic actor all date back to negotiations between the two organizations in the 1990s. Let’s take the issue of EU autonomy for example. After the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990, the EU increasingly aspired to be and ultimately became an emerging strategic actor in international security affairs. The question, however, remained how the Union would be able to differentiate itself from NATO without duplicating existing resources and structures, decoupling itself from the alliance, and discriminating non-EU NATO members, such as Turkey, Norway, and Iceland. After numerous negotiations, a compromise was found in the so-called Berlin Plus package of agreements that gives NATO the right of first refusal, essentially allowing the alliance a veto on EU plans on making use of NATO resources and capabilities. This debate has not been concluded yet as most recent examples in Sudan, Afghanistan, and Libya demonstrate. Above all, they are not the product, nor were they informed or accelerated by the terrorist attacks on 9/11.

Likewise, the issue of burden sharing is probably one of the most unfailing constants in NATO’s history since 1949. Indeed, the minute the alliance was born with the Washington Treaty on 4 April 1949, the allies engaged into bickering practices about who is supposed to pay for NATO infrastructure. It has equally produced hotly debated scholarship in the academy with all kinds of theoretical flavours. In that sense, as Ellen Hallams’s chapter shows, questions of burden sharing by no means are a novelty for the alliance but rather an issue of constant contention and anger like one perhaps occasionally experiences in any successful marriage.

Tim Bird and Jeff Michaels tackle this theme of ‘continuity’ at the operational level and examine NATO’s Afghanistan and Libyan operations respectively and their relationship with the 9/11 attacks. NATO’s Afghanistan involvement, of course, is the direct result of the terrorist attacks on 9/11 and is thus, perhaps, the most obvious case study to focus on in terms of examining the impact of those events on the alliance. In any case, Bird argues that the difficulties that have troubled the Afghan deployment have been only the latest manifestation of a long sequence of NATO’s periodic crises: questions of burden sharing and alliance solidarity, American political and military hegemony, Europe’s role in international security affairs and its relations with NATO, its search for a compelling reason d’être, and differing national interests among its members are long-standing and endemic issues to the organization. In that sense, they can be viewed as a constituting part of the alliance’s identity.

Michaels places NATO’s Libyan operation into the larger strategic context and argues that despite growing public criticisms and several NATO member states reducing their military commitments once the campaign had begun—which once again denotes a question of burden sharing—NATO managed to ‘muddle through’ and thus avoided a potential quagmire. Jeff concludes that “due to its sheer scale, Libya represented one of NATO’s most important missions after the Cold War, placing it in the same league as Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.” Above all, however, against this backdrop of earlier operations he could not find any evidence that this operation represents some sort of a paradigm shift or that it will set a trend for future operations. Besides the ‘muddling’ through attitude, there are a number of similarities to NATO’s Balkan operations that make intervention in Libya no paradigm shift for the alliance.

Likewise, Luca Ratti argues in his chapter on NATO-Russia relations that the events on 9/11 did not affect the fundamental dynamics between the two actors. Indeed, NATO-Russia relations continue to be shaped by underlying systemic impulses that predated 9/11 and can be mostly related to the legacy of unsettled post-Cold War disputes. Above all, they revolve around questions of global order in the post-cold War security environment and the alliance keeping Russia in a junior partner status within it. Moreover, controversial issues such as missile and conventional defense, NATO enlargement to former Soviet proxies as well as energy security can be considered all but a novelty for the alliance.

Closely related to the issue of networks raised above are those of what NATO calls ‘partnerships’ with either other international organizations or states that operate on a level which some analysts have called the ‘periphery’ of the NATO territory. Indeed, since the end of the Cold War, NATO established and consolidated relations with countries in Western Europe (i.e. Austria, Sweden, Finland, the Balkan states), Northern Africa (i.e. through the so-called Mediterranean Dialogue), the Middle East (Istanbul Cooperation Initiative), Central Asia, and Oceania and pursued practices of co-operative security through those partnerships. Perhaps one of the most notable ‘partners’ that NATO has frequently reached out to in order to either negotiate political or military support for NATO policies and practices since the attacks of 9/11 is Australia. However, the term co-operative security reveals that these practices in and of themselves are not a novelty for the alliance, but a continuation of initiatives that were taken much before 9/11 or that in some cases even be traced back to the Cold War. If one studies, for example, the NATO discourse immediately following the end of the Cold War, one will find that the practice of co-operative security was the most important policy directive that the alliance practiced. One may think here, for example, as Trine Flockhart notes of the very successful Partnership for Peace Program (PfP), the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NASS), the Membership Action Plan (MAP), and others. Against this backdrop, NATO’s partnerships, whether they are of integrationist, interventionist, or influentialist nature marked a continuation rather than a novelty for the alliance.

What this means for policy makers

8
A common thread that emerges throughout the book is that most of these dynamics, while being stimulated by 9/11, were not set in motion by or a direct consequence of those events. Rather, they are a distinguishing feature of the alliance and, even some of their most problematic aspects are constitutive pillars of the alliance’s identity. They are therefore to be seen and interpreted as an integral component of the most successful alliance and that make it work in the first place. More specifically, constitutive components do not regulate behaviour, they create the possibility of social actions, and structures social actions over time. Indeed, those constitutive elements create new actors, dynamics, interests, or other categories of action, and hold the possibility to foster group identification. Against this backdrop, constitutive problems can be seen as the source of social power. From the empirical evidence that we produced in this essay it appears that these constitutive elements are the least volatile components the alliance and thus can be interpreted as an integral component of NATO’s organizational culture. Indeed, they do not appear to change easily in different situational environments and retain a certain amount of consistency and continuity. In turn, because these constitutive elements form an integral part of NATO, they are resistant towards change.

Consequently and in terms of policy relevance, any political attempt to try and solve those constitutive problems is unlikely to produce change in the alliance, because it

---

would mean a slow regression of NATO’s organizational practices. In other words, solving these issues and thus tensions and conflicts would take away NATO’s *reason d’être*, and perhaps transform the alliance into a collective security enterprise (unlikely) or lead it to demise (more likely). For policy makers this means that constitutive problems can only be managed but not solved. This re-conceptualization then necessitates a fundamentally different ontology—that is how one looks and conceived NATO in contemporary security politics today.

Finally, while all authors agree that 9/11 did not induce a paradigm shift in NATO as all of the issues that NATO was forced to deal with in the aftermath of the attacks were already on its place much before 2001, some of the empirical evidence seems to suggest that NATO's wars in the Balkans and its subsequent crisis management engagements there could have constituted a paradigm shift in NATO. While this hypothesis (and its testing) has not been the objective of this collective research project, it might, nonetheless, provide an idea for future research projects.

Bacevich, Andrew J. "Let Europe Be Europe: Why the United States Must Withdraw from Nato." *Foreign Policy* March/April, (2010).


